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Introduction 
The aim of this dissertation is to give a deep and critical review of 
neomediaevalism in international relations (IR) theory in order to develop a toolkit 
for taking a closer look at the European Union. Even though the term 
neomediaevalism was spread by Umberto Eco, an expert of mediaeval philosophy 
and literature, it was primarily lawyers, sociologists or political scientists who later 
utilized this term in international relations theory. Their academic background 
significantly influenced their view of neomediaevalism. As Bruce Holsinger 
highlighted, they placed an emphasis on neo rather than medievalism: „the 
neomedievalists make few claims to the historical veracity of the Middle Ages they 
propose as a model for the current state of affairs.”1 I believe this happened 
primarily because the key authors of neomediaevalism in IR were not experts of 
the Middle Ages. Arnold Wolfers, who first introduced the concept to the discipline 
in 1962, was a lawyer; Hedley Bull who elaborated upon it 19772, was a political 
scientist while Jan Zielonka, who adapted the concept to the European Union3 in 
2006, was also a lawyer. The most recent neomediaevalists in IR are also far from 
being historians devoted to the Middle Ages. Michael Hardt is an engineer and a 
literary historian while both Antonio Negri4 and Saskia Sassen5 are sociologists. 
Jörg Friedrichs, who wrote an overview of European neomediaevalism in IR 
theory, studied Greek and Latin and has a major in Political Science, but he warns 
the readers of his study creating a neomediaeval analytical tool that he does not 
“aim at a deep phenomenological understanding of the Middle Ages” in order to 
avoid “myopic historicism.”6 Therefore, it is no wonder that these authors have 
mostly focused on the mere idea of the Middle Ages instead of the “real thing”.  
                                                          
1
 Holsinger, Bruce [2016]: Neomedievalism and International Relations. in: D’Arcens, Louise (ed.) 
[2016]: The Cambridge Companion to Medievalism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge p. 173 
2
 We will use the following edition: Bull, Hedley [2002]: The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order 
in World Politics. Macmillan, London 
3
 Zielonka, Jan [2006]: Europe as Empire – The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
4
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri co-wrote the following book on a neomedievalist note: Hardt, 
Michael; Negri, Antonio [2000]: Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
5
 Sassen’s notable work in this field: Sassen, Saskia [2008]: Territory, Authority, Rights: From 
Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton University Press, Princeton 
6
 Friedrichs, Jörg [2007]: The Meaning of New Medievalism. in: Friedrichs, Jörg [2007]: European 
Approaches to International Relations Theory – A House with many Mansions. Routledge, London 
and New York pp. 127-145 
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In the first two parts of the current study, I wish to distance my narrative from this 
tendency, look at neomediaevalism in a critical sense, and then analyse some of the 
more recent academic achievements on medieval political philosophy. These 
sections allow me to introduce a constructive criticism of neomediaevalism and a 
toolkit to look at the European Union from a new perspective. The major 
contribution of the present study to neomediaevalism is that it might shed more 
light on the “historical veracity of the Middle Ages”. This does not mean of course 
that the dissertation will clarify all questions, which are relevant from an 
international relations perspective, about the Middle Ages. Instead it is an attempt 
at a critical review of neomediaevalism using the recent works of contemporary 
mediaeval historians with the intention of giving a more credible picture of the 
Middle Ages than the previous views that are often of low definition and are used 
as an excuse for overgeneralized analogies. As Holsinger puts it: “[…] such 
analogies have proliferated in the past few decades. They can be found in academic 
studies of corporate militias, prominent articles in venues such as Foreign Affairs 
and the Naval War College Review, and speeches and working papers at the 
American Enterprise Institute. […] neomedievalism has proliferated within and 
beyond the branch of the IR realism that initially developed it to become a powerful 
and quite persistent analytical model for the state of world political affairs in the 
contemporary era.”7 Talking of a millennium long historical period, it would be 
impossible to set the record straight regarding the totality of the Middle Ages. In 
the First Part of this study I will look at the major claims of the key authors of 
neomedievalism in order to assess the credibility of their view of the Middle Ages 
by identifying the key points of their picture and juxtaposing those to the relevant 
findings of the most influential historians of medieval politics of our times. 
Following that, I will construct a revised model of neomediaevalism, and I will 
analyse the original texts of two high mediaeval political philosophers whose field 
of study seems most relevant for the purposes of this paper. The aim of the Third 
Part of this work is to illustrate how the environment and the very core of being of 
the European Union is post-Westphalian and neomediaeval. From that perspective, 
I will argue that in many regards the discourse on the democratic deficit of the 
European Union is anachronistic. After introducing a neomediaevalist toolkit I will 
                                                          
7
 Holsinger [2016] p. 173 
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make an attempt at the description of the European Union as a pre- or post-state by 
a constructive critical approach to sovereignty and using the concept of mixed 
constitution.  
One of the major hypotheses of this paper is, therefore, that neomediaevalism in IR 
theory projects a flawed image of the mediaeval past to our present and drawing 
more on the primary sources and recent historiography of the Middle Ages might 
give a neomediaeval model with a greater explanatory force of the present 
internatonal system. The second hypothesis is that the European Union could be 
better assessed with a revised terminology of mediaeval political philosophy than 
the Westphalian categories of sovereignty, separation of powers and democracy, 
and in the present study this hypothesis will be tested by using the model of mixed 
constitution (regimen mixtum) discussed herein to replace the barren dispute on the 
EU’s democratic deficit. 
Methodology 
The endeavour outlined above requires a complex methodology since the 
dissertation consists of three parts focusing on the question of neomediaevalism 
from three different angles. Concerning the First Part, an IR outlook is necessary 
since the revision of the neomediaevalist toolkit presupposes an IR literature 
review in constant dialogue with the recent results of Mediaeval Studies. Placing 
the European Union in the revised model will also be attempted. Although 
neomediaevalism appeared in the realist school of IR, a constructivist approach 
will be necessary to expose the IR narrative of the Middle Ages to contemporary 
historiography. Building a revised model of neomediaevalism on a deconstructed 
IR narrative of the Middle Ages brings this dissertation methodologically close to 
the constructivist approach of Cynthia Weber. Her critical introduction to IR 
theory8 identified myths and by understanding how they worked she attempted to 
demonstrate some of the key features of IR traditions (realism, liberalism etc.). A 
major difference between her work and the present study, however, is that they are 
not the IR traditions that are being characterised here by various myths, but it is the 
myth of neomediaevalism overarching IR traditions that is being revised. That 
overarching nature of neomediaevalism requires a certain multimethodology. For 
                                                          
8
 Weber, Cynthia [2010]: International Relations Theory. A critical introduction. Routledge, London 
and New York 
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instance, the revision of neomediaevalism would be centred around the concepts 
of sovereignty, empire and natural law. Regarding sovereignty the subject matter 
of the thesis could also be linked to the postsovereignty debate of constructivism,9 
but beside the argument that sovereignty has been socially constructed, the impact 
of the international system’s transformation on sovereignty will be discussed with 
bigger weight than in that debate. An approach that gains its explanatory force from 
the transformation of the international system would qualify as neorealist in IR 
theory, but that approach cannot be ignored in a dissertation discussing 
neomedaevalism.  
The Second Part is an analysis of mediaeval primary sources and therefore the 
methodology of Mediaeval Studies dominates that part of the research. Introducing 
the recent results of mediaevalists through two high mediaeval texts and their 
interpretations will be helpful in rebutting the tropes of 19th century historiography 
about the Middle Ages inherited also by IR theory. The analysis of the texts will 
particularly focus on those topics, narratives and other intellectual structures that 
were highly characteristic of mediaeval political philosophy and thus would help 
us understand the meaning of some mediaeval concepts also applied by 
contemporary scholars (forms of government, modes of rule, mixed constitution). 
Introducing recent historical debates in itself would be a novelty in a text with an 
IR focus.  
The Third Part of the dissertation provides a critical introduction to a debate about 
the nature of the European Union and in doing so adopts some elements of the 
methodology of Political Science and comparative constitutional studies. In 
opposition to the First Part, the internal setup of the EU will be in focus here which 
will require an understanding of the discourse criticising the EU’s democratic 
deficit. The dysfunction of Westphalian constitutional categories like the 
separation of powers, checks and balances and representative democracy will be 
introduced first at the level of 21st century states to demonstrate how even more ill-
fitting they seem when applied to the EU. Following that political scientists’ 
(Majone and Telò) assessment of the EU as mixed constitution will be revised in 
light of the key findings of the Second Part. Thus a continuous element of the 
                                                          
9
 See e.g.: Weber, Cynthia – Biersteker, Thomas J. [1996]: State Sovereignty as Social Construct. 
Cambridge University Press 
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applied multimethodology would be the exposure of various disciplines (IR theory, 
19th century historiography and Political Science) to the recent results of Mediaeval 
Studies.  
Keeping the section on methodology short and simple, there is only one more 
question to answer. In IR it is often relevant to define the “level of analysis”, i.e. 
whether the research is unit-level (focusing on the level of states) or if it is system-
level (focusing on the international system). From an IR perspective this 
dissertation is mostly concerned with a system-level analysis. Neither the 
international system as a whole nor the European Union have traditionally been 
considered unit-level. However, if we take into account that in the Third Part the 
EU is discussed with methods of Political Science and with a revised version of 
mixed constitution, the basis of which was a model applied for city-states and 
kingdoms in the Middle Ages, the picture is less obvious. Therefore it is simplest 
to say that in terms of IR traditions and levels of analysis a multimethodology is 
applied to test the key hypotheses about the historicity of the IR neomediaeval 
model and the place and nature of the EU in such a model.    
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First Part 
 
The Perception of the Middle Ages in Modernity 
The academic discourse on the rule of law, liberty, sovereignty and democracy in 
Western historiography had a distinguished focus on Antiquity and Early 
Modernity until the middle of the 20th century. Scholars of political science 
considered the mediaeval period irrelevant or downright harmful for the evolution 
of these concepts. This approach is more or less understandable given that the 
concept of democracy, which reappeared as a Sleeping Beauty in the 19th century 
after having been dormant for more than 2000 years. However, the 
underrepresentation of the Middle Ages in general could be labelled as a striking 
mistake of 19th and early 20th century political historiography of Europe. The most 
important source of this viewpoint was 18th century French encyclopaedists. Even 
though the very influential Montesquieu promoted a positive picture of the Middle 
Ages, it was Voltaire who set the tone for future academics when he expressed his 
contempt for the superstitious and dark period. His opinion, which failed to finely 
differentiate between the various centuries of the Middle Ages, was inherited and 
repeated by Condorcet. From the viewpoint of political theory most crucial here, 
Benjamin Constant described the Middle Ages in a similar way in his classic study 
entitled The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns10 originally 
published in 1816.  
Constant highlighted that ancient Greek democracy only meant the freedom to take 
part in decision-making but lacked the protection of the individual from public 
power. He believed that Rousseau’s unrevised reception of the concept was 
problematic since it did not take into account that Roman law provided opportunity 
for the defence of individuals. According to Constant, in the Modern Age when 
peace became the rule and war the exception, the overriding necessity of the 
cohesiveness of states could no longer justify the curbing of individual liberties. 
Constant also relied on the argument of the inaccessibility of direct democracy in 
the modern era: “[W]e can no longer enjoy the liberty of the ancients which 
consisted in an active and constant participation in collective power. Our freedom 
                                                          
10
 Constant, Benjamin [2003]: The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns. in: 
Fontana, Biancamaria (ed. and trans.) [2003]: Constant. Political Writings. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge pp. 308-328. 
11 
 
must consist of peaceful enjoyment and private independence. The share which in 
antiquity everyone held in national sovereignty was by no means an abstract 
presumption as it is in our own day. The will of each individual had real influence: 
the exercise of this will was a vivid and repeated pleasure. Consequently the 
ancients were ready to make many a sacrifice to preserve their political rights and 
their share in the administration of the state. Everybody, feeling with pride all that 
his suffrage was worth, found in his awareness of his personal importance a great 
compensation. [...] [Thus] when the ancients sacrificed that [individual] 
independence to their political rights, sacrificed less to obtain more; while in 
making the same sacrifice, we would give more to obtain less.”11 In order to avoid 
that, Constant recommended the use of laws and protective forms for modern 
democracies which were invented by Romans and were viewed by Constant as 
“tutelary deities of human associations.”12 If we carefully observe the reasoning of 
Constant, it is clear that he used arguments from Antiquity, such as ancient 
Athenian democracy and Roman law, and arguments from the modern era, such as 
the expansion of commercial relations among states to define the difference 
between the liberty of the ancients and the moderns.13 He mentioned some 
provisions of Roman law and the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act, but nothing in between. 
The thousand year-long mediaeval period was entirely left out.  
This approach became even more dominant in the last third of the 19th century, 
which was foreshadowed by Jacob Burckhardt’s work The Civilisation of the 
Renaissance in Italy published in 1860. In his book, Burckhardt depicted 
Renaissance as an artistic era without mediaeval roots and defined it almost as an 
antithesis to the Middle Ages. Whatever he found progressive in the late mediaeval 
period, he classified it as Renaissance and the atavistic leftover was characterized 
as mediaeval. Thus, he presented a fairly arbitrary portrait of the borderlands of the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance.14 At the same time the last third of the 19th century 
                                                          
11
 Constant [2003] pp. 316-317. 
12
 Ibid. p. 61. 
13
 His conclusion: “The aim of the ancients was the sharing of social power among the citizens of the 
same fatherland: this is what they called liberty. The aim of the moderns is the enjoyment of security 
in private pleasures; and they call liberty the guarantees accorded by institutions to these pleasures.” 
Constant [2003] p. 317. 
14
 The original title of Burckhardt’s work: Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien. The first English 
edition: Burckhardt, Jacob [1878]: The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy. George Allen & 
Unwin, London, Macmillan, New York 
12 
 
resulted in an antagonistic view of history that firmly juxtaposed the values of 
Antiquity, Renaissance and Enlightenment with those of the Middle Ages, Baroque 
and Romanticism. Intellectuals of the era were pressured to take sides in the debate. 
If a historian in the “long 19th century” were to accept the values of the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, he or she would typically condemn the 
Middle Ages and the culture of Baroque and Romanticism supporting and 
promoting its universalism. On the other hand, those in favour of mediaeval 
religious uniformity and order, rejected antique paganism. This group of 
Renaissance thinkers were willing to restore those priciples, as well as the restless 
rationalism of enlightened scholars. Despite their opposing views, the scholars of 
the time presented a rather unanimous image of the Middle Ages, the only 
difference being in the normative approach to that image in their works. While 
some regarded this image with much longing and others expressed antipathy 
towards it, the image remained more or less the same. If we compare the image of 
the Middle Ages depicted by Novalis and Thomas Mann, who were distant from 
each other both ideologically and in time, we can find startlingly similar 
characteristics. These authors frame the post-Enlightenment attitude to the Middle 
Ages in time, Novalis being a representative of early Romanticism and Thomas 
Mann being a typical figure of 20th century civic humanism, who wrote the 
majority of his works before the 20th century historiographical revision of the 
Middle Ages.  
Novalis, looking back to the medieval period, saw a unified Europe that could even 
be perceived as a single country. “There was once a beautiful, shining time in which 
Europe was a Christian land, wherein all men were part of that Christian world. 
A great community interest bound together the farthest-flung provinces of this 
spiritual kingdom.”15 It is not easy to identify the exact mediaeval centuries Novalis 
portrayed here, since he tried to grasp the Middle Ages as a whole and considered 
universalism as its most important feature. A European kingdom unified under the 
                                                          
15
 „Es waren schöne glänzende Zeiten, wo Europa ein christliches Land war, wo Eine Christenheit 
diesen menschlich gestalteten Welttheil bewohnte Ein großes gemeinschaftliches Interesse verband 
die entlegensten Provinzen dieses weiten geistlichen Reichs.” Novalis [1826]: Die Christenheit oder 
Europa. in: Tieck/Schlegel (ed.): Novalis. Schriften Berlin Vol. 1 p. 189. Quoted in English by: 
Meltzer, Françoise [2011]: Reviving the Fairy Tree: Tales of European Sanctity. in: Meltzer, 
Françoise; Elsner, Jaś [2011]: Saints: Faith without Borders. The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London p. 56 
13 
 
auspices of a single Christianity supposes an organically intertwined religious and 
political leadership of which Novalis writes with nostalgic sympathy.  
The characterisation of the Middle Ages is akin to that in Thomas Mann’s Doctor 
Faustus where he compares the era to national socialism. “It was an old-new, 
revolutionarily atavistic world, in which values linked to the idea of the individual 
(such as, let us say, truth, freedom, justice, reason) were sapped of every strength 
and cast aside, or, by having been wrenched free of pale theory, had at least taken 
on a very different meaning from that given them over the last centuries and, now 
relativized and red-blooded, were made applicable at the much higher level of 
violence, authority, the dictatorship of belief-not in some reactionary way that 
looked back to yesterday or the day before, but in a way that was tantamount to 
humanity's being transferred, along with all these new ideas, back into the 
theocratic situations and conditions of the Middle Ages. […] Unbiased research 
and free thought, far from representing progress, belonged instead to the boring 
world of those being left behind. Freedom had been given to thought in order to 
justify force, just as seven hundred years ago reason had been free to discuss faith 
and prove dogma; that had been its purpose, and that was the purpose of thought 
today, or would be tomorrow.”16 Similarly to Novalis, Thomas Mann also outlined 
a universal and theocratic image of mediaeval Europe with the difference being 
that his normative bias was negative.  However, the above quote provides a more 
accurate chronological point of reference than Novalis. Thomas Mann described 
the 13th century as a typically theocratic mediaeval period where rational thinking 
was only allowed to justify religious dogma. It is important to note that those 
mediaeval scholars, whose works will be analysed in the Second Part of this 
dissertation, also worked in the late 13th century. However, both in the case of 
Novalis and Thomas Mann, we can see an image of the Middle Ages in which the 
secular and the spiritual aspects of life were entangled making it impossible to look 
at the era as a precondition of Modernity, rather than as its antithesis.  
Even if historians recognised that some traits of the Middle Ages could be 
interpreted as precursors to Modernity before the middle of the 20th century, they 
would typically refrain from linking those to the image of a universal mediaeval 
                                                          
16
 Mann, Thomas [1999]: Doctor Faustus. Vintage Books, New York pp. 387-388 
14 
 
Europe and would rather interpret them as innovations of a single nation (very often 
the one they belonged to). This was how national romanticist and republican 
authors drew some attention to the mediaeval legal system and to the mediaeval 
preconditions of some modern political concepts. William Stubbs, a notable 
Victorian historian from Great Britain went as far as identifying a monarchy 
governed by law in mediaeval England.17 Frederic William Maitland was a founder 
of modern Anglo-Saxon legal history in the 19th century who sought the origins of 
common law in mediaeval times.18 A similar role was played by those German 
academics in continental Europe who were willing to detect the traits of German 
national identity in the Middle Ages. A representative result of that movement has 
been the Monumenta Germaniae Historica series in which the reviewed texts of the 
most important primary sources of Germanic history have been published from 
1819 to this day. Notably, Otto von Gierke of Germany envisaged a specific 
mediaeval Germanic collectivism and parliamentarism in his works.19 Fritz Kern 
led his readers from an imaginary “Germanic right of opposition” to the Magna 
Charta.20 Fritz Kern’s works had a considerable impact on the Carlyle brothers, 
who wrote their frequently cited book at the beginning of the 20th century, but in 
the spirit of 19th century history of political ideas.21 Since the middle of the 20th 
century, historians have drawn a more nuanced picture of the Middle Ages in which 
the concept of political power is barely imaginable using a small number of general 
adjectives or exclusively modern categories. An era lasting for a millennium could 
not be as homogenous as it was previously supposed. As we will see, these results 
have not been incorporated in the form of neomediaevalism that is prevalent in IR 
theory. A partial explanation could be that the notion of a new mediaeval world 
was created by historians in the first half of the 20th century before the 
aforementioned revision of the Middle Ages would have taken place and that 
                                                          
17
 Most popular work by Stubbs: Stubbs, William [1875-1888]: The Constitutional History of 
England, in its Origin and Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
18
 Key works by Maitland: Maitland, Frederic William; Pollock, Frederick [1899]: History of English 
Law before the Time of Edward I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and Maitland, Frederic 
[1897]: Domesday Book and Beyond – Three Essays in the Early History of England, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
19
 Gierke’s magnum opus: Gierke, Otto von [1868-1913]: Das deutsche Genossenschaftrecht, 
Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin 
20
 Kern, Fritz [1914]: Gottesgnadentum und Wiederstandsrecht im früheren Mittelalter, Verlag von 
R. F. Rochler, Leipzig 
21
 Carlyle, Carlyle [1909]: History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, Barnes & Noble, New 
York 
15 
 
structure was inherited by IR scholars who did not make the effort to update their 
scheme. In the following chapters, a critical analysis of neomediaevalism will be 
presented by introducing its evolution from the interwar period and its penetration 
to IR theory, as well as by confronting the IR version with contemporary results of 
Mediaeval Studies.   
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Neomediaevalism 
 
The New Middle Ages as a Cultural Concept 
The first scholar of the 20th century to describe the world as a form of new 
mediaeval times and influenced Western academic thinking was the Russian 
Nikolai Berdyaev, who published The End of Our Times in the first decade of the 
20th century. Even though his thinking was inspired by Vladimir Solovyov’s idea 
of the New Middle Ages, it was Berdyaev whose more elaborated concept gained 
wider international attention. It is important to understand that he still used some 
of the structures of 19th century historiography and saw renaissance as a significant 
watershed rather than a natural consequence of the Middle Ages.22 He described 
renaissance as an era that introduced material and rational thinking together with 
the birth of the rule of law. Naturally, these were the qualities that he seemed to 
miss from the mediaeval period. As a Russian living in France, he contended that 
his country was not touched by renaissance resulting in stronger remainders of 
spirituality there. What can we conclude based on his view of the Middle Ages?  
We might believe that Berdyaev considered the Middle Ages as something similar 
to his contemporary Russia: a world that is equally spiritual and defined by 
caesaropapism as the Russian Empire. Yet why did he think that the world of the 
early 20th century in general could be characterised as new mediaeval times? In 
order to understand that, we should look into The End of Our Times.23 Although 
Berdyaev also criticised 19th century historiography for not presenting a credible 
picture of the Middle Ages, he clearly took the side of the anti-Enlightenment, 
romanticist image of mediaeval times—as opposed to the anti-mediaeval pro-
Enlightenment stance—and in that regard he still followed the path of 19th century 
historiography. Berdyaev’s polarised 19th century outlook is perhaps best 
characterised by the following quote: “For long it was believed that this complex 
and rich period had been a great void in the intellectual history of mankind and of 
                                                          
22
 The first scholar to question the 19th century view of the Renaissance was Johan Huizinga who 
also presented an alternative view of that era by depicting it as a late mediaeval phase of European 
history in his work The Autumn of the Middle Ages published first in 1919. Huizinga, Johan [1996]: 
The Autumn of the Middle Ages. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  It is also worth noting that 
alongside Thomas Mann he was also a representative figure of interwar civic humanism in Europe. 
See his work on Erasmus. Huizinga, Johan [1924] Erasmus and the Age of Reformation. Phaidon 
Publishers, New York 
23
 Berdyaev, Nikolai [1933]: The End of Our Times. Sheed and Ward, London 
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its philosophical thought, when as a matter of fact these centuries had so many 
excellent thinkers and such diversity in the realm of their thought that nothing like 
it can be found at any other epoch.”24 It is no wonder that following this assessment 
of the Middle Ages, Berdyaev somewhat urges the coming of new mediaeval times, 
which would be an organic consequence of the end of modernity brought on by 
capitalism.25 Rather than being a descriptive category of the existing world, 
Berdyaev’s New Middle Ages was a cultural concept that he wished to come to 
life. As Evgueny Lampert notes “An integral conception of life is a Christian 
conception: it was characteristic of the middle ages. And Berdyaev arrives at the 
conclusion that the way to cultural integration lies in a creative re-discovery of the 
middle ages, or, as he calls it, the »New Middle Ages«."26 Thus, it is safe to say 
that Berdyaev outlined a vision of the future rather than an epistemic tool for 
understanding the present. He compared the early 20th century to Late Antiquity 
and not the Middle Ages.27 Therefore, it would be problematic to link his concept 
of the New Middle Ages to IR theory in which neomedievalism is considered to be 
a toolkit for comparing the present to some structural traits of the Middle Ages.28  
A few decades later Jacques Maritain, the famous French Catholic humanist also 
projected the “New Middle Ages” in the future in a similar sense although he 
considered the term to be somewhat misleading. Maritain thought it was better to 
describe this period as a third era following the eight hundred year-long Christian 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages. He viewed Modernity as a corollary period, a time 
of the brightly shining decomposition of the Middle Ages.29 Thus, Maritain 
                                                          
24
 Berdyaev [1933] pp. 101-102 
25
 Ibid. p. 94 „the end of Capitalism is the end of modern history and the beginning of the new middle 
ages.” 
26
 Lampert, Evgueny [1945]: Nicholas Berdyaev and the New Middle Ages. James Clarke & Co., 
London p. 66 
27
 “Our age resembles that of the fall of the Roman empire, the failure and drying-up of Graeco-
Roman culture, forever the head-water of all European culture. Modernist art recalls the loss of the 
old forms of perfection under the barbarian invasions; our social and political activities resemble 
those under the emperor Diocletian, when man was no longer his own master; religious and 
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expressed a view that we are on the verge of the new era that could be labelled as 
the New Middle Ages and he viewed that as a cultural category, an age when 
integral humanism and reloaded spirituality shall reign.  Therefore, it seems clear 
that neither Berdyaev nor Maritain used the term “New Middle Ages” in a sense 
that neomediaevalism implies in IR theory. While their term signified a cultural 
and historical process, it lacked the legal, political and structural dimensions that 
are characteristic of neomediaevalism. Another influential use of the term New 
Middle Ages, which will be covered shortly, also has an overwhelmingly cultural 
connotation, and this usage will pave the way to the concept of neomediaevalism.  
Umberto Eco presented a more comprehensive picture of the new mediaeval world 
than the previous authors in his essay entitled Heading Towards a New Middle 
Ages published in 1972.30 The significant difference between Eco and the earlier 
advocates of the new mediaeval concept is that Eco claimed the present to be 
neomediaeval. It was not a utopia or a dystopia anymore, but rather a descriptive 
category characterising the present.31 Eco’s works were also a milestone in the 
development of the concept, because he was the first scholar to have efficiently 
spread the term ‘neomediaevalism’.32 Although the phrase ‘neo-medievalist’ was 
coined by Isaiah Berlin in a 1952 essay entitled The Hedgehog and the Fox, it was 
Umberto Eco whose work gained scholarly attention and who wrote about the 
concept consistently in multiple studies.33  
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As Otto Gerhard Oexle points out Eco was influenced by other Italian scholars 
when he created his concept of the New Middle Ages. “Eco’s essay was based on 
an analysis by the Italian sociologist Furio Colombo. He also used a book by an 
Italian philosopher Roberto Vacca, Il medioevo prossimo venture (1971) which 
also appeared in English in 1974 as The Coming of Dark Ages. In this book Vacca 
fantasised about the collapse of the current technological culture (just like Alain 
Minc twenty years later). In a short time, he claimed, this breakdown will also lead 
to a dissolution of social and political structures, to a re-feudalisation of the world, 
to a division of power on a local and regional level, to the formation of militias 
and self-organised groups, to the return of epidemics and migrations, and to the 
decline of the cities. Vacca suggested, as a preventive measure, thinking about the 
foundations of new monasteries in order to store and preserve the knowledge of 
the present and until a ‘new Renaissance’ should come and culture can revive.”34 
As we can see, these authors created a dystopian almost science-fiction-like new 
mediaeval vision of the future focusing mostly on cultural issues. Umberto Eco 
presented a more balanced picture using some of their ideas as a source, but he also 
took the vision to the level of politics. Eco identified a number of traits that could 
signal the coming of the New Middle Ages. An important cultural feature of the 
Middle Ages was the omnipresence of Latin language despite the fact that fewer 
and fewer people could speak it properly. The emergence of global English as a 
second language has played a similar role after 1945 according to the study. 
Strengthening migration was an equally important neomediaeval trait in Eco’s 
work even though the early 1970s, when Eco wrote his essay, witnessed a 
significantly smaller scale of migration than the 2010s. The oligopolistic nature of 
capitalism also reminded Umberto Eco of the Middle Ages and its feudal lords and 
oligarchs. The following features highlighted in the essay are even more important 
from the viewpoint of the theories of democracy and international relations.  
Eco believed that through the means of mass communication, political propaganda 
and the tabloid press, the levels of public discourse would be significantly lowered. 
In the Middle Ages, the illiterate masses could be manipulated by the images in 
churches and palaces. That image-based illiterate world would start to re-emerge 
thanks to super-size posters, the radio and the television. We should bear in mind 
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that this assertion had been made by Eco before the process of images reclaiming 
their earlier influential status was reinforced by the triumph of the internet in the 
21st century. That is an important statement, because the quality of public discourse 
is one of the pillars of democratic functioning. Eco also highlighted that the 
privatisation of the monopoly of aggression in the form of private militia and 
transnational terrorism could also be considered a symptom of neomediaeval 
functioning. Not only has 9/11 and the terrorist attacks since then increased the 
relevance of this claim, but there has also been an increase in the strengthening 
presence of private paramilitary forces even in the most democratic countries.35  A 
third claim by Eco emphasised the fact that the role of nation-states started to 
decrease similarly to the Middle Ages. That assertion could be linked to the claims 
by political scientists and IR theorists who believed that by the late 20th century 
states stopped being the exclusive actors of international relations and that the 
Westphalian idea and practice of sovereignty is being eroded by multiple factors.36 
Thus, Umberto Eco shifted neomediaevalism from being a primarily cultural 
concept to becoming a political one too. He was also the first to highlight that 
people’s mediaevalist fantasies about a simpler, more pristine era are fairly distant 
from the realities of the Middle Ages.37 Finally, he was the first scholar to publish 
impactful essays on neomediaevalism while being a mediaevalist at the same time. 
As we have seen, Umberto Eco introduced a ‘political leg’ to the concept of 
neomediaevalism. Next, I will provide a short overview of those scholars who 
examine the original ‘cultural leg’ of the concept and subsequently introduce the 
literature on political neomediaevalism and its relevance to IR theory.  
In order to understand cultural neomediaevalism, a continued assessment of Eco’s 
studies is necessary. His works are not only important because he was a scholar of 
mediaeval philosophy, but also because he tried to shed some light on the 
enthusiasm surrounding the Middle Ages in popular culture. He endlessly cited 
titles of paperbacks on the shelves of book stores, which refer to the Middle Ages.38 
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He also mentioned that scholarly works by historians of the French Annales 
School39 were competing with Agatha Christie’s crime stories in popularity, and 
later he also proved his own skills by writing a successful mediaeval crime story, 
The Name of the Rose. Thirty years before Donald Trump was elected President of 
the United States, Eco deemed it important to mention that Trump Tower in 
Manhattan was a typical example of postmodern neomediaeval architecture.40 Eco 
also reminded his readers that cultural neomediaevalism was as old as modernity 
and has never stopped existing: “Cervantes told the story of a man unable to 
reconcile the intrusion of reality with his love for medieval literature.” From 
Shakespeare through 19th century German romanticist architecture and Disney 
castles to Tolkien, he cited numerous examples to prove his statement and would 
have surely listed the Game of Thrones and Anna Biller’s film The Love Witch, had 
he written the study today. However, most ‘cultural neomediaevalists’ have not 
possessed as comprehensive of a picture of the Middle Ages and as critical of an 
approach to neomediaevalism as Eco. Alain Minc who wrote his bestseller Le 
nouveau moyen âge in 1993 envisaged a new mediaeval world of horror where 
anarchy and disorder are the rule.41 Robert D. Kaplan published an article one year 
later in The Atlantic, entitled “The Coming Anarchy”42 in which he presented a 
prognosis of new Dark Ages where constant fights between barbarism and 
civilisation would be the everyday experience.  
Based on these two influential works and the preceding authors, I will present the 
main features of the ‘cultural leg’ of neomediaevalism. The keywords of 
neomediaevalism in the second half of the 20th century were anarchy, disorder, 
barbarism, decay and feudal wars. Eco and the preceding Italian authors also 
speculated that knowledge would have to retreat to institutions similar to mediaeval 
monasteries. Cultural degradation was also a recurring characteristic of Minc’s and 
Kaplan’s neomediaeval scenario. In opposition of this view, the promoters of the 
New Middle Ages in the first half of the 20th century, like Berdyaev and Maritain, 
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would have used the keywords of spiritual renaissance, Christian integrity or 
integral humanism. These early 20th century authors expected a positive outcome 
of the New Middle Ages. A superficial comparison of early and late 20th century 
cultural neomediaevalisms would imply that they have nothing in common. 
However, a more comprehensive scrutiny would easily convince one of the 
contrary. In order to take a closer look, we should ask a very pragmatic question: 
Which centuries or approximately which period of the thousand year-long Middle 
Ages were these authors writing about? As it turns out both the early and late 20th 
century neomediaevalists used the first 4-5 centuries of the Middle Ages as a basis 
for their model and only their normative bias was different. As we have seen, 
Berdyaev made it clear that he found his present more similar to Late Antiquity 
than anything else. Maritain also believed the New Middle Ages would be 
something like a watershed, sweeping away our world to give way to Christian 
integral humanism. That scenario also sounds akin to the demise of Antiquity and 
the advent of the Early Middle Ages. The apocalyptic visions of Furio Colombo, 
Vacca, Eco, Minc and Kaplan—containing migration, illiteracy, privatisation of 
aggression, wars between barbarism and civilisation and elusive borders of 
states—echoed the feudal chaos of the early mediaeval period. Eco has made it 
explicit that his neomediaeval conceptual framework was modelled after 5th to 8th 
century Europe.43 An important element of his model was the erosion of Pax 
Americana in a similar fashion to the erosion of Pax Romana in the Early Middle 
Ages. Thus, either as a wishful image of the spiritual revival of Christianity or as 
an apocalyptic vision of decay, ‘cultural neomediaevalism’ tends to reach back to 
the early mediaeval period for inspiration. In that regard, it is fundamentally 
different from the neomediaevalism in IR theory.   
Neomediaevalism in IR theory 
Every student of IR theory knows that the presence of Antiquity and Modernity is 
overwhelming in the field of international relations. An analysis of the Melian 
Dialogue, Athenian Democracy, Bodin’s and Hobbes’ theories of sovereignty or 
the Peace of Westphalia are much more likely to turn up in textbooks processing 
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the history of the discipline than mediaeval topics. However, when the Middle 
Ages do appear, either on their own right or as an analogy to describe the present, 
the triangle of the kings, the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor are most likely 
featured.44 It means that contrary to ‘cultural neomediaevalism,’ IR theory is more 
prone to focus on the High Middle Ages, which is the period from the 11th to the 
15th century, rather than the early mediaeval times.45 There are, of course, some 
outliers who provide their readers with a mash-up of the complete thousand year-
long era, but that is far from typical.46 However, there is a schizophrenic tendency 
among IR scholars, even when focusing on the High Middle Ages, that splits their 
concept of the Middle Ages into two. On the one hand, the Middle Ages are viewed 
as dangerously chaotic compared to the Westphalian system, yet at the same time 
scholars are also desperately trying to find order, in a Westphalian sense, during 
this period. On the following pages I will present some examples of this tendency 
and attempt to explain the causes of this contradictory attitude. 
Scholars in IR theory started to use the Middle Ages as an analogy for the present 
during the Cold War, but its relevance has increased in the post-bipolar world. The 
first hint in the discipline that contemporary international relations could be 
compared to the mediaeval period appeared in one of the works by the influential 
scholar Arnold Wolfers in 1962. Wolfers wrote: “There is no medieval theory on 
the subject of international relations properly speaking, because under what has 
been called the theory of universal community, political activity within European 
Christendom was not conceived in terms of a dichotomy between domestic and 
foreign policy; theoretically, relations between pope and emperor and between 
feudal kings were expected to follow the same rules and moral principles as those 
between kings and subordinate feudal lords, or between kings and their subjects. 
                                                          
44
 See for instance this quote from a 1959 classic by John Herz: “Modern sovereignty arose out of 
the triangular struggle among emperors and popes, popes and kings, and kings and emperors. […] 
The large-area state came finally to occupy the place that the castle or fortified town had previously 
held as a unit of impenetrability.” Herz, John [1959]: International Politics in an Atomic Age. 
Columbia University Press, New York pp. 44-45 
45
 Jörg Friedrichs, who drew the one of the most consistent models of neomediaevalism in IR theory, 
explicitly based his model on the period between the 11th and 13th century. Friedrichs [2007] p. 133 
46
 An example of such approach: “the corporate masters of the universe […] are driving us right 
back to a future that looks like nothing more than a new Middle Ages, that centuries-long period of 
amorphous conflict from the fifth to the fifteenth century when city-states mattered as much as 
countries.” Describing a millennium as a period of amorphous conflict is rather audacious a step to 
homogenise the Middle Ages.  Khanna, Parag [2009]: Neomedievalism: The World is Fragmenting. 
Badly. Gird Yourself for Another Dark Age. in: Foreign Policy No. 172 p. 91 
24 
 
[…] All of this means, then, that political theorists writing in periods of multiple 
sovereignty are of major if not exclusive interest to the study of international 
relations; and among them preference will go necessarily to those who since the 
age of Machiavelli and More were dealing with the behavior of political units 
similar in most respects to the nations states of our own day. This of course does 
not preclude the possibility that at some future time speculations and observations 
of medieval thinkers like Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, or Dante will become 
relevant again in matters of world politics. Even today it is not fantastic to speak 
of recent changes within the international arena as pointing toward a kind of ‘new 
medievalism’. The trend would seem to be toward complexities that blur the 
dividing lines between domestic and foreign policy. We are faced once again with 
double loyalties and overlapping realms of power.”47  
Taking into account the historical context when Wolfers wrote this study, it is 
hardly surprising that he decided to dismiss the idea that the contemporary world 
could be described by a mediaeval toolkit. It is also understandable since Wolfers 
was a prominent figure of IR theory realism. If there was one important cornerstone 
of realism at the time, it was the concept that sovereign states were the almost 
exclusive actors of the international system.48 As Jörg Friedrichs highlighted, from 
a realist standpoint, it would have been a contradiction in terms to assume an 
international system in the Middle Ages without such entities.49  However, it’s 
worth noting that apart from being the first IR scholar to address this issue, Wolfers 
also proposed studying the works of mediaeval political philosophy by Saint 
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas or Dante if moving towards a neomediaeval world 
order were to be more successfully verified in the future. It’s worth bearing in mind 
that despite the proliferation of neomediaevalist IR literature, an IR-focused 
analysis of mediaeval political texts is yet to be written. One of the incentives to 
use mediaeval sources extensively in the present dissertation came from Wolfers’ 
study quoted above.  
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Hedley Bull and the Traits of a Neomediaeval International System 
One and a half decades had to pass after Wolfers’ work for a further contribution 
to neomediaevalism in IR theory. Again this contribution came from the realist 
school by Hedley Bull who also dismissed the possibility to identify the 1970s as 
neomediaeval, but who discussed the concept of neomediaevalism in more detail 
and in a more systematic way than Wolfers. It is important to pay particular 
attention to Bull’s Anarchical Society because, apart from being a seminal work 
for the English School of international relations, it was also the text that defined 
neomediaevalism. Bull’s definition is used by contemporary IR theorists with 
minor modifications. In the following paragraphs, I am to develop a thorough 
understanding of Bull’s definition and also his picture of the Middle Ages, which 
is often neglected by those who focus on Bull’s claims about neomediaevalism. In 
the Anarchical Society, Bull arrived at elaborating neomediaevalism as a potential 
alternative path to world order. After having listed four alternative forms of states 
system,50 Bull went on to include “new mediaevalism” as a potential scenario of 
the decline of the states system along with the scenarios of a states “system but not 
a society”, “states but not a system” and “world government”.51  
The following section from Bull’s work, in which he outlined what he meant by 
‘new mediaevalism’, is the part most often cited by neomediaevalists.   “It is also 
conceivable that sovereign states might disappear and be replaced not by a world 
government but by a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal 
political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. In 
that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a 
given territory and a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share 
authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope and (in Germany and Italy) the 
Holy Roman Emperor above. The universal political order of Western 
Christendom represents an alternative to the system of states which does not yet 
embody universal government. All authority in mediaeval Christendom was 
thought to derive ultimately from God and the political system was basically 
Theocratic. It might therefore seem fanciful to contemplate a return to the 
mediaeval model, but it is not fanciful to imagine that there might develop a modern 
                                                          
50
 These are: a disarmed world, the solidarity of states, a world of many nuclear powers, ideological 
homogeneity. See Bull [2002] pp. 226-240. 
51
 Ibid. p. 225-247 
26 
 
and secular counterpart of it that embodies its central characteristic: a system of 
overlapping authority and multiple loyalty.”52 If we compare this section with the 
previous quote from Wolfers, there are two important conclusions to be made about 
the early form of neomediaevalism in IR theory. Firstly, the key concept of 
sovereignty was lacking when theorists tried to grasp the Middle Ages. It is less 
explicit in Wolfers’ study, but he also argued that periods of multiple sovereignty 
are more relevant for IR scholars than the Middle Ages. This implies that he viewed 
the Middle Ages as an era in which there were either one or two sovereigns, or 
none at all. Bull was more explicit and stated that in the Middle Ages there were 
no sovereign rulers or states because their power or authority was limited from 
above and from below as well. Secondly, both authors conclude that all this 
resulted in a system where authority did not belong exclusively to structurally 
homogeneous actors and therefore loyalty was also shared among heterogeneous 
actors. It seems likely that Bull’s expression of “a system of overlapping authority 
and multiple loyalty” is a rephrased version of Wolfers’ “double loyalties and 
overlapping realms of power”, despite that Bull did not refer to Wolfers on the 
pages where he provided the definition. Friedrichs later attributed the formulation 
of this concept to 19th century historian Otto von Gierke.53   
Following the definition, Bull went on to understand why it is possible to argue 
that the present could be labelled as neomediaeval. In Bull’s understanding there 
were five symptoms of a potential new mediaeval international system: regional 
integration of states, the disintegration of states, the restoration of private 
international violence, transnational organisations and the technological 
unification of the world. Although he dismissed the possibility of a neomediaeval 
world order, it is easy to argue that Bull’s assumptions would have been less well-
grounded in the 1970s based on other and more recent scholars of IR theory, but 
since that time, Bull’s words have proven to be prophetic in many regards.  
For the purposes of the present study, the first claim about the regional integration 
of states has the most relevance. According to Bull, a prime example of this could 
be the European integration, which he described 40 years ago at a time that was 
fundamentally different from today. The United Kingdom had just joined the 
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E.E.C. at the time, and now it is planning to leave the EU—to illustrate one of the 
most spectacular differences. Bull tried to speculate about the future of the 
integration in 1977 and he came up with the following. “If we are looking for 
evidence that European integration is bringing a qualitative change in the states 
system, it is more profitable to look not to the imagined end-product of this process, 
a European super-state which is simply a nation-state writ large, but at the process 
in an intermediate stage. It is possible that the process of integration might arrive 
at the stage where, while one could not speak of a European state, there was real 
doubt both in theory and in reality as to whether sovereignty lay with the national 
governments or with the organs of the 'community'. A crucial test might be the 
question whether national governments within the 'community' had the right, and, 
in terms of the force and the human loyalties at their command, the capacity, to 
secede. From a situation of protracted uncertainty about the locus of sovereignty, 
it might be a small step to the situation of a 'new mediaevalism', in which the 
concept of sovereignty is recognised to be irrelevant.”54 It is clear today that Bull’s 
words had some intuitive discernment in them. In some fields in the European 
Union—such as agriculture, monetary policy, competition law—the community 
clearly has sovereignty, while in other areas, it is the Member States. There is 
definitely uncertainty in terms of the ‘locus’ of sovereignty. However, in the 
current phase of European integration, sovereignty seems far from becoming 
irrelevant. The crucial test of secession, mentioned by Bull, is just being taken by 
the United Kingdom after 2016’s referendum on leaving the European Union. 
Those East-Central European states that have regained their sovereignty a few 
decades ago tend to refuse a further transfer of sovereignty to the community, as 
illustrated by the political course chosen by the Hungarian and Polish governments. 
Therefore, we can conclude that, in relation to the first criteria, the future justified 
Bull’s speculations.  
Under the second criterion of disintegration of states, Bull essentially described 
what we call today territorial separatism. Bull even asked his readers to imagine 
that Wales secedes from Great Britain or that Croatia becomes an independent state 
instead of being a part of Yugoslavia.55 In light of the break-up of Yugoslavia and 
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the recent referendum on Scottish independence, Bull’s hypothetical scenario again 
seems to have been partially proven right in the course of the last forty years. I use 
the word partially because this tendency was not as widespread as Bull described, 
and it has not been the major factor that led to diminishing the relevance of 
sovereignty, as Bull expected.  
The third symptom of the ‘neomediaevalisation’ of the world that Bull identified 
was the restoration of private international violence. This is a concept closely 
related to what Eco described as the ‘vietnamisation of territory’ and what was 
referred to as the privatisation of the monopoly of aggression in the summary of 
Eco’s neomediaeval concept.56  Bull explained the role of the UN in the Korean 
War and the Congo crisis as instances of limiting the states’ monopoly of 
aggression from above and to the Palestinian guerrillas and Latin-American 
revolutionary forces as elements that have challenged the states’s exclusive right 
to legitimate violence from below. However, Bull also reminded his readers that 
such use of private international violence has its precedents in modern history. His 
examples were the Peruvian insurgents’ seizure of the vessel named Huáscar in 
1877 and “the kidnapping of two American citizens in Tangier in 1904 by the 
Moroccan brigand El Raisuli”.57 Based on these instances, Bull concluded that the 
limitation of the states’ monopoly of violence has always been questioned; 
therefore, the 20th century relevance of such tendencies should not be overstated.58 
However, taking into account the significant difference between an international 
organisation encompassing all states on the planet acting in cases of war and crises 
and insurgents seizing a vessel or the kidnapping of two American citizens, we 
might detect a certain asymmetry of relevance in Bull’s reasoning. Moreover, had 
Bull seen the late 20th to early 21st century resurgence of international terrorism 
and the spread of outsourcing the monopoly of aggression to private companies in 
some of the most democratic countries, he might have made some changes to this 
part of his argumentation.  
The fourth neomediaeval trait according to Bull were transnational organisations. 
He interpreted transnational organisations in a wide sense which included 
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multinational corporations, political movements, NGOs, religious associations like 
the Roman Catholic Church and inter-governmental agencies such as the World 
Bank. From among these, Bull highlighted, mostly the role of multinational 
corporations, which he thought were harmful for the sovereignty of states. 
However, he relativized this claim by adding that the interaction of multinational 
corporations and states is not necessarily a zero sum game as states might open up 
to multinational corporations because they believe they would profit from so doing. 
Apart from the fact that more recent economic history claims that opening up is 
unavoidable and multinational corporations would not assure economic 
convergence in the world, it is also worth noting that the share of such companies 
in the world economy has risen to an unprecedented level since Bull’s book was 
published. Thus, most of his arguments against this feature of neomediaevalism 
have weakened over time.  
The fifth symptom by Bull was the technological unification of the world. Perhaps 
it is least obvious how technological unification would lead to a neomediaeval 
world order, but Bull argues this feature facilitated in many cases the previous ones. 
Technological unification made possible the regional and global integration of 
states which were the most notable harbingers of the idea of neomediaevalism. Bull 
made it clear that he viewed these symptoms as irregularities and anomalies, which 
nevertheless pose a challenge to the realist approach to international relations. 
Despite that he came to the following conclusion.  “A time may come when the 
anomalies and irregularities are so glaring that an alternative theory, better able 
to take account of these realities, will come to dominate the field. If some of the 
trends towards a 'new mediaevalism' that have been reviewed here were to go much 
further, such a situation might come about, but it would be going beyond the 
evidence to conclude that 'groups other than the state' have made such inroads on 
the sovereignty of states that the states system is now giving way to this 
alternative.”59 The forty years that have passed since the first publication of Bull’s 
work have justified most of his claims, in particular the years following the end of 
the Cold War gave rise to discourse on neomediaevalism.  
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The sections from Bull’s work introduced above have served as a foundation for 
neomediaevalism in IR theory. However, this was not the only part in The 
Anarchical Society where he speculated about the Middle Ages and the return of 
some mediaeval patterns in international relations. At the beginning of his work, 
there are some parts that are just as relevant from our perspective as the ones 
generally discussed despite their often being neglected since they are not strictly 
attached to the section on neomediaevalism. Bull starts his overview of world order 
by defining what order generally means in a society and then in world politics. 
While defining the concept, he shares some rather original historical observations 
with his readers. One of his key observations could even be considered a sixth 
symptom of neomediaevalism in contemporary international relations. Bull tried 
to find the key differences between what he called the Christian and the European 
international society. The former described the international world order of the 
fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while the latter that of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Bull identified the survival of some mediaeval traits in 
the Christian international society, such as universalist and solidarist assumptions 
and the natural law.60  
Natural law was perhaps most important among them, since the prominent early 
internationalists like Victoria, Suarez, Gentili, Grotius and Pufendorf were all 
natural law-thinkers. According to Bull, they understood that the mediaeval 
positive ‘law of nations’ that they had inherited was mostly out of touch with the 
early modern international reality and, therefore, decided to use the more flexible 
instrument of the natural law in order to fix the discrepancies of positive law.61 
Despite creating an overly Eurocentric international society where only “civilised” 
European countries were treated as equal partners, the colonial dominance was still 
tamed by the natural law tradition in the Christian international society. “[…] the 
exclusiveness of the idea of Christian international society had been mitigated by 
the influence of the doctrine of natural law, which proclaimed the common rights 
and duties of men everywhere. In the era of European international society the 
decline of natural law thinking withdrew this mitigating influence. By the 
nineteenth century the orthodox doctrine of the positivist international lawyers was 
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that international society was a European association, to which non-European 
states could be admitted only if and when they met a standard of civilisation laid 
down by the Europeans”.62 However, the twentieth century brought back natural 
law to the international society in the form of human rights and under the auspices 
of international organisations, such as the League of Nations and the United 
Nations. Even universalist and solidarist assumptions have reappeared “in the way 
rules of coexistence are formulated.”63 By saying that, Bull argued that an 
important mediaeval organizing principle of societies – the natural law tradition – 
had been applied by early internationalists and disappeared later during the 
conquest of positivist international law only to reappear in the form of 20th century 
human rights regime. Although Bull later does not list the natural law tradition as 
a symptom of neomediaevalism, it clearly is one such symptom. In fact, it is the 
only one that had already played a rather innovative role at the beginning of 
modernity and would later be applied again by the human rights movement.  
The way Bull portrays natural law is characteristic of how IR theorists tend to play 
down the relevance of the Middle Ages. Bull explicitly mentioned that natural law 
was supplemented in the works of Grotius by the Roman concept of ius gentium 
and existing treaty law based on mediaeval mercantile and maritime law; however, 
he failed to introduce natural law itself as a major mediaeval contribution by 
Thomas Aquinas. He rather juxtaposed it to mediaeval positive law as something 
that was used more innovatively by Grotius and other early internationalists, and 
he never used it in a mediaeval context in The Anarchical Society. While 
universalist and solidarist assumptions and mercantile law could be linked to the 
Middle Ages, natural law was depicted as something more progressive and, 
therefore, non-mediaeval. All this clearly resembles 19th century historiography as 
introduced above. Bull even distanced natural law theorists from the mediaeval-
sounding dichotomy of “Papal and Imperialist writers” by quoting from Otto von 
Gierke’s Natural Law and the Theory of Society. Gierke was the only mediaeval 
historian whose work Bull relied on, but this book was written in 1883 almost a 
century before The Anarchical Society was published. The fact that he could have 
used Joseph Strayer’s relevant and more up-to-date On the Mediaeval Origins of 
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Modern State from 1970, signals how IR tends to lose contact with recent 
developments of historiography. 
Another key concept which Bull uses in the introductory part of The Anarchical 
Society is sovereignty or, in the case of the Middle Ages, the lack thereof. In IR 
theory it is generally contended that the idea and practice of sovereignty are modern 
phenomena.64 Both the concept of external and internal sovereignty are linked to 
Jean Bodin, Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, i.e. to early modern scholars. A 
typical sentence by Bull highlights how he associates sovereignty exclusively with 
modernity. “The kingdoms and principalities of Western Christendom in the 
Middle Ages were not states: they did not possess internal sovereignty because they 
were not supreme over authorities within their territory and population; and at the 
same time they did not possess external sovereignty since they were not 
independent of the Pope or, in some cases, the Holy Roman Emperor.”65 As we 
can see, Bull did not simply question the sovereignty of mediaeval kingdoms, but 
downright denied their statehood. By doing that, he disregarded the influential 
modernisation theory of the 1960s and 70s that included Joseph Strayer’s work 
mentioned above, Talcott Parsons’ The System of Modern Societies (1971) and 
Cyril E. Black’s The Dynamics of Modernisation: A Study in Comparative History 
(1966). Parsons argued that modernisation was inspired by mediaeval statecraft66 
while Black downright claimed that the idea of modernisation and progress were 
themselves a part of the European mediaeval heritage and more particularly the 
heritage of mediaeval Christianity.67 Despite that, Bull’s approach would remain 
strong in the discipline, even among those IR scholars who have generally been 
viewed as authoritative in the field of sovereignty studies. Stephen D. Krasner, one 
of the key authors of the theory of sovereignty in IR, also seems to take it for 
granted that the notion of sovereignty was first created by modern scholars. “When 
philosophers Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes first elaborated the notion of 
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sovereignty in the 16th and 17th centuries, they were concerned with establishing 
the legitimacy of a single hierarchy of domestic authority.”68  
As opposed to this view, contemporary historiography tells us something different. 
Joseph Canning published A History of Medieval Political Thought69 in 1996, and 
in it, he elaborated on the mediaeval roots of the concept of sovereignty. In his 
assessment, the Middle Ages significantly contributed to the shaping of this 
concept, and it also gave a political tool to the monarchs to put this concept into 
practice. Saint Bernard of Clairvaux wrote first about the plenitudo potestatis 
regarding the monarchical power of the Papacy. This meant that the Pope had full 
power even in secular terms. The concept was officially embraced by the Papacy 
under Innocent III when his lawyer Hostiensis defined it in academic terms, but 
13th century monarchs were already using it to justify their own rule. Thus, while 
it was a concept delivered by the Papacy, it gained a wider secular usage in the 
High Middle Ages. It seems that the differentiation between external and internal 
sovereignty was also a mediaeval development. It were the glossators (mediaeval 
Roman lawyers) who defined the predecessors of these concepts. The internal 
sovereignty of royal rule was strengthened by the formula introduced in the works 
of Alanus Anglicus in the 12th century which stated that “each king is an emperor 
in his kingdom” (“rex in regno suo est imperator regni sui”). That means the king 
does not acknowledge a higher authority within the territory of his kingdom.  
With regards to external sovereignty it is important to mention the 1202 decree 
entitled De venerabilem issued by Pope Innocent III. The decree underlined that 
the French king does not recognise any higher authority than himself in secular 
matters. This idea was later generalised in a formula emphasising that kings did 
not recognise superior authorities (rex qui superiorem non recogniscit). The 
essence of these formulae was that kings did not recognise higher authorities either 
within the territory of their kingdoms or outside of that and by that mediaeval 
political theory created a precursor of the concept of sovereignty. It is true that the 
concept and practice were relatively far from each other, but it is worth noting that 
the multi-layered system of authorities of the Middle Ages could serve as an 
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incentive for defining the concept. The Papacy encouraged the sovereignty of the 
French king in secular terms to undermine a potential expansion of the imperial 
authority and that precedent proved to be catchy later on. Thus, the Papacy, as one 
of the two authorities limiting the authority of mediaeval kings from above, created 
the notion of sovereignty to challenge the other (the Emperor). This notion also 
helped the kings in early modern absolutism to fight the elements limiting their 
sovereignty from below (l’état c’est moi). Even though those modern thinkers who 
are often cited as the creators of the concept significantly contributed to its 
elaboration by playing down its personal character and adding more abstraction, 
they were definitely not pioneering the idea of sovereignty.70 Bearing in mind the 
mediaeval heritage, it is less surprising that the early modern philosophers of 
sovereignty were still linking the concept to the person of the ruler as Bull and 
Krasner duly noted.  
Bull argues that “[i]n the writings of Victoria and Suarez, and even of Grotius, the 
political units which are bound by the law of nations are referred to not only by 
the term civitates but also by such terms as principes, regni, gentes, respublicae. 
The doctrine of natural law, on which all the internationalists of this period rested 
their conception of the rules binding princes and the communities over which they 
ruled, treated individual men, rather than the groupings of them as states, as the 
ultimate bearers of rights and duties.”71 Bull implicitly says in the quote that early 
modern political philosophers considered individuals to be the exclusive actors of 
international relations and the exclusive subjects of international law. What Bull 
did not emphasise was that it was individuals whom these authors treated as 
sovereign actors in line with a mediaeval political thought, which was less inclined 
to grasp abstract ideas.  
Krasner went somewhat further when he wrote: “Although Bodin and Hobbes 
accepted the existence of divine and natural law, they both (especially Hobbes) 
believed the word of the sovereign was law. Subjects had no right to revolt. Bodin 
and Hobbes realized that imbuing the sovereign with such overweening power 
invited tyranny, but they were predominately concerned with maintaining domestic 
order, without which they believed there could be no justice. Both were writing in 
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a world riven by sectarian strife. Bodin was almost killed in religious riots in 
France in 1572. Hobbes published his seminal work, Leviathan, only a few years 
after parliament (composed of Britain's emerging wealthy middle class) had 
executed Charles I in a civil war that had sought to wrest state control from the 
monarchy.”72 It is highly likely that apart from these personal circumstances the 
mediaeval theoretical structures they were bequeathed and which linked the 
concept of sovereignty to the rulers themselves also significantly influenced their 
views. In other words, if we contend with Stephen D. Krasner that sovereignty is 
nothing more but ‘organized hypocrisy’,73 that hypocrisy started a few centuries 
earlier than we have been told by political scientists. As we could see, even though 
contemporary historians of the Middle Ages have revised their view on the history 
of the idea of sovereignty, their results have not been incorporated in the discipline 
of IR theory either by Bull or by Krasner. They also seemed to ignore Wolfers’s 
suggestion to examine the works of mediaeval authors.  
The Low Tide of Neomediaevalism in the 1980s and Its Resurgence in the 
1990s 
If we go on to examine the works of the major authors of neomediaevalism in IR 
theory, the most striking feature is how the discourse almost disappeared from the 
discipline in the 1980s.74 While cultural neomediaevalism was flourishing in 
Europe, perhaps it was the reinforced Cold War antagonism that hindered the 
effective spread of the concept in political science and IR theory. The Strategic 
Defense Initiative and the general deterioration of the relations between the 
superpowers must have convinced the scholars that a diffuse neomediaeval world 
order was out of the question. However, in the 1990s neomediaevalism went 
through a certain renaissance in IR theory. It seems that the collapse of Yugoslavia 
triggered this new wave of neomediaevalism. Around the very beginning of the 
war, Italian authors published the book Jugoslavia, il nuovo Medioevo: la guerra 
infinita e tutti i suoi perché, in which they compared the contemporary events to 
the Middle Ages using a rather superficial analogy. They clearly reached back to 
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the image of the anarchical Middle Ages as pictured by cultural neomediaevalism 
to portray Yugoslavia as a mediaeval bundle of chaos that was abandoned by the 
international community.75 Even though one of the authors, Marco Ventura, was a 
social scientist, the structure of the text heavily relied on the journalistic style of 
Gigi Riva, a war correspondent in Yugoslavia at the time. Throughout the 1990s, 
more academic works elaborating on neomediaevalism were published, but in a 
typically restricted fashion, meaning that the extent of pages devoted to the topic 
were heavily limited.76 Therefore, these authors could not give a comprehensive 
picture of neomediaevalism or a revision of Bull’s ideas.  
The first author to observe neomediaevalism in a more extenseive, systemic 
manner was Philip G. Cerny who published a paper in 1998 entitled 
Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma: Globalisation as 
Durable Disorder. Atypically for an IR scholar, Cerny discussed the contemporary 
international system as one that is similar to the mediaeval chaos and anarchy and 
in that regard, similarly to Riva and Ventura, he tried to reach back to the Early 
Middle Ages as a model.77 Nicholas J. Rengger used Bull’s text on 
neomediaevalism and compared it to Jean Marie Guehenno’s The End of the Nation 
State (1995) in his study written in 2000. He argued that contrary to Bull’s system 
of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, Guehenno saw the demise of the 
nation state as the harbinger of a disorderly mediaeval imperial era. These 
adjectives seem somewhat exclusive of each other, but Guehenno insisted that the 
coming new polity might merge the qualities of the Roman Empire and the Middle 
Ages. In fact, he compared the present to the late Roman Republican period and 
the future to the Roman Imperial era. As opposed to that, Rengger interpreted 
Guehenno’s disorderly mediaeval empire as a reincarnation of the Holy Roman 
Empire and juxtaposed it to Bull’s fragmentation of power and multiple loyalties 
to conclude that the new Middle Ages would hopefully bring more opportunities 
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and less disasters for Europe than “its calamitous predecessor.”78 Rengger has not 
created his own neomediaeval analytical model, but rather applied two different 
models to describe the European Union. When it came to an image of the “original” 
Middle Ages as a basis of his analogy, Rengger’s account remained equally blurred 
as the works of the preceding theorists. Robert Gilpin also shortly summarised and 
explained the key statements of IR neomediaevalism in his Global Political 
Economy.79  
Among the works focusing on a specifically European assessment of the 
neomediaeval concept were Cardini’s and Lerner’s Martiri e assassini: Il nostro 
medioevo contemporaneo and Hoenicke Moore’s study on “Euro-Medievalism”.80 
Even though the latter, based on its title, might sound relevant for the present 
dissertation, it mostly focused on those cultural aspects of the lengthy mediaeval 
era that could be inspiring for the process of European integration. For instance, it 
paid tribute to the Christian contribution to mediaeval European unity through a 
review of the works published for the 1500th anniversary of King Clovis’ baptism 
in 1996.81  
Jörg Friedrichs and Neomediaevalism as an Analytical Tool 
Jörg Friedrichs has been the first scholar who came up with his own model of 
neomediaevalism in a similar vein to Bull, but he has done research in this field in 
a more consistent and regular way. He is among the few IR scholars who have 
published on neomediaevalism extensively which explains why we should pay 
special tribute to his works. Friedrichs also heavily relied on Bull’s definition of 
neomediaevalism, but he also revisited the definition with a critical approach and 
arrived at innovative conclusions. Friedrichs published three major studies on 
neomediaevalism in the 2000s. The first one from 2001 was entitled The Meaning 
of the New Middle Ages and was aiming at a conceptual clarification. In 2003, he 
published What’s New about the New Middle Ages? and a year later Friedrichs 
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discussed neomediaevalism in light of global governance and international law.82 
In the same year, 2004, he also wrote a book on IR theory with a European focus: 
European Approaches to International Relations Theory—A House with Many 
Mansions. The last chapter of the book was an updated version of The Meaning of 
the New Middle Ages. Even though the key elements of his revised image of 
neomediaevalism appeared in the first two papers, it was his third paper that 
featured his new ideas in their most mature form; therefore, the primarily focus of 
this work will rest there.83  
Friedrichs started his study by quoting the same paragraph from Arnold Wolfers, 
the forefather of neomediaevalism, which was quoted here. However, he excluded 
the following part of the paragraph: “at some future time speculations and 
observations of medieval thinkers like Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, or Dante 
will become relevant again in matters of world politics.”84 By that he wished to 
distance his approach from mediaeval studies and the reality of the Middle Ages 
and decided to focus simply on mediaevalism, that is the idea of the Middle Ages. 
Friedrichs openly admitted that when he wrote: “The heuristic claim is that it will 
be much easier to understand the dynamics of the post-international world when 
turning to the dynamics of the pre-international world. The good news about such 
a detour ‘back to the future’ is that it will help us avoid the Scylla of lofty 
postmodernism; the bad news, however, is that it may bring us close to the 
Charybdis of myopic historicism. In order to prevent the latter, I deliberately 
choose a creative use of the medieval world. With due apologies to the 
connoisseurs of medieval history, I do not aim at a deep phenomenological 
understanding of the Middle Ages […]. In the context of the present conceptual 
Odyssey the neomedieval analogy is just that: a device to overcome the conceptual 
blindness we are all more or less victims of due to the powerful mental habits of 
the modern mindset.”85 Getting rid of the conceptual blindness should not 
automatically exclude aiming at a credible image of the political structure of the 
Middle Ages by using primary sources from the actual period. For an analogy that 
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is more or less precise, an accurate basis is required and looking at the thing itself 
would definitely help in building that. Looking at the thing itself, in our case, means 
using the most recent results of mediaeval studies and also primary sources from 
the era. Using such sources also does not mean that one has to give up on “a 
creative use of the medieval world” and that the pitfalls of “myopic historicism” 
are unavoidable. However, Friedrichs found these aims incompatible with each 
other and went on to describe expressively why IR theory needed the neomediaeval 
toolkit.  
According to Friedrichs neomediaevalism provides a chance to resolve the “triple 
dilemma of IR theory” and in that regard it may be an embryonic alternative to 
both state-centric approach and the globalization discourse. None of the latter two 
are capable of handling the triple dilemma, i.e. attempting to grasp the tension 
between globalisation, fragmentation and the nation state system. As Friedrichs 
puts it: “when talking about globalization, one is in danger of being blind to the 
opposite trend of fragmentation; when shifting to the discourse about 
fragmentation, one can hardly grasp the evidence of globalization; and both the 
discourse about globalization and the discourse about fragmentation are blind to 
the fact that the nation-state system continues to monopolize the lion’s share of 
legitimate action in world politics; however, when returning to the familiar 
discourse about sovereign statehood, one becomes unable to capture the evidence 
of either globalization or fragmentation.”86 Neomediaevalism is portrayed in the 
work as a conceptual framework that could help scholars to come to terms with the 
fact that international order is not guided by a single organising principle anymore. 
It is the modern forma mentis of a single organising principle that keeps IR theorists 
captive and stops them from creating more out-of-the-box analytical tools. In 
Friedrichs’ opinion, neomediaevalism could develop into such a tool despite its 
current embryonic form. He thinks, the Middle Ages can teach us that the 
Westphalian state system is not more than a “historically unique anomaly” which 
had a beginning and will come to an end and that there are many other forms of 
“inter-polity order”, for instance empires, city-states and theocratic regimes.87 
Before defining neomedievalism and constructing his own model, Friedrichs also 
                                                          
86
 Ibid. p. 130 
87
 Ibid. p. 133 
40 
 
set the exact time frame which served as a basis of his analogy: „the Middle Ages 
in western Christendom between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries.”88  
He then went on to describe how the world has gotten from an old mediaeval order 
to a new one.  “The old medieval order in western Christendom, understood as a 
system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, worked for centuries in a 
precarious coexistence with other forms of political order, especially in eastern 
Christendom and the Islamic world […] Subsequently, early modern 
rationalization led to a reorganization of political order in the western world and 
to the progressive evolution of the nation-state system. […] In that system, 
sovereign nation states claimed to hold the monopoly of legitimate political action 
vis-à-vis other actors. From the beginning of modernity to decolonization, the 
system of sovereign nation states expanded territorially over the globe and 
displaced all competing conceptions of political order […] However, in the 
changed environment of the contemporary world, the hegemonic claim posed by 
the nation-state system is again problematic. Older conceptions of political order 
along ethnic, cultural and religious lines begin to re-emerge, particularly in the 
periphery but also in the western world. The international system is moving 
towards new medievalism, i.e. back to a system of overlapping authorities and 
multiple loyalties.”89 Friedrichs based his own model of neomediaevalism on 
Bull’s definition, which explains why the expression of “overlapping authorities 
and multiple loyalties” was featured more than once. Following the broader 
historical narrative, Friedrichs outlined the major works of neomediaevalism in IR 
theory to conclude that their authors had a fairly simplistic view of the Middle 
Ages. They attepted to juxtapose a chaotic version of the Middle Ages with the 
modern order at all costs and then often tried to look for some modernity-inspired 
order in it as a consolation prize.  
Friedrichs also accused Bull of only explicitly and superficially admitting the unity 
of the mediaeval order and of placing too much emphasis on the fragmentation of 
power in his neomediaeval definition of overlapping authorities and multiple 
loyalties. He argued instead that competing papal and imperial universalisms were 
two factors that assured a considerable level of coherence in the mediaeval order. 
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In verifying that claim, Friedrichs is our first neomediaevalist scholar who used 
mid-20th century rather than just 19th century historiography. Although he admitted 
that the 19th century works of Otto von Gierke served as a basis also for his model 
of neomediaevalism,90 he used the works of the historian Walter Ullmann too when 
he argued that against the centrifugal forces of fragmentation, Christian 
universalism and the Pope served as a counterpoint. He identified another 
counterpoint in the secular universalism embodied by the Holy Roman Emperor 
from the eleventh century onwards.91 In the latter Friedrichs relied on a study by 
Andreas Osiander92, also an IR theorist, but a rather rare type, in that he attempts 
to shed some light on the ignorant attitude of IR towards historiography.93 Even 
though Osiander has not focused on neomediaevalism and is not a mediaeval 
historian, he made an impressive attempt at describing the pre-Westphalian 
international order including Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Early Modern era 
by using an IR toolkit. He has been the only IR scholar who acted on the suggestion 
of Wolfers and went back to the texts of Thomas Aquinas and Dante and many 
others when he depicted their periods.94 However, he did not use these texts to say 
anything about the neomediaeval present as Wolfers suggested. In fact, he did not 
even use the word neomediaevalism in his magnum opus.  
However, the fact that Friedrichs relied on the works of 20th century historians and 
IR scholars with a flair for history showed that he wished to move towards a more 
progressive concept of neomediaevalism. Counterbalancing Bull’s overly 
‘centrifugal’ definition by the spiritual and secular forms of universalism, he 
created his own definition of neomediaevalism:  “A medievalist system is a system 
of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, held together by a duality of 
competing universalistic claims.”95 Friedrichs then went on to identify the 
contemporary equivalents of the universalist elements that he introduced to the 
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definition. The two functional equivalents that he detected were a political and an 
economic universalism: the nation state system and the transnational market 
economy. The nation state system was paralleled with the imperium while the 
transnational market economy with the sacerdotium. Friedrichs compared the 
national and international bureaucratic class promoting the nation state system to 
the feudal lords and kings promoting the shared expectations of imperial vassals. 
The social ethos of feudalism was similar to the universal belief in international 
order in the modern era.96 On the other hand, Friedrichs found the managerial class 
of the world market economy comparable with the clergy of the Middle Ages. Both 
could be characterised by an unusually “high degree of social and spatial mobility” 
and both protected their orthodoxy against various forms of heresy. The dogma of 
the “econocrats” would be neoliberal laissez-faire orthodoxy while economic 
isolationists or interventionists would be the respective heretics. “There is 
excommunication from financial markets for stubborn states, just as there was 
excommunication from Christendom for reluctant secular rulers in the Middle 
Ages. There is a contest between the world market economy and the nation-state 
system for supremacy in the international sphere, just as there was a contest for 
supremacy between the Church and the Empire in the Middle Ages.”97 Friedrichs 
further analysed the elites who were responsible for representing the ideologies of 
these blocks. He highlighted that religious universalism was mostly spread by 
Catholic theology while the intellectual representatives of imperial universalism 
were to be found more sporadically in the elites and from among them he named 
Dante, William Ockham and Marsilius of Padua. Regarding the contemporary 
world, Friedrichs identified “a knowledge-based elite, or epistemic community, of 
organic intellectuals and public writers” as the intellectual background of both the 
nation state system and the transnational market economy.98 In the conclusion of 
his work, Friedrichs expressed his hopes that his revised model of 
neomediaevalism would prove to be a thought-provoking and innovative device 
“helping to overcome the ‘tyranny of the concepts’”.99 For those who might worry 
that a new mediaeval order meant giving up on political values guaranteed by the 
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state such as democracy or the rule of law, Friedrichs mentioned that 
neomediaevalism also has the aim of “preserving and recovering a proper space 
for political action.”100 
What are the major concerns about the concept of neomediaevalism by Friedrichs? 
There is a certain inconsistency in his neomediaeval structure that stems from the 
standard IR flaw of playing down the relevance of sovereignty in the Middle Ages. 
As we can remember, Bull, Krasner and also Osiander denied that sovereignty 
existed in any form in the Middle Ages. That is partially why Bull could dismiss 
the claim of a neomediaeval world order. Since he did not see enough evidence 
that other actors in the international order could seriously curb the sovereignty of 
the nation states, he thought the ‘danger’ of the new Middle Ages was not 
imminent. In other words, he would have only deemed a scenario justifiable 
enough to call it neomediaeval if it were to erase state sovereignty from world 
politics. As we have demonstrated above, this was a significant misunderstanding 
of the Middle Ages on Bull’s behalf. The Middle Ages was an era when, according 
to recent mediaeval historians, the predecessors of the ideas of external and internal 
sovereignty were introduced. It was the very limits of the sovereignty of kingdoms 
– the Church and the Empire – that enabled this concept to emerge as a 
consequence of their rivalry. Thus, a system with partially sovereign states, with 
shared sovereignty, or with limited sovereignty could be labelled neomediaeval 
more safely than Bull contended. Friedrichs followed Bull’s footsteps when he 
more or less ignored the question of sovereignty in his neomediaeval model. He 
juxtaposed two fully fledged ideologies as equal rivals and these represented the 
new version of the papal and imperial parties. One of these ideologies was the 
nation state system. However, that can be somewhat misleading since the very 
point of neomediaevalism has been that for various reasons the nation state system 
has been losing the exclusive right to sovereignty it used to possess.  
The neomediaeval structure envisaged by Bull was able to highlight the elements, 
which restricted the sovereignty of the nation state and, therefore, identify these 
elements as being other than the nation state system itself. Bull identified 
constraints that were limiting mediaeval kingdoms from above and from below. 
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The Pope and the Emperor were both constraints from above while the king’s 
vassals were limiting his power from below.101 Bull then tried to find those 
elements that were similarly limiting the power of today’s nation states from above 
and from below. He named, among others, international corporations and 
organisations above and the privatisation of international violence below. 
Friedrichs used Bull’s text on neomediaevalism and also listed the five symptoms 
of neomediaevalism pinpointed by Bull but decided to discard many of Bull’s ideas 
to provide a new take on the issue. In order to prevent the centrifugal nature of 
Bull’s theory from hijacking his revised model, he wished to give the rivalling 
universalisms of the Pope and the Emperor more weight. By doing so, he played 
down the relevance of sovereignty entirely. Bull could not detect enough evidence 
for a neomediaeval order because he could not see anything fully robbing the nation 
states of their sovereignty, while Friedrichs introduced a neomediaeval system in 
which the nation state system itself—the sovereignty of which was supposed to be 
under siege by multiple factors in a proper neomediaeval model—was one of the 
two fully sovereign entities competing for universal power. Thus, we can see that 
both authors have let the sovereignty of states remain almost intact in their 
assessment of the possibilities of neomediaevalism, despite the fact that one of 
them concluded that neomediaeval times had not arrived yet (Bull) while the other 
thought that they had (Friedrichs).  
Both examples show that these authors have disregarded the fact that some form 
of sovereignty might exist on the mid-level of the mediaeval structure, under the 
Pope and the Emperor, but above the vassals. Bull explicitly denied the statehood 
of mediaeval kingdoms on the level of the previously mentioned structure and 
diagnosed that neomediaeval times have not appeared in the 1970s since nation 
states could retain their sovereignty. In opposition to this view, Friedrichs made a 
contrary diagnosis by moving nation states to the top level of his neomediaeval 
structure—next to transnational market economy—fully preserving their 
sovereignty. The realities of limited mediaeval sovereignty were not faced by either 
scholars. Despite the recurring formulation of “overlapping authorities and 
multiple loyalties”, they both decided in fact to extract and save the nation state 
from the sovereignty-eroding power of the system they built. Their trains of 
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thought fell prey to the modern forma mentis (Friedrichs) or the “tyranny of the 
concepts” (Bull), which both of them sought to avoid but neither fully managed.   
Saskia Sassen – Political Science and IR as an Analytical Framework of 
History 
It is symptomatic of the ignorance of IR neomediaevalism to sovereignty in the 
Middle Ages that the scholar, who devoted an entire treatise to the subject of 
mediaeval statecraft from a political science/IR point of view, was the sociologist 
Saskia Sassen. Her influential Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to 
Global Assemblages102 was published in 2006 and provided “a sweeping overview 
of the history and historiography of premodern cities, institutions, and 
bureaucracies.”103 Sassen found it important to write with a special focus on those 
mediaeval practices and patterns of political power that helped rulers to unite actors 
that were often stronger than the ruler himself because she deemed these practices 
relevant in an age when the forces of globalisation could dislodge the capabilities 
of the nation state.104 Sasken understood how considerable of an effort it was that 
mediaeval rulers could demonstrate their sovereignty against the upper and the 
lower constraints of their power through repeated waves of centralisation. Sassen 
found the attempts of the Capetian administration between the eleventh and the 
twelfth centuries particularly impressive. As Holsinger quotes, the Capetians 
“implemented key elements of a centralized bureaucracy that created a grid for 
partial control over what was a sharply fragmented territorial and political 
organization with many actors far more powerful than the king.”105 Unlike 
Friedrichs, Sassen did not neglect the lower constraints of mediaeval royal power, 
nor did she play down the relevance of sovereignty. Her impressive account of 
mediaeval ‘urban territoriality’ was counterbalanced by such symptoms of 
sovereignty as the royal assemblage of territories and the birth of “state 
bureaucracy for extracting revenue”106. She even went so far as detecting abstract 
forms of authority as the predecessors of sovereignty. In fact, one of the major 
hypothesis of her treatise was that sovereignty was not a radical post-feudal 
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innovation,107 and she concluded that this hypothesis was verifiable: “The 
sovereign authority that would be critical for the national state was facilitated by 
the presumed divinity of the monarch […] The complex and abstract notion of the 
legitimate authority of the national territorial sovereign does not simply represent 
a radical innovation of the postfeudal order. Multiple medieval capabilities went 
into its making, from notions of divine authority to those of the secular and 
constitutional systems of law arising out of the formations of cities in the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries. Even when backed with material and identifiable power, 
authority is to be distinguished from raw power: sovereign authority introduces 
abstraction into the materialities of the sovereign's power. […] In this regard the 
emergence of towns as complex political economies in their own right willing to 
contest powerful rulers and develop their own sources of political authority is 
interesting and illuminating, especially since most cities lacked armies. ”108  
There are multiple refreshing aspects of this paragraph compared with the standard 
IR neomediaevalist texts. On the one hand, it is clear that Saskia Sassen’s work 
reflects the stance of contemporary historians, i.e. sovereignty was not merely a 
modern Westphalian invention. The fact that she used multiple sources of more 
recent historiography might explain her up-to-date take on the question. Works of 
the French Annales school by Jacques Le Goff, Georges Duby and Fernand 
Braudel were relied upon, while Joseph Strayer’s studies were also featured (the 
lack of which was so striking in Bull’s work). Another important discovery made 
by Sassen was that an important lower constraint of royal power might 
paradoxically contribute to the birth of sovereignty too. As she correctly explained, 
eleventh and twelfth century cities gave birth to certain constitutional systems that 
were later projected on and exported to the level of nation states.109 Thus, we can 
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conclude that similarly to the way the Papacy as an upper constraint of mediaeval 
royal authority contributed to the concept of sovereignty, the cities and towns as 
elements that were limiting royal authority from within or from below, also 
provided intellectual ammunition for their sovereignty. If there is one point where 
Sassen’s train of thought might seem questionable, it is when she emphasised the 
abstract nature of the mediaeval contribution to sovereignty. As we have already 
discussed the mediaeval version of sovereignty was a highly personified concept, 
the abstraction of which was carried out by early modern thinkers like Bodin and 
Hobbes. Saskia Sassen argued that the divine origin of royal power was an abstract 
concept. If one accepts this claim, we would have to agree that most types of royal 
power were abstract from the earliest stages of state formation, i.e. from the age of 
the Mesopotamian and Egyptian empires and in the Judeo-Christian tradition from 
the time of the kingdom of Saul. The divine nature of royal power has been as old 
as any form of political rule in human history; therefore, it would be an 
overstatement to say that it was a “mediaeval capability”.  
The idea that various constitutional forms were also abstract mediaeval concepts is 
more justifiable, but in this case the time frame of the eleventh and twelfth century 
set by Sassen is not entirely fitting. It is true that by that time the fermentation of 
cities’ political systems into various constitutional forms (often republican ones) 
had begun, but it was a century later, at the end of the thirteenth century, that 
abstract constitutional forms were established thanks to the assimilation of 
Aristotelian political ideas, a process which was only completed by the 1280s.110 
As will be discussed in the Second Part of this dissertation, this era had much more 
significance for mediaeval political philosophy than the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries. Irrespective of some of her questionable ideas regarding the Middle 
Ages, Saskia Sassen provided a much deeper analysis of mediaeval political 
realities than some of the IR scholars who delved into neomediaevalism. Even 
though Sassen did not embrace the idea according to which we are facing the new 
Middle Ages in the 21st century, she clearly used mediaeval patterns of distributing 
authority to explain certain trends and forces of globalisation in the present. In 
doing that, her analogies were more based on “the historical veracity of the Middle 
Ages” than those of most neomediaevalists. The way she compared the role of 
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mediaeval cities to her own concept of global cities was particularly remarkable. 
After claiming “that late medieval cities constituted a type of urban political 
economy of territoriality” she went on to discuss the following question. “Can we 
make this more abstract so as to accommodate particular forms of territorial 
authority we see emerge today? Some of these get constituted as denationalized 
territories inside ongoing national territorial regimes. Global cities are such 
entities as compared to electronic financial networks, which are not.”111 Even 
though Sassen’s work is a detour from both IR and neomediaevalism, it is an 
inspirational example showcasing how the historiography on the Middle Ages can 
be used in order to explain certain trends of the present.  
Jan Zielonka – The European Union as a Neomediaeval Empire 
Moving on to a more specifically European focus, I will now examine how 
neomediaevalism has been projected on the questions of the European Union. The 
only major work that dealt with the question in detail was Jan Zielonka’s Europe 
as Empire published in 2006. However, in order to fully grasp his conception of 
the EU as an empire, it is necessary to briefly consider the idea of a neomediaeval 
empire developed before Zielonka. To that end, an important study to observe was 
written by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, it was published in 2000 and bears 
the laconic title Empire.112 It was one of the works Bruce Holsinger found worthy 
of reviewing in the Cambridge Companion to Medievalism. Holsigner wrote: 
“Mixing political philosophy, theology, and postcolonial and Marxist theories of 
value, the book proposes an amorphous global network of post-national 
sovereignties with surprising inheritances from the premodern world. Empire’s 
eccentric variant of neomedievalism involves a return to several distinctive 
moments in premodern history: the fall of Rome and the resistance to empire 
represented by the northern barbarians; the processes of primitive accumulation 
and the birth of capitalism; and the rise of the mendicant orders in the thirteenth 
century, with the model of love and charity promised therein.”113 As we can see, 
Hardt and Negri proposed a view of a neomediaeval empire that included features 
from almost the entirety of the Middle Ages. Early mediaeval elements from Saint 
Augustine’s time to high mediaeval elements like the appearance of the mendicant 
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orders (such as the Dominicans and the Franciscans) and many other features from 
in between were all channelled into their image of the mediaeval empire. This all-
encompassing approach to empires was the one explicitly refused by Zielonka in 
his work.114  
Zielonka aimed at the description of the European Union as a neomediaeval empire 
and used a rather specific terminology to analyse it. Relying on his previous works, 
Zielonka identified four theoretical regimes that could serve as a descriptive model 
for the European Union: “liberal internationalism, imperial neo-medievalism, 
parochial nationalism, and Westphalian super-statism.”115 He found these options 
much more functional than Jacques Delors’s “unidentified political object” or the 
mysterious “postmodern polity” which represented in his eyes an insufficient 
“anything-goes” attitude.116 Zielonka argued that in order to say something 
relevant about the European Union a more pragmatic approach is required. Ideally 
one which provides an analytical tool that is more robustly applicable than the 
simple observation that the EU is unprecedented. Starting with the four theoretical 
regimes, the author gradually narrowed down the choice to imperial 
neomediaevalism and the Westphalian super-state. However, he makes it clear very 
early on in his book that the European Union is much closer to a neomediaeval 
empire than a Westphalian super-state or a Westphalian empire. “The contrast 
between the EU and the imperial might of the contemporary United States or 
nineteenth century Britain is enormous. […] This is because the EU resembles an 
empire we know from many centuries earlier. Its multilevel governance system of 
concentric circles, fuzzy borders, and soft forms of external power projection 
resemble the system we knew in the Middle Ages, before the rise of nation states, 
democracy, and capitalism.”117 In his previous works, Zielonka focused on the 
question of European borders and concluded that the internal and external borders 
of the European Union were more like those of the Middle Ages, which were not 
considered to be strict demarcating lines. The European Union had Member States 
that were part of the Schengen zone, as well as members that were not. And in this 
regard, their membership did not coincide with a single border policy. EU borders 
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did not resemble Westphalian rigid and sharp state borders, but rather those more 
open mediaeval geographic barriers, which could not precisely delineate 
administrative, military, economic and cultural zones since these were 
overlapping.118 These less physical and more fluid borders of the European Union 
inspired the author to dig deeper into the neomediaeval nature of the European 
Union.  
Reading Zielonka in more depth, it is interesting to see how he defended the 
hypothesis that the European Union is not just neomediaeval, but also an empire. 
He argued that Westphalian super-states may turn into Westphalian empires 
through “military conquests, territorial annexations, or international economic 
exploitation.”119 Following these assertions, he expressed blatantly that his concept 
has nothing to do with such a Westphalian empire. The European Union is more 
prone to offer economic and financial help to its neighbours and peripheries rather 
than to exploit them. Despite that, Zielonka wrote, there are some symptoms that 
qualify the European Union as some sort of an empire, such as the “ever-further 
extension” of its borders and the export of EU rules to its neighbours. The 
asymmetries between the eastern and the western part of the continent made 
possible, in Zielonka’s estimation, “the skilful use of political and economic 
conditionality” that led to the EU’s control over “the unstable and impoverished 
eastern part of the continent.”120 To somewhat relativize the strength of the 
statement, Zielonka admitted that the EU invited the new Member States instead 
of conquering them, but also expressed his concerns about the extent of freedom 
these countries possessed during the accession negotiations. The fact that the new 
Member States had to adopt the entire acquis communautaire also signalled a 
hierarchy between the Community and the candidate countries. The phenomenon 
of the new Member States not being able to comply with these rules was interpreted 
by Zielonka as a form of cheating that is also characteristic of imperial relations. 
A further symptom of imperial functioning was detected by Zielonka in the form 
of transfer of sovereignty.121   
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In order to demonstrate the unique characteristics of his theoretical construction, 
the author compared the Westphalian type of state to the neomediaeval empire. 
“The former is about concentration of power, hierarchy, sovereignty, and clear-
cut identity. The latter is about overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, 
diversified institutional arrangements, and multiple identities. The former is about 
fixed and relatively hard external borderlines, while the latter is about soft-border 
zones that undergo regular adjustments. The former is about military impositions 
and containment, the latter about export of laws and modes of governance.”122 This 
comparison exposes the most important characteristics of Zielonka’s concept and 
also its relative proximity to Bull’s image of neomediaevalism. A further point he 
decided to make was a reasoning to show why the theoretical construction of a 
neomediaeval empire was necessary to apply for the EU. He first underlined that 
he found the competing concepts rather inadequate and that a model with historical 
roots might urge political scientists to make a better use of history, philosophy and 
law instead of ignoring or contradicting them. He hoped that even if the real Middle 
Ages produced its regimes in an entirely different socio-political context, some 
know-how and best practices would be available for scholars if they searched hard. 
He also highlighted that in the given phase of his research he used the concept of 
the neomediaeval empire as a theoretical benchmark “rather than the exact 
approximation of the course of history.”123 Thus we find that the assessment of the 
empirical flow of history, “the historical veracity of the Middle Ages” (Holsinger) 
or the “deep phenomenological understanding of the Middle Ages” (Friedrichs) is 
missing from yet another major work devoted to neomediaevalism.  
Therefore, Zielonka’s study is just as generalising when it comes to the basis of his 
analogy, the Middle Ages, as the bulk of neomediaeval literature in IR. He rather 
convincingly used his theoretical benchmark as he went through the various fields 
of European integration from constitutionalism through governance structure to 
foreign policy, but his more or less justifiable image of the Middle Ages was of 
low definition and sometimes relied on questionable sources. Although we have to 
admit that Anthony Black’s, Georges Duby’s, Walter Ullmann’s and Joseph 
Strayer’s works were referred to in his account of the Middle Ages, and in that 
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regard it represented a significant step forward compared to some other pieces of 
IR literature, these sources were not considered most up-to-date among historians 
at the beginning of the 21st century. More recent or relevant works by Jacques Le 
Goff, Peter Brown, Joseph Canning or James Blythe on mediaeval political 
philosophy were missing. Even though he used studies by IR scholar Andreas 
Osiander who referred to some of these authors, it did not fully compensate for the 
lacking pieces of literature. Given the neomediaevalist IR works covered here so 
far, it almost seems automatic that Zielonka also did not use mediaeval primary 
sources.  
On the other hand, the sources that he used were often not professionally chosen. 
Some of the assertions by Zielonka about the Middle Ages were based on the works 
or on the mere informal communications of scholars, who were neither experts of 
the Middle Ages, nor even themselves historians. Charles S. Maier was quoted on 
the Middle Ages as an expert of the 20th century and John Gerard Ruggie as a 
political scientist.124 Despite all these literary deficiencies, the image of the Middle 
Ages drawn in Europe as an Empire is not entirely off the mark. Zielonka depicted 
the Middle Ages using the image of a vassal linked to more than one lord by feudal 
contracts, and lords having many vassals (although he somewhat exaggerated the 
complexity of the feudal system). He also found it worthy of mentioning that there 
were overlapping territories of jurisdiction, and citizens could be subjects to more 
than one of these. Zielonka also highlighted that the fragmentation of authority was 
enhanced by cities and towns, and similar to Sassen, he also understood that 
sovereignty existed in the Middle Ages despite its shared nature. He even 
highlighted that the Pope and the Emperor possessed de facto sovereignty.125 Given 
that the mediaeval predecessor of sovereignty in the form of plenitudo potestatis, 
as we have seen, was designed for the Papacy, this statement seems highly 
justifiable, even though Zielonka did not draw the attention of his readers to this 
fact. Finally, referring to the comprehensive opus on European History by Norman 
Davies, Zielonka claims that “[n]ations in the modern sense of the word did not 
exist in the Middle Ages, and cultural identity was weakly connected to the network 
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of authority.”126 Later throughout his work, Zielonka attempted to detect these 
traits, and the ones he previously associated with the EU in the incremental 
development of the European integration. He found democracy non-existent in the 
Middle Ages  and expressed his worry that scholars struggle with the concept of 
the democratic deficit because democracy in its Westphalian form would also be 
unavailable in a neomediaeval structure.127 He concluded that the everyday 
functioning of the European Union justified that it was a neomediaeval empire. 
According to the author, this conclusion explained why most scholars are 
struggling to get a grip on the EU.  “My aim in this book is to show that mainstream 
thinking on the process of European integration is based on incorrect conceptual 
assumptions. Without a change of paradigm we will be unable to comprehend the 
ongoing developments, assess their implications, and identify proper solutions for 
addressing these implications. Even now, we are trying to apply Westphalian 
solutions to a largely neo-medieval Europe, and are surprised that these solutions 
do not work.”128 As I will discuss in the Third Part of this dissertation, the 
prevailing Westphalian terminology often presents difficulty for scholars 
attempting to grasp the nature of the European Union. However, it is not obvious 
what sort of conceptual framework or terminology could replace it. 
Further in the book, Zielonka also tried to contextualise Europe’s neomediaeval 
design in world politics. Even though he did not say much about the world outside 
Europe, there is one important section in the book that vaguely conveys something 
about Zielonka’s global model. He wrote: “The emerging international system in 
Europe also looks more medieval than Westphalian. The system is truly polycentric 
and split into multiple, overlapping arenas that are only loosely connected. Like in 
the Middle Ages the system is geared towards two major power centres. This time 
it is not the Empire and the Papacy, but the EU and the United States.”129 It is 
interesting to compare this neomediaeval structure with the one developed by 
Friedrichs. For Friedrichs, the two competing universalistic claims that held 
together the system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties were the 
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nation state system and the transnational market economy, which replaced the 
Emperor and the Pope. In the model proposed by Zielonka, the European Union 
and the United States play the roles of the postmodern Papacy and the Empire. It 
is worth noting that while in Friedrichs’ model the two universalistic claims were 
both ideologies, Zielonka chose two blocks of states. He recognised that while the 
European Union may well resemble a neomediaeval empire, the United States does 
not come close to the Church despite its moralist rhetoric.130 Zielonka made it clear 
that he was aware of Friedrichs’ model yet decided to deviate from it. To make his 
intentional shift obvious he even gave the title “competing universalistic claims” 
to the chapter in which he discussed the above.   
Zielonka criticised those scholars who clung to inadequate and obsolete concepts 
while describing processes of the European integration. This criticism drove him 
to the new conceptual and analytical terrain he was trying to discover. He listed 
state, sovereignty, and empire among those terms the use of which he found 
particularly problematic.131 In Europe as Empire, he primarily focused on 
elaborating the concept of empire. Therefore, as a conclusion of the assessment of 
his treatise, we should observe more closely how he managed to achieve this. The 
most striking feature of the term neomediaeval empire for a mediaevalist is that it 
loosely links the concept of the empire to an age in which there was not one. One 
of the most important ever-green and recurring concepts of the Middle Ages was 
the renovatio imperii (Renewal of the Roman Empire), which demonstrates quite 
obviously that such attempts were unsuccessful.132 The early mediaeval period was 
about managing the consequences of the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire 
and the successive attempts to fill in the vacuum of power either through the 
Roman Catholic Church as an organising principle of authority or through feudal 
contracts in the 9th-10th centuries. The short-lived attempt of the Carolingian 
Empire should be viewed as a typical example of the imperial reflexes that, 
however, were unable to fix what was broken. On the other hand, the High Middle 
Ages were also about the fragmentation of authority. By the time the Holy Roman 
Empire was consolidated, it had to face the Papacy, which was stronger than ever; 
thus, instead of renewing the Roman Empire to its alledged single and indivisible 
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authority, the two highest authorities had to share the power in Europe. The birth 
of the nation state system in the early modern period represented a further 
fragmentation of authority.  
Zielonka was aware that the Holy Roman Empire is not unequivocally regarded an 
empire. “There was at the time a Holy Roman Empire, but students of the Middle 
Ages argue that it was neither Roman, nor holy, nor even an empire.”133 We might 
ask then what exactly in the Middle Ages served as a basis for the concept of 
Zielonka’s neomediaeval empire? Zielonka referred to an informal discussion by 
Charles S. Maier, expert of modern history and particularly the 20th century, and 
claimed the following:  „there was a great deal of decentralized layering and soft 
power extension in the Middle Ages, but never before did so many sovereign 
powers decide to pull their various resources together and form an imperial 
centre.”134 It is not decipherable what he meant exactly in this passage since he 
moved on without supporting the statement with any reliable primary or secondary 
sources. It would be important to clarify his meaning given that this is one of the 
few points in his reasoning that seeks to explain why an imperial regime could be 
modelled after the Middle Ages. Zielonka never explicitly compared the 
neomediaeval empire to the Holy Roman Empire, and all the examples about the 
mediaeval fuzzy borders suggest that he viewed the mediaeval European political 
system, as a whole, to be the basis of his analogy. However, the whole of Europe 
was even less imperial than the Holy Roman Empire. To contend that the elected 
head of the Holy Roman Empire had truly imperial power within the borders—
rather than simply reflecting symbolic imperialism through being first crowned the 
King of Rome and then becoming an emperor—would be an overstatement. On the 
other hand, when Bull claimed that the Holy Roman Emperor only possessed 
power within the borders of the Empire, i.e. in Germany and Italy,135 it was an 
understatement. As discussed, Canning argued that the concept of external 
sovereignty was developed by the Papacy for the French kings in order to provide 
them a shield to protect their country from the secular intervention of the 
Emperor.136 We can also mention that it was Emperor Otto III who provided the 
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opportunity for the kings of Hungary and Poland to establish their kingdoms at the 
turn of the millennium. Thus, we can agree with Friedrichs that Bull played down 
the relevance of those universalisms that provided coherence to the mediaeval 
system of Europe and among these was the Holy Roman Empire, but treating it as 
a fully-fledged imperial structure and basing a neomediaeval imperial concept on 
it, as Zielonka did, may be a step too far.137  
If we track the pattern of building empires in Europe after the fall of the Western 
Rome, we will find that the European Union is the very opposite of an empire. 
Zielonka claimed that the European Union is very far from Westphalian empires, 
which were prevalent in the last 200 years. In fact, it is very far from the empires 
that were built in the last 1500 years. The following is a comprehensive list of 
aspiring empires in Europe over the course of that time: the Carolingian Empire, 
the Ottonian attempt of the Holy Roman Empire, Charles V’s attempt at a 
Habsburg empire, Napoleon’s attempt and Hitler’s attempt. All of these attempts 
were made with the intention of the renovatio imperii, i.e. with the idea in mind of 
building an all-European empire, similarly to the Roman one.  
However, when it came to the practical side of building these empires, some 
common features can also be observed. These attempts were all initiated by a single 
dynasty or country intending to rule over the others. In other words, they were 
organised in a top-down way. The second characteristic, as a consequence, was 
that they resulted in more or less ravaging wars on the continent. The third common 
feature is that these attempts all ended as failures in a period of time less than two 
or three generations. The history of the Holy Roman Empire might seem to be an 
outlier with its exceptional longevity, but the periods in which it behaved like an 
empire were the three generations of Otto I, II and III, and the period of Charles V 
five centuries later. Otherwise, the key territories of Italy were gradually slipping 
out of their hands and, symptomatically, the last two countries to build up 
functional nation states in Europe were the ones formally ruled by the Empire. If 
we want to measure the extent to which the European Union can be labelled an 
empire by these standards, it is worth considering the very antithesis of an empire. 
The European integration was not initiated by a single country; rather it was born 
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as a consequence of mutual cooperation between six countries in a bottom-up way. 
The building of the European Union did not entail ravaging wars. On the contrary, 
the point of its existence is meant to be securing peace on the European continent. 
And so far, despite some heavy blows, it still cannot be labelled a failed project 
after more than 60 years of existence.  
Disregarding these circumstances and arguing that a neomediaeval empire is 
entirely different from all other empires seems like defying the linguistic consensus 
on what the word ‘empire’ means. In that regard, Zielonka is right in saying that 
the use of the term ‘empire’ is problematic in IR literature, but to be fair, his own 
work would have to be included on this list. Most of his arguments about the 
neomediaeval nature of the European Union were fitting despite the dated pieces 
of historiography he used. The problematic part was labelling the EU an empire. 
As we have seen, the Middle Ages in Europe can hardly be presented as an age of 
empires; therefore, the term neomediaeval empire is a touch more hazy than an 
analytical tool should be. It was not exactly clear from Zielonka’s work if the basis 
of the analogy was the whole of mediaeval Europe or just the Holy Roman Empire. 
Regardless, it is possible to agree with Zielonka that it is not just the international 
system that can be described using neomediaevalism as an analytical tool, but also 
the European Union. One aim in the following parts of the present study will be to 
understand what sort of neomediaeval construction could most closely describe the 
European Union if not an empire.        
A Revised Model of Neomediaevalism  
The striking deficiencies of the relationship between IR theory and mediaeval 
historiography were made obvious in the previous pages. However, it is worth 
quoting an IR scholar on this issue who made the first significant step to bridge the 
gap dividing the two disciplines. Andreas Osiander, in his aforementioned 
monograph, decided to discuss the history of international relations before the birth 
of the state (that is before the long 19th century in his understanding) using the most 
recent results of historiography and primary sources from Greek Antiquity to the 
Early Modern era. In terms of the Middle Ages, he extensively referred to texts by 
Dante, Engelbert of Admont and Pierre Dubois.138 He also textually compared the 
fiction of the efficient ruler in the works of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, 
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the latter of whom will also serve as one of the pillars of the present dissertation.139 
Osiander handled Antiquity with equal care and went back to some of the original 
Greek texts that most IR scholars simply refer to by ‘hearsay’. With such 
background it is not surprising that his observations on the relationship between 
history and IR theory seem justifiable. For all these reasons we should quote his 
introductory notes somewhat longer than usual. 
 “The primary goal of the academic discipline of international relations (IR) has, 
so far, been to explain the present. Not until very recently has IR begun to extend 
its focus to events beyond living memory, in the sense that some authors are now 
trying to bring IR perspectives and methodology to bear on the social and political 
phenomena of past ages and societies. In the discipline as a whole this is as yet a 
marginal phenomenon. The IR mainstream still uses history in much the same way 
that it has always done: as a source of uncontroversial statements usually made in 
passing and in order to enhance an argument that in itself, more often than not, is 
about something present. While history may or may not repeat itself, references to 
it in IR literature typically do. Such references tend to be limited to a relatively 
small pool of names, events, and concepts with which readers of this literature will 
be familiar. Names include Kautilya, Thukydídês, Hobbes, Louis XIV, Napoleon, 
and Hitler. Events include the Peloponnesian War and the Peace of Westphalia. 
[…]For IR, paradoxically, history is what we know; the present is what we are 
trying to understand. The paradox is that we can actually know and understand 
infinitely more about our own time than we can know about the Greece of 
Thukydídês, the India of Kautilya, the China of the warring kingdoms, or 1648 
Europe. […] Almost never in IR literature is history discussed with anything 
approaching scientific rigour. When history is brought up in IR, there is no mention 
of the latest monographs or articles in historical journals, no taking of sides in 
ongoing controversies among historians, no discussion of the available evidence 
and its problems, and no awareness that historians will occasionally discover 
something new or, more frequently, come up with new interpretations. There is no 
recognition that our knowledge of the past might actually be insecure and 
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historians’ beliefs, shifting. If historians and their publications are cited, they are 
usually household names, indeed preferably dead.” 
Our findings in the field of neomediaevalism have mostly verified Osiander’s 
laments. IR scholars often do not have the necessary academic background to 
integrate the results of historiography and IR theory, but they also seem to lack the 
willingness. The situation in the field of neomediaevalism is even harsher than in 
other areas of IR theory whereas it would be of the utmost importance to draw a 
credible picture of the Middle Ages at least here, if not elsewhere. It seems that IR 
scholars can use primary sources from the Middle Ages, as in the case of Osiander, 
but neomediaevalists almost never do that. Osiander did not focus on the 
neomediaevalist conceptual framework, in fact he did not even mention 
neomediaevalism on the pages of his Before the State. On the other hand, IR related 
questions can be addressed with the methodology of historiography, as in the case 
of Sassen, but neomediaevalists do not bother doing that. That ignorance partially 
explains their often flawed or simplistic view of the Middle Ages, a view which is 
generally also of low definition. On the following pages, a short list will be 
presented of the most typical incorrect stereotypes about the Middle Ages in the 
field of neomediaevalism, and after evaluating them, we will move on to construct 
a new model of neomediaevalism by making corrections to the existing ones. 
As we have seen, there are three concepts that are used fairly problematically in 
relation to the Middle Ages by IR scholars: sovereignty, natural law and empire. 
Regarding sovereignty, it is a widely held misconception that its origins can be 
traced back to the early modern period exclusively. From Hedley Bull to Andreas 
Osiander, many share this idea. However, as discussed, more recent literature on 
mediaeval political thought favours the approach that sovereignty was not a 
disruptive innovation of Early Modernity, but rather resulted from a gradual 
political philosophical evolution starting at the turn of the 12th-13th centuries. I have 
also argued that, paradoxically, the predecessor to the idea of external sovereignty 
was developed by the Papacy, an actor that is generally considered in IR to be a 
major barrier of sovereignty in the Middle Ages. I have also attempted to show that 
the mediaeval nature of natural law was also played down by Bull’s influential 
work, which resulted in a similar underrepresentation of natural law in other works 
of neomediaevalism. One of the most striking features of a neomediaeval world 
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order is that natural law in the form of its descendant, i.e. human rights, again plays 
a central role in its normative canon. However, Bull did not list this as a symptom 
of neomediaevalism, and following suit the major authors of the field, including 
Friedrichs, Sassen and Zielonka completely neglected the topic. Only Osiander 
found natural law important enough to devote some pages to it in his work, but he 
did not draw the parallel between natural law and human rights since he did not 
focus on the present. A third controversial concept dealt with in previous sections 
was empire. We have seen how Bull mistakenly limited the power of the Holy 
Roman Emperor to the borders of his Empire and how Zielonka claimed that the 
Middle Ages were imperial altogether and the European Union itself is also a 
neomediaeval empire. Such over- and understatements primarily resulted from the 
fact that IR theory and historiography have been ignoring each other.  
This bad relationship also results in dated historical concepts of IR theorists, which 
sometimes take the readers back to 19th century stages of historiography. The two 
extremes of 19th century academic thinking about the Middle Ages were quite well 
reflected by echoing the belief that the Middle Ages were completely chaotic140 
and that mediaeval times were all about universal order.141 Similarly 19th century 
patterns of historiography were repeated by IR scholars when they either portrayed 
the Middle Ages as theocratic, as in the case of Bull,142 or imperial, as in the case 
of Zielonka.143 Both authors implicitly promoted a monolithic vision of the Middle 
Ages either in the form of theocratic or imperial design despite explicitly defining 
it as a system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties. However, if we 
look at mediaeval political thought, it is clear that an exclusively theocratic or 
imperial structure was not the case, especially after the Gregorian Reform of the 
Papacy. “Although the church and secular rulers normally worked in harmony 
throughout the Middle Ages in the west, the opportunity for conflict was ever-
present from the mid-eleventh century onwards, when the papacy substantially 
enlarged its jurisdictional claims. There was thereafter an underlying tension 
between secular and ecclesiastical power, which on occasion broke out into full-
scale conflicts. The existence of such disputes in the west and their virtual absence 
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in the more static east had the most profound long-term implications for the 
political ideas of both parts of Christendom. The conflicts between the church and 
secular power, reflecting the divided loyalties of those involved, provided so much 
of the dynamism of western medieval political thought, and prevented the 
emergence of the idea of a monolithic society. Writers engaged in these disputes 
radically disagreed about the ordering of society, its government and the public 
obligations of its members. Fundamental enquiries concerning the nature and 
purpose of rulership were exhaustively pursued precisely because of this 
disagreement. As a result, profound contributions were made to perennially 
important political questions, but contributions which were characteristically 
medieval in content.”144  
Based on this summary by Joseph Caning, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Friedrichs’ model of competing universalisms was closer to the mediaeval political 
realities than Bull’s universalist and solidarist theocracy or Zielonka’s imperial 
vision, both of which seem to have been inherited from 19th century or post-
Enlightenment historiography. It is worth adding that the antagonism between the 
Papacy and the Emperor and its consequence, i.e. the separation of the Church and 
the State, also resulted in a unique situation in which the mediaeval authors of 
political philosophy were provided much more freedom to criticise the kings and 
the emperors. These rulers ceased to be directly associated with religion and God, 
and, therefore, their activity could become the subject of critical scrutiny. Open 
intellectual conflicts between scholars started to emerge, and after the injection of 
Aristotelian philosophy, the predecessor of political science was born by the end 
of the 13th century. In the Second Part of this study, I will also examine an example 
of two opposing mediaeval opinions on political rule, thereby justifying Canning’s 
statements. In sum, I have argued so far that IR theory has failed to draw a credible 
picture of the Middle Ages as a basis of the neomediaeval present because it 
heavily relied on dated 19th century-influenced historiography and also neglected 
primary sources.  
Based on a more up-to-date image of the Middle Ages, what can we say about the 
concept of neomediaevalism? Is it necessary to make corrections to the existing 
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concept? If so, how should a revised model of neomediaevalism look? These are 
the questions which we will try to answer in the closing section of this part of the 
dissertation. As previously noted above, Friedrichs’ model came closest to using a 
well-grounded image of the Middle Ages as a basis of his analogy. Although there 
are some significant, problematic elements in his model; however, this does not 
prevent one from accepting the following definition: “A medievalist system is a 
system of overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties, held together by a duality 
of competing universalistic claims.”145 The point where our revised view will differ 
from that of Friedrichs is that I will try to resist the temptation of evacuating the 
state system from the sovereignty-eroding nature of a neomediaeval order. As we 
remember, Friedrichs set the nation state system as one of the competing 
universalisms, and in so doing he raised this system to the upper level of his model 
together with the transnational market economy. I believe that the core reason why 
the concept of neomediaevalism appeared was the observation of scholars that the 
sovereignty of nation states is being eroded. This is emphasised in the first part of 
the definition. Overlapping authorities and multiple loyalties mean that there is no 
group of actors with exclusive sovereignty. Therefore, replacing one of the two 
sovereign actors of the Middle Ages with the very nation state system, which is 
supposed to be under siege, seems highly problematic. Another point of criticism 
is that Friedrichs toned down the relevance of the actors which challenged the 
sovereignty of nation states from below. The role of private international violence 
or of cities, which were respectively featured in Bull’s and Sassen’s work, was 
ignored by Friedrichs. With these corrections, the model by Friedrichs can serve as 
a basis for a revised concept of neomediaevalism.  
Our model is based on the assumption that the sovereignty of states is limited by 
various new actors and phenomena of the international system. There are some 
which limit their sovereignty from above, and there are some which challenge them 
from below. In general, the ones above (or on the top level) are those universalisms 
that provide a certain level of coherence to the international system; therefore, it 
would be fitting to call them the unifying forces of the world or the forces of 
globalisation. There is a soft and a hard constraint of sovereignty on the level of 
supra-state actors, as Bull referred to them. The soft constraint consists of 
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international organisations and the human rights regime. The soft constraint of the 
sovereignty of states can be paralleled with the mediaeval Church and the Papacy. 
On the one hand, the human rights regime has inherited and secularised the 
mediaeval concept of natural law from Catholic theology; therefore, it can be 
regarded as a promoter of intangible values similarly to the Church in the Middle 
Ages. The concept of universal and inalienable rights was bequeathed by natural 
law to the human rights regime.146 At the same time, similar to the mediaeval 
Catholic Church, which in the late centuries of the Middle Ages was occasionally 
engaged in armed conflicts, the United Nations can also use military force in the 
form of peacekeeping operations and its Security Council can give authorization to 
humanitarian intervention for other states. For that reason, it is more apt to interpret 
the role of international regimes as universalisms rather than the hegemony of the 
United States or any other country. Robert O. Keohane argued that international 
regimes are more likely to survive global hegemons than the other way around. In 
his landmark study entitled After Hegemony, he explained that decreasing 
transactional costs, the reduction of moral hazard and their legally binding nature 
all require that the international system preserve the infrastructure of international 
regimes irrespective of the survival of states.147 More precisely, he forecasted in 
the 1980s that the international regimes created during the hegemony of the United 
States, such as the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are 
likely to survive even in case of the potential demise of the United States. 
Therefore, I argue that if there is a global universalism that is comparable to the 
mediaeval Church, it has to be the United Nations and its human rights regime.  
The hard supra-state constraint of sovereignty is a universalism that was also 
highlighted by Friedrichs: the transnational market economy. Under the 
transnational market economy, I will specify to particular two elements: the 
commercial banks and the multinational companies. They can be referred to as a 
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hard constraint on sovereignty since they do not pose an ideological challenge to 
the states, but a very pragmatic, financial one. Regarding the power of the 
international banking system, Keohane used the term moral hazard. Based on a 
study by Fred Hirsch, he argued that the biggest banks have such a strong financial 
influence on the world that no matter how irresponsibly they act, they can be sure 
that they would be bailed out in case of emergency.148 Therefore, they are inclined 
to induce financial crises that are definitely against the interests of the states. Thus, 
they curb the sovereignty of states since they lose the power to pursue a sovereign 
financial policy. Multinational companies, on the other hand, pose a threat to the 
sovereignty of states since they try to maximise their profits globally, and the 
interests of nation states only come second on their agenda. Since their globally 
established productivity and efficiency makes it almost impossible for small and 
medium sized domestic enterprises to compete with them, multinational companies 
become the ones who can provide the majority of the jobs in most countries. Thus, 
their presence is an inevitability for the state. States have to compete in order to 
seduce some of these global companies by convincing them to outsource some 
tasks to their territory. They can typically reach that through providing these 
companies tax benefits and other advantages. In other words, these global actors 
can transform a country’s economic policy. Another reason for considering the 
transnational market ecoomy universalistic beside the points mentioned by 
Friedrichs is that according to World Bank data the 21st century saw the rate of 
globalization rise above 51 percent. The rate of globalization means the share of 
world GDP realized in foreign transactions, i. e. a 51 percent rate means that the 
biggest share of world economy has become transnational and the national 
economies’ contribution is only secondary.149 The forum for states where to 
respond to that significant challenge has been the World Trade Organisation since 
the 1990s where they can negotiate about the trading relations among themselves. 
In sum, the hard supra-state constraints of sovereignty are the actors of 
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transnational market economy that seriously curtail the economic and financial 
possibilities of the states.    
On the lower level of elements limiting the states, Bull differentiated between sub-
state and trans-state actors.150  I will borrow these terms to describe the mediaeval 
constraints of kingdoms on the lower level, although Bull surely would have found 
the use of sub-state and trans-state categories on mediaeval relations anachronistic. 
However, in order to understand why these sub-state actors are neomediaeval, we 
must start by casting our eye on the Middle Ages. Influential princes and 
margraves, who were gaining more and more land from the kings as their vassals, 
could often challenge the king’s authority as many examples show from early 14th 
century Hungary to the 15th century history of Valois-Burgundy.151 Another typical 
form of sub-state actors were mediaeval cities that were able to detach their 
political and economic sphere from the kingdoms. This was what Sassen referred 
to as “urban political economy of territoriality”. Trans-state actors were groups 
that were cutting across the borders of countries: powerful mediaeval merchants, 
organizers of trans-border heresy like the Cathars or the Waldensians152 or the 
Teutonic Order. The latter is a particularly interesting phenomenon. They were 
knights of German origins who split in two groups after the collapse of the Sixth 
Crusade and one of these moved to the West across the Mediterranean first to 
Cyprus and later to Malta, while the other group moved to the North and settled in 
Transylvania in the early 13th century. Hungarian king Andrew II, however, 
accused them of forming an enclave within Hungary and therefore expelled them 
from Transylvania.153 The Teutonic Knights then moved even further to the North 
where they carved out a part of the Baltic coastline from a less organised and 
centralised Poland for themselves. Out of these territories gradually the 
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Brandenburg Principality was formed, which later transformed itself into the 
Prussian Kingdom, the key vehicle of the future unification of Germany.154  
Which are the elements in the neomediaeval model that could be more or less 
equated with these mediaeval factors? A typically sub-state factor would be 
oligarchy in some states; however, they are not universally relevant actors since 
their power can significantly vary by country. Another growing sub-state tendency 
that endangers the sovereignty of states is territorial separatism. Referendum on 
Scottish independence, the movement for an independent Catalonia, demanding 
autonomy for Transylvania, the question of East Turkestan in China and separatist 
fights in Ukraine backed by Russia are all examples of this tendency. Similar to 
mediaeval princes and margraves, these tendencies can even result in a secession 
of a certain territory. However, there is a major difference between the mediaeval 
and the contemporary version, in that the modern forms of territorial separatism 
are usually backed by popular support or at least its façade. The secession of 
Valois-Burgundy from France in the 15th century, the birth of de facto little 
kingdoms in Hungary in the early 14th century or the secession of the Baltic 
coastline from Poland were procedures that were decided by an incomparably 
smaller number of actors than in today’s examples of separatism. Even the seizure 
of Crimea by Russia had to be justified by a mock-up referendum, not to mention 
the instances of real separatist movements with popular support. Irrespective of the 
question if these are successful (mostly they are not), they pose a threat to the 
sovereignty of states.  
Similar to the Middle Ages, cities could become a further sub-state element 
limiting the sovereignty of states. As Saskia Sassen mentioned, global cities could 
represent something surprisingly similar to mediaeval cities and city-states in that 
they might denationalise certain territories.155 Even her first major academic 
breakthrough was entitled Global Cities and focused partially on this issue.156 
Edward L. Glaeser has depicted a very detailed picture of the unprecedented level 
of urbanisation and the rising importance of cities in countless studies in the field 
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ranging from economics to social policy.157 According to Global Trends, a forecast 
by the National Intelligence Council the importance of cities will be constantly 
rising over the course of the next decades. In their prognosis, they expect the 
number of megacities with more than 10 million inhabitants to grow from their 
present number of 28 to 41 by 2030. The number of cities with populations between 
5 to 10 million will grow from 43 to 63 million while the number of cities with a 
population between 1 to 5 million will grow from 417 to 558 in the same time 
frame. The rising weight of such cities will arguably increase their bargaining 
power and, thus, might challenge the sovereignty of states on the long run. It is 
important to remember that in the meantime the other challenges facing states 
might reach a critical level, at which point cities might look more prepared and 
able to provide some basic services currently provided by the states. This situation 
might create scenarios that are highly comparable with the mediaeval power of 
cities and city-states.158  
Regarding trans-state factors limiting the sovereignty of states from below, it is 
worth mentioning NGOs in the first place which can have formal or informal ties 
to various organs of the United Nations similarly to the way laic fraternities and 
religious orders were formally or informally linked to the Church in the Middle 
Ages. The way for instance the Russian, the Israeli or most recently the Hungarian 
governments have tried to impose stringent laws stigmatising NGOs, which receive 
financing from abroad, shows how such trans-state actors are viewed as a threat to 
state sovereignty. Another important trans-state element limiting states’ 
sovereignty is transnational terrorism. As opposed to the Westphalian era, in case 
of a terrorist act contemporary nation states, who supposedly have a monopoly of 
aggression, cannot find the appropriate means of responding. The police that were 
formally designed to fight domestic crimes cannot effectively persecute a 
transnational network of terrorism, while the army of such a traditional 
Westphalian state was designed to tackle interstate armed conflicts. Thus, 
transnational terrorism can almost paralyse a traditionally sovereign state in terms 
of its monopoly of aggression. The societies of such states often respond to these 
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challenges by setting up companies with private paramilitary forces which further 
weaken the state by privatising its monopoly of aggression. This process also 
brings the international system closer to the restoration of private international 
violence that was listed by Bull as a potential symptom of a neomediaeval world 
order.159 United States companies like Blackwater, Halliburton, Bechtel, L-3, 
CACI and Booz Allen have followed such a path of development as it was 
convincingly introduced in an already quoted study by Naomi Klein.160 Thus, both 
the challenge (transnational terrorism) and the response (privatisation of 
international violence) limit the sovereignty of nation states.  
Another important trans-state phenomenon is international migration. According 
to the UNHCR the number of refugees in the world was an unprecedented 65.3 
million people.161 Their trans-border migration and distribution is a significant test 
for the states. Some political forces and even governments have attempted to frame 
the discourse on refugees and migration in a way that connects it to the rising levels 
of transnational terrorism. Linking the two and standing up against them is often 
viewed as a tour de force of the sovereignty of the nation states. The way the 
Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán interprets the situation is reminiscent of 
certain aspects of Umberto Eco’s cultural neomediaevalism. Orban argued on 
many occasions that accepting refugees is a dangerous practice of European states 
because they would simply build ‘parallel societies’ instead of being easily 
integrated into the host societies.162 Umberto Eco, in his first work on the New 
Middle Ages, wrote extensively about migration as a typically mediaeval 
phenomenon, and, in the same study, he also referred to a work by Giuseppe Sacco, 
an Italian geographer who described how a city can become neomediaeval as a 
consequence of immigration. The minorities unwilling to assimilate, organise clan-
like units and segregate themselves in various quarters of the city. That vision 
closely resembles the mediaeval contrada system of Italian cities, but also Orbán’s 
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theory about ‘parallel societies,’ which was most likely based on empirical reality 
of quarters like Molenbeek-Saint-Jean in Brussels rather than the concept of 
neomediaevalism.163  
The model of neomediaevalism outlined in the previous paragraphs could thus be 
summarised as a three-level system with a top-level of two supra-state 
universalisms in the form of the UN, including the human rights regime and the 
transnational market economy, with a mid-level of the nation state system and a 
lower level of sub- and trans-state actors and tendencies. On the top level the UN 
is a soft form of universalism that bears many characteristics akin to those of the 
mediaeval Church while the transnational market economy is a hard universalism, 
which is not comparable to the Holy Roman Emperor, but has a large impact on 
the nation states similar to the impact the emperor had on kingdoms. The mid-level 
of the model comprises the nation states. Unlike Friedrichs, I do not contend that 
the nation state system is one of the universalisms. Nation states are becoming 
more and more similar to mediaeval kingdoms in that they are not exclusive actors 
of international relations anymore and their sovereignty is often seriously curtailed 
by the two universalisms from above and certain factors from below. I have also 
argued that the lowest level of the model consists of sub-state and trans-state 
elements that are similar to mediaeval princes, margraves and cities, but instead 
take the form of territorial separatism, urbanisation, transnational terrorism and 
NGOs. For all these reasons, it seems justifiable to argue that the present 
international system is closer to the mediaeval system than to the classical 
presumptions of Westphalian internationalism.  
An important question to settle is how the European Union fits into this picture? If 
we project our model of neomediaevalism to a global level, the European Union 
could be seen as a regional integration, which is more similar to a pre-state or a 
post-state than anything else. It is a false assumption by Zielonka that the EU is 
one of the competing universalisms with the United States. The European Union 
clearly does not fit into the same league with the United States, but the less pro-
active foreign policy of the latter during the Obama and the Trump administrations 
makes it more difficult to interpret it as an actor with universalistic claims. If we 
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accept Bull’s idea that in the lack of indivisible sovereignty mediaeval kingdoms 
cannot be labelled states, we might question whether today’s nation states deserve 
their name. However, by these standards, it seems clear that the European Union 
cannot be compared to a simple state. I believe that the European Union is more 
like a pre-state, i.e. like a mediaeval kingdom than anything else. It is clearly not 
an empire in any sense of the word. The EU cannot be compared to the Holy Roman 
Empire since it has neither an emperor with universalistic claims nor much political 
influence outside the borders of the European Union. The EU is also not a military 
power that can intervene in armed conflicts in neighbouring countries. The Holy 
Roman Empire could send German troops to support Hungarian King Stephen I, 
while the European Union could not have done so, even if it had had the willingness 
in the Ukraine Crisis in the mid-2010s. Therefore, we should interpret the European 
Union as an actor on the nation state level that is not exactly a nation state. It is an 
actor in our neomediaeval model that seems most neomediaeval of them all. 
Looking at a global picture, the European Union seems like an actor comparable 
in size and in economic potential to the United States, Russia, China and India. If 
these are the new “kingdoms” of the neomediaeval model, the European Union 
more or less fits in. In the following paragraphs, I will argue that the European 
Union should be placed at the mid-level of our neomediaeval model instead of 
being on the top.  
The European Union is a typical mid-level actor of our neomediaeval model for 
many reasons. First of all, the fuzzy borders of the EU qualify it as a mediaeval 
actor, but also the fluid nature of its territory looks similar to the mediaeval concept 
of territoriality. The way certain territorial units could achieve de facto 
independence from certain mediaeval kingdoms; or the way certain territories were 
gradually incorporated into mediaeval kingdoms—shows similarities to the way 
states can join or more recently leave the European Union. Most mediaeval 
kingdoms were also multilingual or multicultural although perhaps not to the same 
extent as the European Union. Mediaeval France has developed various neo-
romance languages the speakers of which often could not automatically understand 
each other, but that was even further complicated by Frisian and Dutch in the 
North-East, Celtic in Bretagne, Basque and dialects of Spanish and Italian in the 
South. The mediaeval Hungarian kingdom included German speaking populations, 
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various forms of ancient Slavic languages, like Slovak, Serbian and Croatian, an 
ancient version of Romanian was spoken in Transylvania and of course Hungarian 
was also a language spoken by a significant portion of the population. That system 
of multiple linguistic zones was also interspersed with occasional French and 
Italian settlers in Hungary.  
Even though the Catholic Church represented a united Christian Europe in religious 
terms, there were some religious minorities in mediaeval European kingdoms as 
well. Apart from various heretic groups, like the Cathars and Waldensians in 
Western Europe and the Bogumils in the Eastern territories, there were Orthodox 
Christian minorities in the kingdoms of Poland and Hungary and Muslim 
minorities in Spain. It’s worth mentioning that sporadically Muslim groups 
appeared also in other areas. For instance, in mediaeval Hungary there were 
significant Muslim minorities who were in charge of coinage, salt trading and even 
some issues of the kingdom’s treasury.164 Thus, the ethnic, linguistic and religious 
mosaic of the European Union is comparable to that of mediaeval kingdoms. A 
further symptom of neomediaevalism in the case of the European Union is the 
strong presence of English language in a largely non-native English community. 
Now, that the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union, the position 
of English has become even more similar to that of Latin in mediaeval kingdoms. 
Even though it was not spoken as a native language by any of the officials in these 
kingdoms, they still used Latin in the formulation of official documents and even 
academic works since a wider target audience could be reached. In a similar way, 
today’s sources of EU law are most often published and quoted in English and the 
academic community of the multilingual European Union also uses English to 
provide their publications with a wider academic reach. It is also difficult to 
identify the locus of sovereignty in the neomediaeval European Union. We could 
describe the European Union as an actor the sovereignty of which is stuck between 
the Member State level and the Community level. Since the subject of the highest 
authority varies by policy areas, we can speak of overlapping authorities in the EU 
and that clearly resembles mediaeval kingdoms. The levels of decision-making in 
various policy areas from agricultural policy through social policy to foreign and 
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security policy may differ greatly, further eroding sovereignty and rendering the 
European Union similar to mediaeval kingdoms. The fluid and changing nature of 
the EU’s institutional setup also distances the EU from a classical Westphalian 
nation state. There are, of course, plans about a more federal European Union, 
which could bring it closer to modern nation states similar to the way absolutism 
did in the case of early modern kingdoms, but the competing idea of a multi-speed 
Europe might further sustain the current neomediaeval state of affairs in the 
European Union.  
What is the problem, in general, with a neomediaeval Europe? A general worry 
raised by many scholars (among them Zielonka) is that in the lack of sovereignty 
a neomediaeval entity is unable to guarantee civil liberties, the rule of law and 
democracy. Sovereign nation states have provided the frameworks for liberal 
democracy, and it is dubious whether these could be upheld without them. As we 
have seen, Friedrichs suggested that in order to compensate for that loss a 
neomediaeval system should aim at “preserving and recovering a proper space for 
political action.”165 Zielonka derived the rather futile discourse on the democratic 
deficit of the European Union from the same problem. “Public representation and 
participation under this system are weaker than in traditional Westphalian states. 
Democratic controls and the accountability of European officials are also 
problematic. And it is difficult to establish the purpose of democratic policies in a 
complex and segmented cultural setting. New ways have to be envisaged to 
articulate and aggregate public preferences. New methods of assuring the 
transparency, responsiveness, and compliance of public institutions must be put in 
place.”166 Zielonka made it clear that, in his view, the Westphalian democratic 
devices would prove dysfunctional in a neomediaeval environment. Quoting Yves 
Mény, he urged the formulation of post-national democracy, which for him 
obviously entailed a neomediaeval regime. He went on to argue that due to its 
nature, a neomediaeval system is perhaps even more likely to ensure pluralism, 
dialogue and consent than the centralised and hierarchical Westphalian system. His 
major question was how such a system could deserve the name ‘democratic’. 
Zielonka finally concluded that a neomediaeval democratic system could best be 
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reached “through the mechanism of public contestation rather than through 
representation. In other words, the capacity of citizens to contest European 
decisions will be more crucial in a neo-medieval setting than the functioning of 
institutional channels of representation.”167 
With a more authentic image of the Middle Ages, one might wonder why it is 
necessary to label the new system ‘democratic’ if it is about accountability and 
reliability. Democracy was not in practice during the Middle Ages, but there were 
definitely republican regimes. On the other hand, while democracy was a dormant 
concept that was revived after 2200 years in the 19th-20th centuries, it was 
constitutional liberalism that had a continuous presence and a gradual evolution in 
Western legal history. While democracy refers to the method of selection of the 
government, constitutional liberalism has more to say about the content of 
governing. As Fareed Zakaria has put it: “It refers to the tradition, deep in Western 
history, that seeks to protect an individual’s autonomy and dignity against 
coercion, whatever the source – state, church, or society. The term marries two 
closely connected ideas. It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, 
beginning with the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberty. It is constitutional 
because it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law. 
Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United States as a 
defense of the individual’s right to life and property, and freedom of religion and 
speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks on the power of each branch 
of government, equality under law, impartial courts and tribunals, and separation 
of church and state.”168 Although it is true that philosophers of ancient Greece 
came up with an anthropocentric humanism,169 in paractice ancient democracy, as 
Constant demonstrated, resulted in sacrificing private autonomy in the name of 
organising cohesive city-states.170 It was the Romans who created the legal forms 
that that had the capacity to guarantee individual liberties, but they were only begun 
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to be used for these purposes consistently in the modern era from the Habeas 
Corpus Act (1679) onwards. All those conceptual elements that Zakaria described 
as constitutional liberalism (separation of powers, impartial courts, equality under 
law, separation of church and state) could be simply referred to as the rule of law. 
It’s arguably more didactic to explain that constitutional liberalism stems from 
Greek (liberalism) and Roman (constitutional) roots, making it easier to understand 
why we refer to the mixture of democracy and constitutional liberalism as liberal 
democracy. However, Zakaria also stepped into the trap of 19th century 
historiography when he attempted to trace back the origins of what he called 
constitutional liberalism. Although he expressed that constitutional liberalism has 
a more organic and continuous development in European history than democracy, 
he still used exclusively ancient and modern examples to justify his claim just like 
Benjamin Constant more than 150 years before him. In fact, most items Zakaria 
lists under constitutional liberalism rooted in the Middle Ages. The concept of the 
Holy Trinity in Western Christendom and the neo-Aristotelian idea about mixed 
constitutions can both be regarded as predecessors of the separation of powers.171 
Equality under law also appeared in the Middle Ages in a primitive form which 
was still more progressive than the ancient versions of it. In case of felony, i.e. the 
breach of the feudal contract, it was not exclusively the lord who could deprive his 
vassal of his fief, but the vassal could do the same. Thus, besides the written nature 
of feudal contracts, the equal availability of legal remedies for both the lord and 
the vassal was interpreted by legal historians and sociologists from the early 20th 
century as a mediaeval forerunner of the principle of equality under law.172 As it 
was already noted, the separation of Church and State was also a mediaeval 
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innovation even though it is true that it was inherently coded in the biblical 
statement “my kingdom is not of this world”.173 
Therefore, in the second part of the dissertation, I will focus on those practices that 
contributed to the mediaeval evolution of constitutional liberalism or the rule of 
law, even without democracy. I will attempt to grasp the sense or the core of those 
mediaeval models that ensured the continuous evolution of the supremacy of law 
into the rule of law and the concept of the mixed constitution into constitutional 
liberalism. The aim of this inquiry will be to identify mediaeval pieces of political 
thought and terminology, the creative use of which could aid in updating the image 
of a neomediaeval European Union. In so doing, I hope to defy Friedrichs by 
making creative use of a “deeper phenomenological understanding of the Middle 
Ages” without boring the reader with “myopic historicism.” To that end, I will 
closely examine two highly influential political philosophers of the Middle Ages, 
both of whom were active at the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries. This period was 
chosen for two major reasons. On the one hand, this seems to be the era of the High 
Middle Ages after which most IR scholars model their neomediaeval systems. On 
the other hand, as demonstrated in previous sections, it was during this era when 
the assimilation of Aristotelian ideas was completed; thus, mediaeval political 
thinking can be observed in its purest form without the infiltration of Renaissance 
or early modern influences.  
Both of our authors were influenced by Aristotle’s Politics and by Thomas 
Aquinas, whose lectures most likely both of them attended at various points of his 
career. Giles of Rome and Ptolemy of Lucca wrote two different but widely 
circulated and cited books with opposing conclusions, which ironically bore the 
same title: De regimine principum (On the Government of Rulers). The works of 
these authors will be discussed here because they explicate the limits of royal 
power, i.e. the constraints of the sovereignty of mediaeval kingdoms. While Giles 
of Rome primarily focused on an upper constraint of royal power in the form of 
Papal authority,174 Ptolemy of Lucca elaborated on a lower constraint when he 
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justified the republican regimes of city-states. It is also worth noting that regarding 
the regimes in territorial kingdoms, both authors agreed on the necessity of royal 
power, but while Giles has often been regarded as an early advocate of absolutism, 
Ptolemy has been widely interpreted as a republican who promoted some form of 
constitutional monarchy. We have chosen these two authors because both of them 
made an attempt at discussing what we would call today sovereignty. They also 
used extensively Aristotle’s revised terminology to elaborate on the concept of the 
mixed constitution in premodern kingdoms that would gradually evolve into 
constitutional liberalism and the rule of law. A revised version of the toolkit 
presented by these authors will be deployed in the Third Part of this study to 
describe the functioning of the European Union with something else than a 
standard Westphalian terminology. This will be particularly relevant because, as 
we will see, contemporary political scientists have applied the mediaeval concept 
of mixed constitution to the EU often without a deep understanding of its structure. 
By using the works of Giles and Ptolemy, I will act upon Wolfers’ suggestion of 
going back to mediaeval texts in order to see if they have “become relevant again 
in matters of world politics.”175   
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Second Part 
 
The Limits of Royal Power in the Middle Ages 
The Impact of 12th Century Renaissance and 13th Century Scholasticism on 
Political Thought 
In order to understand the relevance of the two authors we have to give some 
context to their works; therefore, I will briefly cover the major novelties and 
achievements of 12th and 13th century political thought. Following the 
impregnating effect of the Gregorian Reform and the consequent separation of 
Church and State, new layers of culture were added to mediaeval political writing. 
Twelfth Century Renaissance176 has led to a more refined level of discourse about 
political power. Twelfth Century Renaissance is a cultural concept consisting of 
the rising numbers of urban schools, the so-called translator movement and the 
rediscovery of ancient authors. The improving demographic and economic 
conditions of the century provided the background for these phenomena. The 
assimilation of two elements from Antiquity were vital from the viewpoint of our 
topic: Roman law and Aristotelian political philosophy. In the following pages, I 
will showcase the most relevant aspects of these processes. 
Petrus Crassus introduced legal reasoning to the debate between secular and 
spiritual power in the eleventh century. The generation following him began 
studying Roman law at an academic level around the turn of the 11th and 12th 
centuries. From the middle of the 12th century the whole of the Justinian 
codification became available for the glossators of Bologna. The works of the 
glossators, which reached its peak with the Glossa ordinaria by Accursius (in the 
1230s), went further than simply interpreting ancient Roman law. They also tried 
to apply Roman law to the mediaeval realities and in doing that they were rather 
innovative. It was an important difference compared to ancient imperial 
jurisprudence that these works were also trying to understand the role of the ruler’s 
will in legislation. These authors believed that, apart from divine and natural law, 
the law common to all peoples (ius gentium) also limited the will of the ruler. 
Glossators argued that customary law may repeal the law of the ruler in certain 
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cases. On the other hand, the opposing view that the absolute power of the ruler 
was also developed by the glossators. As discussed previously, the mediaeval 
predecessors of sovereignty were also developed by glossators.  
The movement of translators in the 12th and 13th centuries primarily focused on 
translating the Greek and Arabic works flowing (back) to Europe through the 
Iberian Peninsula. These mostly scientific texts originated from ancient Greek or 
Arab authors and they were translated to Latin. A notable exception was the Holy 
Qu’ran which was translated to Latin at the request of Peter the Venerable, the 
abbot of Cluny for a considerable sum of silver.177 The high costs of translation 
could be explained by the fact that Iberian translators were primarily focusing on 
the language of scientific literature instead of religious texts according to Le 
Goff.178 Instead they focused on translating academic works that entered the 
circulation of scientific texts in the Middle East during the intensive Hellenistic 
intellectual flow179 and that reappeared in Europe joined by new works of Arab 
scholars (e.g. Avicenna) or with commentaries added to them by their Arab 
interpreters (Averroes). Aristotle’s works have shared the faith of these texts since 
only two books of Organon were available for the mediaeval readers before 
(Categories and On Interpretation). The majority of these works were translated 
between the 1120s and the 1270s. In most cases the Arabic commentaries were 
also translated to Latin. The commentary by Averroes of Córdoba (Ibn Rushd) 
written for Nicomachean Ethics gained particular influence. Aristotle’s logical 
rules were mostly used to discuss metaphysical and theological questions. The 
mediaeval responses to the Aristotelian corpus had a wide range of attitude from 
total rejection (Franciscan spirituals) through their mystical transcendence (Master 
Eckhart) to the schools aiming at a dialogue between one’s faith and understanding. 
In Latin Christianity the latter was prevalent. The thorough, encyclopaedic 
processing of the newly acquired knowledge was considered vital by Albertus 
Magnus whose approach to Antiquity remained decisive even after the Middle 
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Ages. The experts of mediaeval Aristotelianism were convinced for a long time 
that the group surrounding Siger of Brabant called the Latin Averroists presented 
the most revolutionary response as they proclaimed the autonomy of both theology 
and philosophy by allowing the simultaneous existence of their mutually exclusive 
results. However, in the past decades it was proved that the so-called duplex veritas 
was not more than a legend. It is true that Thomas Aquinas used the term duplex 
veritas, but in an entirely different sense, while he clearly believed that a synthesis 
between philosophy and theology can be reached with the methods of scholasticism 
and only the inappropriate use of reason can hinder this understanding. Summa 
Theologiae can be interpreted as a very attempt at the synthesis. Many of the theses 
of these schools were condemned by Parisian archbishop Étienne Tempier in 
1277.180 The majority of the condemned teachings were those of Aristotle’s. Based 
on the few items of political philosophy on the list, it can be concluded that while 
Aristotle’s philosophical and metaphysical teachings infiltrated European 
academic thinking by this time, his works on politics were yet to be interpreted. 
Politics was the last item of Aristotle’s corpus to be translated to Latin. The reason 
for that could have been that no Arabic translation or commentary was available, 
and Western scholars only knew about the existence of it through references in 
other texts. The full text was only discovered in Greek (with many other works by 
Aristotle) after the Fourth Crusade. But even after this discovery, translation 
progressed slowly. William of Moerbeke, who did not start translation at the 
request of Thomas Aquinas as it is commonly held, could only cope with the text 
after a second attempt. The text was finally made available in Latin around 1265 
and revolutionised the political thinking of the Middle Ages, despite the fact that 
initially only a handful of scholars dared to use it. Its novel language and the terms 
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nobody was familiar with at the time such as democracy, aristocracy or the word 
politics itself looked intimidating for many.181   
There were certain elements in Aristotle’s works that mediaeval authors have dealt 
with even before the translations such as mixed systems of governance. James 
Blythe argued that even before the discovery of Aristotle’s ideas some European 
scholars advocated the use of power for the public good and suggested that the 
ruler was under the control of both God and laws. Such ideas were expressed in 
Henry of Bracton’s work entitled De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae.182  In fact, 
a century before John of Salisbury declared that laws also bind kings, even 
mentioning the possibility of tyrannicide, but he considered it justifiable under 
extremely strict conditions which rendered it entirely theoretical.183 Therefore, 
Aristotle’s seeds did not fall on a barren soil.  
The mediaeval works written based on Politics can be grouped in four categories. 
Commentaries appeared first as notes added to the text in an Arabic fashion. Their 
major aim was to clarify those parts that were difficult to understand. Three 
outstanding personalities of the University of Paris wrote the first commentaries: 
Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Peter of Auvergne. Later, in the fourteenth 
century Nicole Oresme wrote longer commentaries, which could even be 
considered separate treatises in themselves. The second genre to appear was 
Questiones. The aim of this category was to closely observe the original text by 
posing question, answering them in the form of a debate between different 
conflicting responses, and finally adding often innovative conclusions. Although 
this genre offered more space for original thought, it still chained the authors to the 
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content of the original text. The genre providing the most freedom for mediaeval 
scholars comprised comprehensive independent political treatises. The fourth 
category includes other miscellaneous writings.184  The first author to write a 
comprehensive independent political treatise based on Aristotle’s Politics was 
Thomas Aquinas, who started to write his treatise under the title De regno, but it 
was only finished by Ptolemy of Lucca after the death of Thomas under the title 
De regimine principum. Treatises with the same title were written by Giles of 
Rome and Engelbert of Admont in light of Aristotelian political philosophy, 
although the latter relied much less on Aristotle than the other two authors. Similar 
treatises were written by Marsilius of Padua and John of Paris. The fourth group 
also consists of works that rely on Politics, but political philosophy is not their 
subject matter. Such works include Summa theologiae by Thomas Aquinas and 
Ptolemy of Lucca’s Determinatio compendiosa de iurisdictione imperii. In the 
following chapters of this dissertation I will introduce and compare the 
aforementioned works by Giles of Rome and Ptolemy of Lucca, which bear 
identical titles. Where necessary, certain parts of their other writings will be taken 
into consideration, in particular those that have political philosophical relevance. 
In order to do this, I will begin by shortly introducing the political theoretical 
foundations of Thomism, which served as a basis for both of their works.  
Thomas Aquinas wrote his commentary on Politics between 1269 and 1272 at 
around the same time as his tutor Albertus Magnus did. However, this work is not 
complete, it was finished by Peter of Auvergne. Similarly, the political views of 
Thomas do not form a complete system, they can only be interpreted in light of his 
theology. He was willing to harmonise Aristotle’s works with Christianity. Thomas 
differentiated between natural and supernatural order, but he characterised the two 
as forming an organic unity in which the supernatural element (grace of God) 
corrects the natural one. He underlined that humane rules should stem from natural 
law, and they should be reasonable instead of being interpreted simply as the will 
of the monarch. Thomas acknowledged the necessity of various forms of 
government, but he mostly supported limited monarchy. Regarding the governance 
of cities, he found satisfactory the rule by many.  However, in general, he 
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highlighted the advantages of monarchy. He viewed the ruler as somebody who 
exercised control alone just like the human heart exercises control over the whole 
body.185 However, monarchy had to function within limits according to Thomas, 
meaning that aristocratic and political elements had to counterbalance the power 
of the ruler. Thomas found particularly dangerous the forms of government with 
public participation (politia) in which relations were the least adequate to maintain 
peace. After Aristotle, he also treated democracy as the tyranny of the majority in 
which the majority exercised oppressive power over wealthy individuals (populus 
plebeiorum per potentiam multitudinis opprimit divites).186 Despite that, he 
considered democracy to be better than tyranny, a degenerated version of the best 
form of governance, monarchy. Thomas, in fact, believed that there was a greater 
likelihood that democracy would evolve into tyranny since democracy was less 
stable.187 Thomas adopted the basic frameworks of political categorisation from 
Aristotle: he differentiated between six forms of government and three modes of 
rule. Aristotle wrote the following about the forms of government: “we classified 
the right constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and constitutional 
government [politea in the original], and the deviations from these as three, tyranny 
from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy and democracy from constitutional 
government”.188 We should mention that in his work entitled Rhetoric he listed 
oligarchy as one of the basic forms, which can also have a good and a bad 
version.189 However, Thomas was not familiar with the work of Aristotle. The idea 
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that the degradation of the best form can lead to the worst one also originates from 
Politics. “For necessarily the deviation from the first and most divine must be the 
worst, and kingship must of necessity either possess the name only, without really 
being kingship, or be based on the outstanding superiority of the man who is king; 
so that tyranny being the worst form must be the one farthest removed from 
constitutional government, and oligarchy must be the second farthest,[…] while 
democracy must be the most moderate.”190 Aristotle mentioned four modes of rule 
in the first chapter of Politics: political (regimen politicum), regal (regimen regale), 
that of the household (regimen oeconomicum) and that of the slave-keeping lord 
(regimen despoticum). As opposed to Plato, Aristotle did not see the major 
difference among these areas in the number of subjects; rather the difference lay in 
the quality of exercising power. Moreover, he did not view regimen oeconomicum 
a realistic mode of rule since it concerned the household instead of the political 
community. The key difference Aristotle identified between regimen regale and 
regimen politicum is that the monarch himself exercised the power, while in the 
case of regimen politicum, the possessor of power was a ruler on one occasion and 
a subject on another.191 Thomas adopted the six forms of government,192 but he 
only used two of the modes of rule: the political and the regal.193 Blythe argued 
that there was not mediaeval political philosopher who would use precisely the 
terms regimen politicum and regimen regale. Irrespective of their definitions, 
monarchy was the intended meaning of the latter and republican rule the meaning 
of the former. Aristotle viewed the mixing of various forms of government 
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particularly advantageous, and Thomas Aquinas voiced the same opinion on two 
occasions to the extent he favoured a form of royal rule compensated by aristocratic 
and democratic elements.194 Since the work of Thomas was prepossessed by an 
urge to seek the transcendent aims of human existence, there was no room for the 
assessment of an independent worldly political order. Therefore, it would be 
accurate to say that proper political philosophy is missing from the works by 
Thomas. The second part of De regno focused explicitly on political power, but it 
has been known since the middle of the 20th century that this part was not written 
by Thomas Aquinas, but rather by Ptolemy of Lucca. Thus, someone else had to 
take the role of spreading Aristotelian political thought in the High Middle Ages, 
and it was Giles of Rome who published his ‘mirror of princes’, De regimine 
principum, only a few years after the death of Thomas. In the following pages, I 
will shift focus to the life of Giles of Rome and his magnum opus.   
 
Two Theories of Good Governance at the Turn of the 13th and 
14th Centuries 
Giles of Rome 
Giles of Rome (approx. 1240-1316) is known in historiography under other names 
too, e.g. in some sources he appears as Aegidius Romanus or Aegidius Colonna. 
Giles was born in Rome and was likely a member of the Colonna-family, 
possessing serious political and religious influence. He joined the Augustinian 
Order at the age of 14, then later studied at the University of Paris where he might 
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have been a student of Thomas Aquinas’ theological courses between 1269 and 
1272. In the following years, he wrote commentaries on the works of Aristotle 
jeopardizing his scientific career. In 1277, the rather inconsistent wave of 
condemnation against certain Aristotelian and orthodox doctrines carried out by 
Parisian bishop Étienne Tempier affected him as well.195 Therefore, he had to leave 
the University of Paris. According to contemporary authors, including Henry of 
Ghent and Godefroid de Fontaines, the doctrines of Giles were condemned by a 
procedure independent of the decree issued on 7th March 1277.196 There are no 
sources confirming that Giles went to Italy before 1281. Probably during this 
period (1277-1280), he was writing his mirror of princes entitled De regimine 
principum to the future King of France, Philip IV the Fair.197 Based on the number 
of the remaining manuscript copies, its translations and citations, this work 
probably made the largest impact in its field during the Middle Ages.198 He was 
occupied by the task of organising the Augustinian Order in Italy between 1281 
and 1284. After 1285 he was allowed to return to the University of Paris as a 
teacher significantly raising his prestige in the Augustinian Order. His works were 
declared to be the official doctrine of the Order, and he was elected vicar-general 
from 1292. In 1295 Pope Boniface VIII inaugurated him as the archbishop of 
Bourges. From this time, he started to be the apologist of the authority of Boniface 
VIII. He protected the resignation of Pope Celestine V and the election of Boniface. 
When Boniface twice entered into a conflict with Philip IV, Giles took the side of 
the Pope. Giles played a role in this debate from 1301 when Philip IV arrested the 
bishop of Pamiers, and Boniface openly opposed him in the bull Asculta fili, 
withdrew the privileges issued earlier and called all French bishops to a council in 
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Rome. Besides influencing the Parisian public opinion, Philip openly condemned 
the pope and forbade the participation of the French priests at the council. Finally, 
with the bull Unam sanctam the debate peaked in 1302.199 It seems to be very likely 
that the bull was inspired by the treatise De ecclesiastica potestate written by Giles 
of Rome in 1302. The treatise reflected a hierocratic standpoint.200 This became his 
second most significant writing. Giles had many different scholastic attributes such 
as doctor fundatissimus (Most Fundamental Doctor), doctor beatus (Blessed 
Doctor) and doctor verbosus (Verbose Doctor). 201 
  
His most important work De regime principum written between 1277 and 1280 
discusses the theory of the ruler’s authority on its own right, regardless of the 
governing role of the church. Its significance is shown in the fact that at least 300 
of its Latin manuscripts survived, and it has been translated to all the significant 
European languages. Giles of Rome reflected a somewhat distorted image of 
Aristotle’s moral and political philosophy, but this view played an outstanding role 
in the Western expansion of Aristotelian terminology. This work is one of the few 
that combined the mediaeval genre of the mirror of princes and Aristotelian 
political philosophy.202 An important difference compared to De Regno by Thomas 
is that De regime principum has a significantly more secular point of view. There 
is nothing written about the relationship between secular and spiritual authority. 
Giles used the Aristotelian language and terminology extremely arbitrarily in order 
to justify the single rule of the king. He put great emphasis on the sections where 
Aristotle praised the virtues of royal power and left out or intentionally 
misunderstood those that portrayed royal power as something negative. 
Contemporary French political requirements probably influenced his way of 
thinking, but despite this influence he rarely ever used contemporary or past 
empirical political examples in his work. Giles’ staunch monarchist stance with the 
hereditary and the institutionally unrestricted royal power encouraged earlier 
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authors to think of his work as one of the theoretical foundations of absolutism.203 
There is significant difference between Thomas and Giles in their ability to create 
synthesis. In Blythe’s view Giles’ work shows that he struggles to comply with 
both the Aristotelian worldview and with that of the Augustinian Order. He wrote 
in a contradictory fashion on whether governance was the product of the original 
sin or if it can be derived from human nature. Similarly, he did not take a stance on 
whether the monarch should rule only according to his own will or if he should be 
restricted by a comittee. There is a contradiction in Giles’ work between the 
autonomous ruler and the royal power based on the consent of the people.  We 
cannot find a final decision in De regimine principum on whether the state is an 
organic extension of the family or if it is a social contract-like artificial creature.204 
With an analysis of De regimine principum we will observe whether these 
statements can be supported textually. 
The work follows the ethica – oeconomica – politica triple division. The first book 
is about ruling virtues, the second displays the governance of the smallest 
community through the operation of the household, and the third deals with the 
topic of political power. The order in itself says a lot about the Giles’ 
preconceptions. According to Aristotle the virtues of the citizen and the ruler 
change in accordance with the governmental forms.205 The fact that Giles dealt 
with the ruling virtues at the beginning of his work means he understood them as 
absolute, stressing the role of the single ruler. However, it should not be 
overemphasised because since Seneca, it had been a traditional pattern of thought 
that the good monarch is ethical; therefore, he can rule also over himself.206 In the 
Middle Ages it became commonplace that the good ruler not only exercised his 
power perfectly over himself but also over his micro-environment, the family. 
Therefore, we should be careful with the statement of Blythe, according to which 
the division of the text in itself says a lot about the views of Giles since it can be 
regarded as a simple political literary motif of the Middle Ages.207 However, it still 
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seems that Giles in his treatise stands for some kind of absolute monarchy as the 
ideal form of government. Giles did not accept the statement of Aristotle and 
Thomas that the household and the political community should be separated with 
a sharp line. Hence, similar to Plato, he equated a big household with a small city 
state. This explains why the appropriate command of the household plays a 
significant role in a work otherwise focusing on political philosophy. This work 
introduces Giles’ views on the modes of rule (regal, political and despotic) first in 
relation to the household. Therefore it is necessary that we briefly cover the second 
book of De regimine principum. According to Blythe, Giles did not treat the 
household as a laboratory where he could freely discuss the ways of exercising 
power so that the conclusions he made would be applied to the political 
community. In Blythe’s view this is supported by the fact that Giles did not present 
an omnipotent father figure, who could serve as a model for an absolute monarch 
in the political community, as the head of the household. Instead he projected 
exercising political power onto the family (as opposed to the other way around). 
Taking this into consideration, it is possible to learn as much about his political 
views from the second book as from the truly political philosophical third one.208 
  
By contrast, if we take a look at the text, it is evident that Giles considered it natural 
that there could only be regal power in a household. The wording here suggests an 
omnipotent father figure which contradicts our previous statement: In communitate 
maris et foeminae, mas debet esse principans, et foemina obsequens: in 
communitate vero patris et filii, pater debet esse imperiens et filius obtemperens; 
in communitate quidem domini et servi, dominus debet esse praecipiens et servus 
ministrans et serviens.” 209 Although the father relates differently to the various 
members of the household, this relationship is apparently always subordinate. At 
the same time, Blythe is correct in stating that Giles first differentiated between 
political and regal rule in relation to the household. It seems that the author initially 
used the Aristotelian dual division of the modes of rule.210 In the first case, the head 
of the household practiced power through laws and agreements, while in the second 
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case he governed according to his own will.211 It is important to note that he did 
not divide the two modes based on the existence or absence of law; rather, he based 
this categorization on whom the law could be derived from: the ruler or the 
subjects. „Dicitur autem quis praeesse regali dominio, cum praeest secundum 
arbitrium et secundum leges, quas ipse instituit. Sed tunc praeest regimine politico, 
quandi non praeest secundum arbitrium, nec secundum leges quas ipse instituit; 
sed secundum eas quas cives instituerunt.” 212 According to Blythe, by focusing on 
the decision-makers, Giles pointed out that each acceptable mode of rule was based 
on law. He contended that this was not obvious in the case of Thomas Aquinas. It 
is most likely that Blythe defined the situation incorrectly here213 since, as 
mentioned previously, Thomas contended that every authority and by extension 
every ruler should be subordinated to natural law. Hence, statutory positive law 
should also be derived from natural law. In this sense, Thomas always wrote about 
a lawful government, but in his works law meant natural law and not necessarily 
positive man-made law. However, it is true that the supremacy of law was also 
emphasised by Giles and that the differentiation between the political and regal 
rule became even more significant since he did not contrast them by the mere 
existence or absence of law but by the different internal sources of law, i.e. by the 
individuals or the bodies law originated from.  
 
Giles further subdivided regal power which, in his view, deserved the name ‘regal’ 
only when it served the well-being of the subjects. Otherwise, the single rule is 
considered to be despotic. This consideration is how he arrived to the three modes 
of rule that were regal, political and despotic. Here Giles returned to the field of 
the household and brought examples from there for the modes of rule. Hence, 
political rule (regimen politicum) in the household characterised exclusively the 
relationship of husband and wife. It is based on the equality of the spouses, which 
derives from the fact that they chose each other mutually. In this sense the wife is 
equal to the husband and can participate in the elaboration of the rules that 
determine their common life. Moreover, certain rules may come exclusively from 
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the wife, the same way as in case of political rule they stem from the people.214 It 
is important, however, to see that Giles did not present legislation as a dynamic 
procedure, and of course the role of the wife cannot be called legislation. Giles 
contended that the legal corpus accepted at the election of a ruler and at the 
wedding determined these relationships until the election of the new ruler or the 
end of the marriage. According to Blythe, it is worth emphasising that Giles of 
Rome, who earlier had been interpreted as the forerunner of absolutist thought, 
discussed regimen politicum, which was based on the equality of the parties, as an 
evident fact. He even referred to it as a well-known and accepted mode of rule. It 
is likely that he took into account regimen politicum only because he followed 
Thomas’ commentary on Aristotle while his own train of thought almost always 
favoured the monarchist standpoint.215 This is demonstrated by the fact that the 
father’s power over his children was seen as an example of the royal power in the 
household. It is an important difference as opposed to the relationship of the 
spouses that children were not equal to their father since they could not choose 
him, rather they were begotten by him.216 That is why the father rules over them as 
the king over his people, he determines what the best is for them. The despotic 
version of regal rule can be exercised in relation to the servants in the household. 
Giles viewed servants as household objects unable to do intellectual work, over 
whom their lord possesses full right of disposition. As opposed to Thomas Aquinas, 
Giles saw despotic rule (regimen despoticum) as serving the right of both parties, 
since the lord could practice power according to his own interests but at the same 
time he completed the lacking intellectual capacity of the servants.  
 
We can see that the interpretation of Giles of Rome is reminiscent of that of 
Aristotle and Thomas, but his conclusions are novel. According to Blythe, the most 
important difference between the approach of Thomas and Giles is that while 
Thomas differentiated between the modes of rule based on how much freedom is 
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given to the subordinates, Giles divided them based on the freedom or limits of the 
ruler’s power. Therefore, according to Thomas, there was a significant dividing 
line between the freedom of the wife and children and the quality of the servants 
while Giles saw the difference between the power based on the will of the ruler 
over the servants, and the lawful power practiced over the wife. Based on this 
reasoning, Thomas saw the two main modes of rule to be the political and the 
despotic (regimen politicum and regimen despoticum) and subdivided the political 
into regal and political (regimen regale and regimen politicum). On the otherhand, 
Giles viewed the regal and the political as the two main modes of rule, and the 
regal was subdivided into despotic and regal. The double meaning of the world 
‘regal’ is deceptive in Giles’ work, but the despotic ordered under the regal mode 
legitimated the former.217  
 
A further, important difference is seen between the thinking of Aristotle, Thomas 
and Giles in the nature of regimen politicum. According to Aristotle, the rotation 
of the offices is an organic inherence of regimen politicum, which is not the case 
in the family. Thomas and Giles did not consider the constant filling of offices with 
new officers an inalienable part of regimen politicum. Giles did not even mention 
the idea; moreover, a government operating with more rulers was not even 
remotely referred to in his work. In Giles’ view, the idea that the political 
community is ruled by a single person was as obvious as the fact that a family can 
have only one father. In Giles’ work regimen politicum only means that the power 
of the ruler is restricted by rules that are co-created by its subordinates. At this 
point it is clear that Giles projected his statements about the household directly to 
the questions of government. Similar to Aristotle and Thomas, he treated marriage 
as a contractual relationship and accepted the leading role of the man referring to 
his superior intellectual ability. Giles contended that, in this sense, marriage can be 
interpreted as a lord-servant relationship although in other places he clearly divided 
marriage and servitude.218 According to Blythe here we can see again that the 
author cannot choose between the Aristotelian thought and the Augustinian 
tradition in De regimine principum.219 According to the former, power is natural 
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and good for humanity, whereas the latter views power as servitude in every case 
and derives it from the original sin. In spite of this, according to Giles, the wife in 
the bond of marriage is more of an equal party than a servant whose advice must 
be taken into account by the husband since it can be more correct than the 
husband’s own considerations.220 The statements made in relation to the marriage 
refer to regimen politicum. In the latter the ruler can only exercise his power legally 
if he was elected by the citizens and if his power has their consent; therefore, they 
are more like his partners than his servants. Furthermore, it is important that the 
ruler is bound by the laws that the citizens made him accept at the beginning of his 
rule. However, following the inauguration, the ruler practices an absolute power 
just like the father in the family. 
 
Although Giles contended that the election of the ruler and the consent of the 
citizens was not necessary for practicing regal power, this mode of rule can also be 
interpreted with certain limitations. He wrote about these limitations in the 
explicitly political theoretical third book though; therefore, these issues will be 
revisited. In Giles’ interpretation regimen regale is similar to paternal rule while 
regimen politicum can only be realised if the ruler is elected. The law restricting 
the power of the ruler can only be made at the election. „Nam pacta et conventiones 
non interveniunt inter subditum et praeeminentem, nisi sit in potestate subiecti 
eligere rectorem: non est autem in potestate filiorum eligere patrem.” 221 
According to Blythe, by contending that the hereditary power is equal to paternal 
power, Giles automatically became an advocate of hereditary regal rule. Because 
of this, the election of the ruler was limited to regimen politicum in his work. 222  
 
Giles wrote systematically about Aristotelian political theory in the third book of 
De regimine principum, and it is only here that he referred to existing governments. 
These references appeared for the exclusive purpose of illustration. Giles did not 
analyse them in depth, but rather he remained at the level of general theorising. 
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Since the monarchical form of government stood in the forefront of Giles’ thinking, 
he found it important to demonstrate the functionality of the other forms. Blythe 
emphasised that while Giles accepted the Aristotelian six-fold scheme of 
governmental forms, the forms other than monarchy appeared only as negative 
counterexamples in his work.223 The description of the government of the Roman 
Republic, demonstrating the rule of the few, is a good example of this. „Videmus 
enim pluries in civitate Romana, quod deficiente senatu, tempore illo intermedio, 
antequam alius senator eligeretur, regebatur totus Romanus populus quibusdam 
paucis viris: eligebantur enim duodecim viri approbati et boni testimonii, quos 
vocabant duodecim bonos homines; et horum gubernatione tota civitas regebatur: 
unde et maleficia facta distinguebantur ex diversitate principatuum. Dicebatur 
autem de aliquo maleficio fuisse factum tempore senatoris, de aliquo vero tempore 
bonorum hominum.”224 It is remarkable that Giles used the expression “tempore 
illo intermedio, antequam alius senator eligebatur” to describe when rule of the 
few was available: only during the intermission between two senators’ office. Thus, 
according to De regimine principum, republican rule was a temporary period or a 
sort of intermission covering the period when an old senator was replaced by a new 
one, but Rome was also usually governed by a single ruler.  
 
The author also observed the rule of many through the communities of the North-
Italian city-states. „Communiter enim civitatibus Italiae dominantur multi, ut totus 
populus: ibi enim requiritur consensus totius populi in statutis condendis, in 
potestatibus eligendis, et etiam in potestatibus corrigendis. Licet enim semper ibi 
adnotetur potestas vel cominus aliquis, qui civitatem regat; magis tanem 
dominatur totus populus, quam dominus adnotatus, eo quod totius populi est eum 
eligere et corrigere, si male agat: etiam eius totius est statua condenda, quae non 
licet dominum transgredi.”225 The last two clauses express Giles’ thoughts 
straightforwardly and concisely on the rule of many, i.e. subjects can correct a ruler 
and create laws that he cannot violate. In Blythe’s interpretation, in order to 
understand the thoughts of Giles, one has to raise the question whether the rule of 
many in the latter case means something different from a monarchy where the king 
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rules through law instead of his own will.226 According to the key idea of a monarch 
in De regimine principum, it is natural and proper for a state to be ruled by single 
person, similar to a body having only one head. But in Blythe’s train of thought the 
most important question is not whether one person leads a community since every 
government can see the necessity of one person having the executive power to 
represent individuals on daily issues and, thus, avoiding all matters being handled 
by a committee. 227 The true question for Blythe is to what extent the community 
is able to retain the right of having control over the power of the ruler.228 By making 
parallel the bond of marriage and regimen politicum, Giles explained that the 
subject or the wife can only oblige their lord to obey the legal corpus created at the 
time of the election or the start of the marriage, and after this initial commitment, 
the lord can rule by his own free will. At the same time, it seems that the above 
quotation gave the Italian citizens a much more dynamic role. The explanation of 
the difference might be that the citizens of the city states could continuously 
participate in the procedure of governing. Therefore, instead of the citizen’s passive 
agreement, all issues of the city-state could only be taken care of by their active 
cooperation. Based on the above, Giles apparently provided more room to 
manoeuvre for the citizens of regimen politicum than for the wife in the bond of 
marriage. At the same time, based on the example of the Italian city-states, citing 
Thomas’ De regno, Giles laconically condemned political rule. „Experti enim 
sumus civitates et provincias non existentes sub uno rege esse in penuria, non 
gaudere in pace, molestari dissensionibus et guerris: existentes vero sub uno rege 
e contrario, guerras nesciunt, pacem sectantur, abundantia florent.”229 I. e. he 
viewed regimen politicum to be the root cause of all sufferings a society may have 
to endure while he believed that the flourishing of a society could only be brought 
about by regal rule.  
 
It is beyond a shadow of a doubt that for Giles the only form of governance that 
God approved was royal power. Although the other forms could be legitimate, they 
did not reflect the order of nature. The political community that was stuck between 
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the universe and humanity had to follow the organising principle of nature. „Nam 
sicut universum dirigitur uno principe, ut uno deo, qui est intellectus separatus et 
purus: sic omnia, quae sunt in homine, si debite regi debent, regenda sunt intellectu 
et ratione. […] Si ergo regimen totius universi assimilatur regimini quod debet 
esse in uno homine: cum civitas sit pars universi, regimen totius civitatis multo 
magis reservabitur in una domo.”230 Therefore, based on the pattern of the divine 
governance, monarchy was the only natural government on earth. Despite that, 
Giles raised constraints against royal power as well. Even the author interpreted as 
an early advocate of absolute monarchy found it much more favourable for the 
monarch to rule by his own laws than by his own will. „Expedit quantum possibile 
est per legem omnia determinari, et quam paucissima arbitrio iudicum 
commitere.”231 After stating this, Giles adds that there are some natural exceptions 
to this rule, i.e. when in the name of equity and justice, the king still should be 
trusted with making the right decision. In Giles’ interpretation, the rule of law 
formulated in Aristotle’s works can only apply for natural law and not for the 
positive law created by people. 
Giles used a wording very close to one of Thomas Aquinas’ standpoints here. 
Regarding the regimen regale, Thomas explained the following at one point in 
Summa theologiae: „Unde quantum ad Dei iudicium, princeps non est solutus a 
lege, quantum ad vim directivam eius; sed debet voluntarius, non coactus, legem 
implere. Est etiam princeps supra legem, inquantum, si expediens fuerit, potest 
legem mutare, et in ea dispensare, pro loco et tempore.”232 The reasoning leading 
up to these two standpoints differ. Whereas Thomas would have strengthened the 
ruler in regimen politicum by raising him above positive laws, Giles weakened the 
monarch practising regimen regale by restricting his power through obliging him 
to abide by his own laws. However, by exempting the king from positive, statutory 
law in a pioneering way, he opened the gate towards the theory of the absolute 
power which was, by the way, an alien concept in the political thought of the High 
Middle Ages. That is why Carlyle saw De regimine principum as the forerunner of 
early modern absolutism.233 It is remarkable that while Giles left little room for the 
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subjects in his ideas on governance in general, he still elaborated extensively on 
the role of consulting committees surrounding the ruler in relation to regal rule. It 
was the duty of the wise to consult the king since they possessed more knowledge 
together than the king by himself: „Plura cognoscere possunt multi, quam unus.”234 
This was the first occasion that Giles apparently found an ex-post constraint of 
regal rule acceptable. Beyond what was said with regards to regimen politicum, he 
also gave a chance to the wise to limit the process of practicing regimen regale. In 
this respect the role of the wise or the “experts” in regimen regale showed 
similarity to the way citizens could have a say also during the reign of the ruler. 
Giles dealt with the question of why the advice of the wise was necessary in the 
immediate environment of the monarch in great length. He took the most important 
arguments from the third book of Aristotle’s Politics, where the author drew the 
reader’s attention to the fact that two heads are better than one, and with more 
hands, more work can be done. According to Aristotle, the rule of many creates a 
situation as if a ruler had more than two eyes and hands. This is also important 
because the individual can be corrupted much more easily than a group of 
individuals. The good ruler can be recognised by the fact that he acts for the 
commonwealth and does not seek benefits for himself, and the rule of many can 
also be beneficial from this point of view. Because if all the individuals 
participating in the power served their own good, the governance would still be 
closer to the commonwealth than with the monarch alone following his own 
interests. In sum, Giles hoped that the contradicting interests would neutralise each 
other and even if that did not happen, it would display a picture closer to the 
commonwealth than the empowerment of a single person. According to De 
regimine principum, an additional advantage of the consultants surrounding the 
king was that they strengthened the legitimacy of the monarch since by having 
advisors the king could not be accused of not knowing enough. If the committee is 
viewed as the members of the king, everything the committee knows is part of the 
knowledge of the king. An important additional benefit was that if the ruler wanted 
to govern well, he would be less likely to lose the right track if the wise and just 
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consultants were beside him. Giles contended that losing track could have only 
occurred if all members had a distorted will.235 
It seems then that in Giles’ idea the committee of the consultants also had a certain 
role in controlling the king. In various parts of the text Giles accused the ruler 
dismissing the consulting committee of being a tyrant.236 A typical example is the 
following: „Si autem aliter se haberet, ut spreto consilio, et dimissa societate 
sapientum et bonorum, vellet sequi caput proprium, et appetitum privatum, iam 
non est rex sed tyrannus: tale ergo dominari non esset melius quam plures.”237  
Blythe contended that the importance of the controlling function was emphasised 
in the fact that Giles went against Aristotle and Thomas who thought that the 
monarch is legitimised by ethical excellence and superiority. In contrast, Giles has 
had a surprisingly flexible standpoint when he discussed hereditary regal rule. „Si 
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aliquis defectus esset in filio regis, ad quem deberet regia cura pervenire, suppleri 
poterit per sapientes et bonos, quos tanquam manus et oculos debet sibi rex in 
societate coniungere.”238 At first it might seem that the ruler was degraded to the 
spokesman of the committee. In making this claim, Giles strongly constrained 
practicing power, but at the same time, he protected the idea of hereditary 
monarchy. The protection is seen in the fact that in case the successor of the king 
was not suitable, the consulting committee could almost replace the ruler instead 
of forcing him to abdicate because of his incapability, as it was suggested by 
papalist Gregorian thinkers.239 It is also important that the consultants could get 
into the committee exclusively on the recommendation of the ruler; therefore, they 
were not at all independent of the ruler. In addition, Giles also suggested the 
monarch to appoint people to the committee who were polite and loyal to him 
because they were going to give the best advice. It is worth taking a look at the 
order the author used when he listed the qualities necessary to the consultants: first 
of all they had to be good, secondly they had to be friends, and wisdom was 
featured only as their third quality. 240 Giles’ model obviously protected the ruler, 
even at the cost of limiting his power.  
 
Blythe formulated this in the following way: the consultants were actors who could 
exercise the authority of the ruler and who were to be fully used in the interest and 
for the purposes of the ruler. The point of the consulting committee was not to 
restrict the ruler but to help him protect his power. Although the wise monarch 
always listened to the opinion of the consultants, he was not obliged to base his 
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decisions on their opinion, especially not if it had not served the interests of the 
community he governed. Blythe contended that the consulting committee could be 
in charge of many public duties but its independence was obviously absent, and 
that was the most significant barrier of Giles’ model to be qualified as a mixed 
constitution (regimen mixtum). 241 
 
Ptolemy of Lucca 
Ptolemy of Lucca was a contemporary of Giles of Rome and lived an 
extraordinarily long life by medieval standards (1236-1327). He was born in Lucca 
into a notable merchant family named Fiadoni. It is debated whether the family 
was middle class,242 but it seems clear that Ptolemy had three brothers.243 As a 
young man he joined the Dominican Order and according to certain sources he was 
a student of Thomas Aquinas between 1261 and 1268 at the University of Paris.244 
According to other scholars he did not study in Paris and more likely he was a 
student of Thomas in Orvieto or in Rome.245 It seems verifiable that he joined 
Thomas when he returned from Paris to Naples meeting him in Rome. Ptolemy 
lived in a Naples convent with Thomas for a year and a half and was supposedly 
with him at the time of his death, although some scholars deny that.246 It was 
Ptolemy of Lucca who first devoted a work to the life of Thomas Aquinas247 and it 
is thanks to him that we are familiar with some of the details about him today.248 
He served as a prior in numerous monasteries of Tuscany between 1280 and the 
first decade of the 1300s. Among them was Santa Maria Novella in Florence which 
was the hub of studying ancient authors, the scene of the early development of the 
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republican idea and the centre of so-called pre-humanism. Charles Till Davis 
indicated in a paper written in 1974 that a rediscovery of republican values started 
a generation before Petrarch in Santa Maria Novella. Davis highlighted that the 
impact of Ptolemy who intentionally misinterpreted Saint Augustine to support his 
republicanism can be traced in the works of authors who were in contact with Santa 
Maria Novella like Remigio de’ Girolami or Dante Alighieri.249 Ptolemy most 
likely spent the second decade of the 14th century in the Papal Court in Avignon 
where he did research and worked in the library. Pope John XXII appointed him 
archbishop of Torcello in 1318. He was engaged in a furious debate with the 
Patriarch of Grado after which the Pope had to provide him protection, because the 
Patriarch imprisoned him. He was interrogated and absolved of the accusations of 
the Patriarch in 1323 in Avignon where he most likely also attended the 
beatification of his master Thomas Aquinas. He died in 1326 or 1327 at the age of 
90 in Torcello.250  
Besides De regimine principum, which will be discussed in detail, it is worth 
underlining his work on ecclesiastical history (Historia ecclesiastica), his 
Hexameron focusing on the six days of creation and his treatise discussing some 
aspects of imperial power entitled Determinatio compendiosa de iurisdictione 
imperii which also contains relevant information from our point of view regarding 
North Italian city-states and the upper limits of royal authority. The latter piece 
could be considered a counterpart of De regimine principum written twenty years 
later since it discusses the relationship between the State and Church which topic 
is significantly underrepresented in De regimine principum. The two works 
resemble each other structurally since both interpret the Pope as the highest of all 
earthly authorities and by doing so Ptolemy joined the politico-philosophical 
debate starting with the Gregorian Reform which reached one of its peaks around 
his time. A weakening papacy was using stronger and stronger terminology as it 
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was weakening.251 Blythe considers it noteworthy that Ptolemy depicted the 
papacy as a limited form of monarchy in some parts of his texts.252  
Before the political ideas of Ptolemy are sketched, we need to delve into a short 
introduction of Northern Italy, an area where he spent most of his youth and which 
largely shaped his worldview. It is also important to touch upon the matter of 
Northern Italy and Lucca because Ptolemy referred to the institutional setup of 
contemporary or historical city-states much more abundantly than Giles of Rome. 
The two most important formative features in the development of North Italian 
city-states were that the Holy Roman Emperors could hardly exercise any authority 
there and that the nobility or aristocracy lived within the borders of these city-
states. The first feature contributed to the birth of the movement of the most 
innovative self-governing organisations, the so-called communes while the second 
resulted in an extraordinary coexistence of the emerging bourgeoisie and the 
aristocracy which is regarded by some scholars as a major precondition of the Great 
Renaissance.253 Initially communes were protecting the interests of the aristocracy 
and the more affluent bourgeoisie and therefore they can be perceived as the 
product of the organic coexistence of the city and the aristocracy. Later they 
developed into power structures governing complete city-states and even consuls 
were elected from among their members between 1080 and 1220. Following that 
period city communes elected leaders, so-called podestàs from external sources, 
other city states in order to ensure their unbiased and effective functioning.  
In the meantime an unprecedented expansion of Mediterranean trade was 
witnessed in the region. From the 11th century onwards it was possible for the city-
states to build up a dominance first against the Byzantine and much later against 
the Ottoman Empire.254 The agricultural revolution and the expansion of commerce 
enabled the process in which lower class members of various guilds could demand 
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a bigger share of authority. That is how the age of the popolo came about in which 
political power was exercised by widening layers of the population. However, that 
did not lead automatically to more peaceful social conditions because of the 
centrifugal effect of faction fights and party politics. In some city-states the 
wealthier turned against the poorer255 while in others the Papalists were opposed 
by Imperialists and both of these were often accompanied by clashes among the 
city-states themselves. The exhausted city-states whose populations were 
disenchanted with their situation often returned to various forms of single rule and 
only preserved the empty forms of republican government.256 It is important to see 
that to the South of the Alps despite the crises a relatively wide layer of secular 
intellectuals (ars notaria) survived from the early mediaeval period onwards 
thanks to urban law schools while in post-Carolingian North-Western Europe 
education was only available within ecclesiastical frameworks.257 These 
circumstances might explain the appearance of pre-humanist workshops like Santa 
Maria Novella which despite being a religious institution attracted notable secular 
intellectuals like Dante Alighieri.258 Santa Maria Novella became the source of the 
most modern scholastic education in Tuscany.  
Besides the general picture of Northern Italy the position of an extensively 
urbanised 13th-14th century Lucca should also be drafted in order to understand the 
political views of Ptolemy. He spent thirty years of his life there.259 Together with 
other city-states supporting the Holy Roman Empire, Lucca received liberties 
which first allowed them forming communes and electing their own podestà while 
later these contributed to Lucca conquering the neighbouring regions. Lucca was 
competing with some of the other city-states of Tuscany, initially in the 12th century 
Pisa having been its rival while following the latter’s defeat by Genoa (1284), 
Florence took over that role. Lucca as a financial and economic centre mostly 
capitalised on a flourishing silk industry. In the period of 13th century financial and 
economic upswing the classical characteristics of the North Italian model also 
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appeared in Lucca: the guilds successfully fought the communes for power. 
Governing through certain bodies and councils appeared which was also 
characteristic of the region. Popular councils, a specific council of the elders 
(Anziani) and a single executive authority in the person of the captain jointly 
constituted the specific form of government of Lucca in the youth of Ptolemy.260 
But in his old age Lucca could not resist the zeitgeist and shifted towards a more 
despotic regime. In the meanwhile a pro-Guelph Lucca could successfully fight 
Emperor Henry VII during his campaign of 1310-13, but later was still forced to 
surrender and fell under the authority of Ghibelline warlords from 1316. That 
situation ended in 1363 when Lucca was turned into a republic again, but with 
oligarchic undertones. According to Blythe Lucca had to face serious challenges 
similar to the other North Italian city-states, but responded to them more 
successfully. We should not understate that the family of Ptolemy played a 
prominent role in such a relatively successful city-state.261  
Since Ptolemy often mentioned the contemporary political regimes outside Italy, 
the major political facts from the regions covered should also be briefly introduced. 
Ptolemy’s century was the most important regarding the formation of mediaeval 
states. The Estates of the Realm which emerged out of the general feudal chaos of 
the turn of the millennium were living their heyday at the time. The economic and 
demographic decline of the 14th century unfolded among stable political and social 
frameworks except in the case of the Holy Roman Empire and Northern Italy. 
Paradoxically in these regions, where Frederick II was aiming at the utmost 
centralisation in the first half of the 13th century, did fragmentation appear in its 
most severe form. The idea of a trans-Alpine Empire could not evolve into a real 
political structure as it is well demonstrated by the fact that the two regions of 
Europe where absolutistic centralisation could not take place at all were the Holy 
Roman Empire and Italy.262 Frederick II could never really break the resistance of 
the city-states263 and shortly after his death in 1250 Naples and Sicily fell into the 
hands of the Anjou monarchs while in the Holy Roman Empire the Great 
Interregnum soon started. The severe clashes between the Emperors and the city-
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states as the upper and lower limits of mediaeval territorial statehood illustrate 
particularly well in Northern Italy how paralysing their impact was on effective 
state-formation 
At the time of the Great Interregnum Ptolemy was a teenager and also well before 
the writing of De regimine principum did the Sicilian Vespers take place (in 1282 
when Ptolemy was 46 years old), an event when the Anjou guardians were 
massacred by the locals in order to take control over the island. However the 
authority over Sicily was later held by the Aragon dynasty.264 The turn of the 13th 
and 14th century found Naples in the hands of the Anjou dynasty while Sicily under 
the authority of the Aragon monarchs.265 In the meantime the Great Interregnum 
ended and the Holy Roman Empire was also in a state of fragmentation thanks to 
the strengthening Prince-electors and the weak emperors. The territories other than 
Italy and the Holy Roman Empire produced much more stable and successful 
political formations. The heirs of the Magna Charta in England unwillingly created 
the roots of parliamentary rule during the life of Ptolemy as the strengthening 
debates between the kings and the aristocracy were gradually institutionalised. The 
nobility also seized strong positions against the king in France. The frameworks of 
representative institutions of the Estates of the Realm were slowly taking shape 
during the time of (Saint) Louis IX under whose reign also Ptolemy visited France. 
Some scholars are of the view that the ideas of Thomas Aquinas about a mixed 
constitution were inspired by the France of Saint Louis.266 Ptolemy wrote De 
regimine principum following the beatification of Saint Louis during the reign of 
Philip IV who was more successful in weakening the powerful nobility and clergy 
than his predecessors. Irrespective of that France also took the path of building 
representative institutions limiting the authority of the kings even though the 
Estates of the Realm only functioned as an occasional event supporting the foreign 
policy of the kings. There were other smaller centralised states being born at the 
time, particularly in the Northern regions of Iberia. There were also both more and 
less successful examples of centralisation in East-Central Europe. While the kings 
could exercise authority all over Hungary in the Árpád Era, Poland served as a 
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good example of the fragmentation of royal power. But that was to change during 
the life of Ptolemy, since during king Władisław I (the Elbow-high) a stronger 
royal authority was being organised in Poland while in Hungary the extinction of 
the Árpád dynasty led to a considerable strife of succession which largely 
contributed to the rise of oligarchs and the fragmentation of public power. It is 
important to bear these circumstances in mind since the author himself often 
referred to them.267   
Regarding the authorship and the dating of Ptolemy’s work there are more 
controversies than in the case of Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum. It seems 
highly likely that the text was written around 1300 since the German king Albert I 
(Habsburg) is mentioned in the text who reigned between 1298 and 1308. It brings 
us even closer to the time of writing if we take into account that according to 
Ptolemy 270 years had passed since the coronation of Conrad II which happened 
according to recent historiography in the year 1027, but according to Ptolemy it 
was held in the year 1030.268 Based on these and other arguments the text is 
considered to be written between 1301 and 1303.269  
The question of authorship is even more exciting since its soaring popularity was 
owing to its attribution to Thomas Aquinas. Only 20th century philology discovered 
that Thomas wrote merely the part entitled De regno ad regem Cypri and from 
Book 4 Chapter 2 a different author continued the work. The belated discovery 
might be surprising in light of the fact that the second part differs from the first 
stylistically, structurally and also regarding the its references and strongly 
resembles Determinatio compendiosa. From all the differences the most important 
is the markedly different content. While regal power was considered to be a 
positive feature in the first book, it was an object of harsh criticism in the others. 
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In light of these circumstances did Alfred O’Rahilly make the claim that Ptolemy 
of Lucca must have written the second half of the work.270 Other scholars even 
doubted the contribution of Thomas Aquinas271 and there were some who argued 
that there was a third author.272  Walter Mohr believed that internal consistency 
was missing from the second book and found it likely that the second book itself 
was written by multiple authors who might not even have been familiar with the 
first book since they have not referred to back to it. According to him, Ptolemy of 
Lucca must have taken up writing from the third book, but was already familiar 
with the content of the previous two. Blythe refuted Mohr’s theory on multiple 
grounds. He highlighted that the second book basically introduced the theme of the 
third when the author discussed the obligations of the ruler and the welfare of the 
people. It seems equally likely that the author of the second book referred back to 
some parts of the text from the first one. In part 2.8 the author shortly outlined his 
theory about the six-fold Aristotelian scheme of the forms of government, but 
instead of repeating the Aristotelian classification, he wrote that it was already 
elaborated in the first book: „licet plures ponat in 5 Politicorum, ut supra est 
distinctum, et infra etiam declarabitur.”273 Besides that in 2.9 it is stated based on 
I Kings that in that book the Bible argues that political rule is better for the people 
than regal rule. As the author highlights it, the contrary was already proved above: 
„cuius tamen superius contrarium est ostensum.”274 
Mohr claims that connecting law and public good does not appear in the first book 
even though it was a centrepiece in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and it is 
highly unlikely that he would have omitted that from the introduction of a work on 
political philosophy. It was already Blythe who added that the separation of 
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regimen politicum and regimen regale is also missing from the first book which 
appeared in his commentary on Aristotle’s Politics and was also extensively used 
by Ptolemy. Based on all these circumstances Blythe arrived at the conclusion that 
the first book and the first half of the second was written by an author whose person 
could not be safely identified. According to the introduction to Blythe’s translation 
Ptolemy clearly wrote everything from the middle of article 2.4.275 Therefore the 
text will be observed here mostly from that point.  
Ptolemy of Lucca belonged to a small group that was outstanding in late-13th and 
early-14th century political philosophy because its members had studied deeply the 
translation of Politics by Moerbeke. The members of that group were connected 
through the University of Paris and the following six authors belonged there: 
Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne, Albertus Magnus, John of Paris, Giles of 
Rome and Ptolemy. Other scholars only joined the group in the later decades of the 
14th century from England, the Holy Roman Empire and Italy, but very often even 
they were connected to the University of Paris. From among them Ptolemy’s works 
clearly resembled those of Thomas and Peter of Auvergne. All three were 
implicitly promoting some sort of mixed constitution. Ptolemy urged the 
reconciliation of Aristotle’s and Saint Augustine’s views and in that sense also 
resembled Giles of Rome besides Thomas Aquinas. His results of reconciliation 
will be mentioned in the comparison the two author’s works at the end of the 
present Chapter. 
We should look at the foundations first and see how Ptolemy assimilated 
Aristotelian categories. As it was demonstrated above, Ptolemy did not take the 
task of introducing the six-fold scheme of Aristotle, but rather relied on the first 
book when he referred to the scheme. However the introduction of a system similar 
to Aristotle’s four-fold classification of the modes of rule was already introduced 
in the third book. „Recepit igitur divisionem dominium quadreimembrem ex eadem 
causa  et ratione, quia quoddam est sacerdotale et regale simul; aliud autem est 
regale solum, sub quo imperale sumitur, et sic de aliis, ut infra patebit. Tertium 
vero politicum; quartum autem oeconomicum.”276 The author obviously used his 
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own classification here,277 but he heavily relied on Aristotle’s four-fold scheme. 
As it was mentioned above, Aristotle believed that all modes of rule were 
applicable to any lager group except regimen oeconomicum (which concerned the 
household). By saying that, he challenged Plato’s approach who only reserved 
political (regimen politicum) and regal (regimen regale) modes to larger groups 
and deemed economic rule merely applicable to the household and despotic rule to 
slave-keeping lords.  
Ptolemy followed the Platonic way and linked the applicability of each mode to 
the number of subjects. Sacerdotal and regal (sacerdotale et regale) mode thus 
concerns the whole world, regal alone (regale solum) is applicable for a kingdom 
or a province, political (regimen politicum) typically for a city while economic 
(oeconomicum) for the family or the household.278 Since the first and last of these 
modes has less to do with public affairs than with the sacred279 and the private 
sphere, Ptolemy covered them shortly and did not return to discussing them on the 
pages of De regimine principum. Out of the two irrelevant modes of rule he 
described the first in more detail. For him as a supporter of the Papacy it was 
beyond a shadow of a doubt that that sacerdotal and regal rule was the highest mode 
of exercising power since it could be derived straight from Jesus Christ who has 
built his Church by Saint Peter.280 On the other hand, Ptolemy hardly discussed the 
question of the household, most likely he just mentioned it in order to make the list 
of the modes of rule complete. It is also striking that Ptolemy entirely ignored 
Aristotle’s despotic mode of rule (regimen despoticum). The reason behind that 
could be that he saw no real difference between the despotic and regal modes, 
moreover he thought that the previous could be reduced to the second and therefore 
he almost used them interchangeably. Referring to the Scripture, Ptolemy argued 
that regal rule is just a form of despotic rule.281  
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In order to understand Ptolemy’s concept of monarchy we first need to take a closer 
look at the close connection of regimen regale and regimen despoticum which 
appears in his work and which almost shows a form of unity. Ptolemy’s 
interpretation of Politics and the Scripture will serve as the starting point of our 
inquiry. A major innovation of Ptolemy was that he mixed the modes of rule and 
the forms of government even though both Aristotle and Thomas carefully 
distinguished between them. The flexible treatment of categories was already 
signalled by the fact that Ptolemy differentiated between the various modes of rule 
based on the number of governed people although Aristotle warned against that. 
Here we see the opposite, since simultaneously with the merger of the modes and 
forms Ptolemy linked the various modes of rule to the number of rulers. He argued 
that since both aristocracy and politeia mean rule by more people they can be 
labelled regimen politicum as opposed to regal (regimen regale) or despotic 
(regimen despoticum) rule which have a single ruler.282  
At the same time he also highlighted the importance of legality which appeared in 
the texts of Aristotle. While the justice-seeking rulers of regimen politicum had to 
observe written laws, kings and other rulers could rule according to the laws 
“hidden in their breasts”. It might be relevant to mention that the expression kings 
and other rulers (regibus et aliis monarchis) most likely referred to the despots of 
the preceding paragraph who together with the kings could exceed the bounds of 
law as opposed to the heads of regimen politicum.283 Thus Ptolemy also lumped 
together kings and despots here. With Thomas who fiercely separated the modes 
of rule and forms of government it was possible for the head of a regimen politicum 
to be king. With the theoretical toolkit of Ptolemy that was out of question, but he 
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still showed much flexibility when he applied his system to historical or 
contemporary regimes.284 
When discussing one of the historical examples, Ptolemy implicitly admitted that 
regimen politicum might function even with a single ruler. That was possible 
because he attributed numerous features to both regimen politicum and regimen 
regale. The former was characterised by the plurality of rulers, legality, soft rule, 
rotation and remuneration of offices and the judgement of rulers after their term 
expired. In opposition to that, regal rule was not subjected to positive law, it lacked 
plurality, but was characterised by stability, the succession of power, harsh rule, 
immunity and the lack of remuneration. We should point out that it were again the 
blurred dividing lines between his concepts that enabled Ptolemy to discover the 
possibility of regimen politicum in some versions of single rule. Ptolemy believed 
that even single rule could qualify for plurality as long as there was only one ruler 
at a time but with a clearly and reasonably fixed time in office. That is why Ptolemy 
could claim that the ancient Roman dictator exercised political rule and that his 
specific form of government was aristocracy.285 Therefore, according to Blythe, 
Ptolemy’s regimen politicum could be defined as “the rule of one or many under 
law”.286 Apart from the Roman dictator, Ptolemy also gives examples from his own 
time, for instance that of the Holy Roman Emperor who also represented the 
blurred borderlines between the various categories. The Holy Roman Emperor was 
clearly a political ruler insofar as the office was theoretically open for any man and 
he was elected. To support that, Ptolemy mentioned ancient and mediaeval 
examples including Rudolf of Habsburg, Adolf of Nassau and Albert of Habsburg. 
The rule of Emperors also qualifies as political, because they were often not of 
noble descent just like Vespasianus or Diocletian in Antiquity or Adolf of Nassau 
in the Middle Ages. On the other hand, based on the tradition of coronation, 
taxation and rule by will, imperial rule should qualify as regimen regale.287 To sum 
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it up, the authority of the Emperor depended on the decision made by many and 
relied on the arbitrariness of the ruler instead of being regulated by law. Had 
Ptolemy distinguished between regimen regale and regimen politicum, in line with 
the views of Thomas Aquinas, based on the dominance of law or arbitrariness, he 
would not have dealt with the contradictory nature of imperial authority as 
extensively, but would have simply categorised it as regimen regale.  
Ptolemy took regimen politicum under closer scrutiny than Thomas or Giles and 
had a more complex idea about it when he tried to integrate the rule by many into 
it. Based on that did Blythe refute Charles T. Davis’s claim that the key political 
distinction of Ptolemy was that of arbitrary rule and “rule regulated by statute”.288 
We should take into consideration though that the central thesis of Blythe’s book289 
was that the works of all mediaeval political philosophers had the implicit or 
explicit guiding principle of a mixed constitution and thus Blythe was inclined to 
see a mixture of the various modes and forms sometimes without justification. It 
does not mean that plural and single rule was not an essential question in Ptolemy’s 
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diversitatem temporum, et comparationem ipsius ad regimen politicum, et regale.” At one point 
(3.10. 128.) Ptolemy simply calls imperial rule regimen regale. According to Blythe, the context 
makes clear that by saying that he wanted to subjugate the Emperor to the authority of the Pope.  
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theory, but it is obvious that Davis was also right when he argued that legality was 
a central feature of his political philosophy.290  
Another important source that can shed light on the relationship between regimen 
regale and regimen despoticum in De regimine principum is the Holy Scripture. 
According to Ptolemy’s interpretation the two categories appeared in the Bible, but 
there it was clear that one can be reduced to the other. The example of regimen 
regale appears in Deuteronomy when Moses describes the Kingdom of Israel to be 
built in the land of promise where the pious rulers observe the holy law, never work 
for their own gains and refrain from oppressing the people.291 The example of 
regimen despoticum appears in 1 Samuel when Samuel declares to the people what 
can be expected if they – being dissatisfied with the transcendent divine rule – elect 
an earthly ruler for themselves similarly to other peoples. That part is almost like 
the polar opposite of the prophecy of Moses, the king treats his subjects as slaves, 
takes what was theirs, uses it for his own purposes and only lessens their burdens 
if he is being asked forcefully.292 After having introduced the biblical prefiguration 
of these concepts, Ptolemy tried to understand how it was possible that God gave 
rulers to his chosen people who resembled more the prophecy of Samuel. 
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He attempted to respond to the question by introducing two different concepts of 
sin. One was the concept of the original sin that could be derived from Adam and 
Eve while the other was the group of particular sins committed by various nations 
or peoples. These two concepts of sin were not fully reconcilable with each other. 
Ptolemy discussed first the original sin mentioned also by Saint Augustine and 
regarding that he underlined the essential unity of the two modes of rule: 
„Principatus despoticus ad regale reducitur: sed praecipue ratione delicti propter 
quod servitus est introducta, ut Augustinus dicit Lib. undevicesimo de Civ. Dei.”293 
That part of Ptolemy’s text recognizes the difference of the two modes, but – 
referring to the original sin – claims that since the Expulsion from the Garden of 
Eden, the rule of each king has necessarily become despotic. That is the meaning 
of the idea that one of these modes could be reduced to the other. The elaboration 
of the specific sins of various peoples can also be found in the same chapter. „In 
talibus ergo regionibus sic dyscolis necessarius est regibus principatus despoticus, 
non quidem iuxta naturam regalis dominii, sed secundum merita et pertinacias 
subditorum. Et ista est ratio Augustini in praedicto iam libro. Philosophus etiam 
in tertio Politic., ubi distinguit genera regni, ostendit apud quasdam barbaras 
nationes regale dominium esse omnino despoticum, quia aliter regi non possent, 
quod quidem dominium praecipue viget in Graecia et apud Persas, saltem quantum 
ad regimen populare.”294 It arguably seems that the latter quote contradicts the 
former since it allows certain peoples to avoid slavery despite being corrupted by 
original sin. Numerous examples convince the author of the latter. Apart from the 
Greeks and Persians appearing in the text,295 the ancient Roman Republic and 
contemporary Northern Italy are also used as references for modes of rule without 
slavery. These peoples were virtuous enough to avoid despotism and slavery. This 
claim runs counter to the Augustinian tradition which he would have liked to 
reconcile with Aristotelian concepts. According to Blythe Ptolemy’s attempt at the 
reconciliation was more successful than that of Giles.296  
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Both of them tried to provide a synthesis of Aristotelian and Augustinian political 
ideas and Ptolemy could prove to be more successful because he clearly stood on 
Aristotelian grounds, but he was flexible and tried to reinterpret Augustine in the 
same (Aristotelian) fashion. In the view of Robert A. Markus that was primarily 
the heritage of Thomas Aquinas in the work of Ptolemy,297 while according to 
Blythe he did rely on Thomas but went further than him since he referred to the 
politico-philosophical key points of Augustine’s text.298 However, that in itself 
does not represent a major innovation in mediaeval political philosophy. In the 
work of the highly venerated Thomas extensive references to Augustine are most 
likely not featured because De regno was a late and unfinished piece which should 
be regarded as a draft. It was Ptolemy who “completed” it and therefore it is 
understandable that the references appear in his part. Another reason for the 
missing Augustinian political ideas in Thomas’s works could be that he wrote little 
on political philosophy and also verifiably read De civitate Dei as opposed to his 
followers and therefore must have been aware of the incompatibility of Aristotelian 
and Augustinian frameworks of analysis. On that note one should mention that 
Ptolemy’s peculiar Aristotelian interpretation of Augustine is not primarily 
noteworthy because of the dubious success of the reconciliation, but rather because 
through that he could promote regimen politicum and strike a new tone in early 
14th century political philosophy. 
According to Charles T. Davis this new tone made it possible for him to rehabilitate 
the ancient Roman Republic and to strengthen republican views in his own time.299 
In order to really do that a rather “creative” interpretation of Augustine was 
required, one that according to Davis might qualify as intentional 
misinterpretation.300 If we want to understand the scope of his innovation we 
shortly have to portray the republican image transferred to the Middle Ages by 
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early Christian authors like Orosius and primarily Saint Augustine. Both of them 
clearly condemned the Roman Republic although it is true that Augustine also 
recognized the virtues of the era. He admitted that the ethos of the Roman Republic 
scorned wealth and served as an incentive to do hard work against all hardships. 
However, in the core of that ethos Augustine could not discover the love of God or 
mankind, only self-love. Which means that the Republican Romans, by 
suppressing the lesser vices, fell prey to the supreme vice of pride and instead of 
the City of God they built up the city of the devil which led them to damnation 
instead of the public good, because they taught their people to worship idols. 
Augustine believed though that Christian virtues must be able to compete with the 
virtues galvanised by guilty self-love, since the former were conceived in the hope 
of salvation.301 The vast impact of Augustine on mediaeval philosophy 
considerably impeded the development of sympathy towards the Roman Republic 
and this tendency was also reinforced by the fact that most mediaeval regimes were 
monarchies. Emphasising the values of the Roman Republic was also not rational 
from a Christian perspective since it was during the time of Augustus that Pax 
Romana was created which effectively enabled spreading the gospel and it was 
Constantine the Great who declared tolerance for Christianity and he was supposed 
to have bequeathed the government of the Western part of the empire to the Pope 
in Donatio Constantini. Besides that the Roman Republic ceased to exist by the 
birth of Jesus Christ and therefore it seemed extremely distant to mediaeval 
political philosophers. Had theologians or political philosophers wanted to find the 
precursors of Christianity, they more likely turned to ancient Israel than the Roman 
Republic.302 That approach was dominant throughout the lengthy mediaeval 
centuries and therefore it was striking when some scholars politely and carefully 
contradicted it. Experts of the question detect the first signs of the shift around the 
turn of the 13th and 14th centuries in Northern Italy. Hans Baron declared in his 
book published in 1955 that the most clear-voiced proponent of the new value 
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judgement was Ptolemy of Lucca.303 And among the pioneers were also the authors 
mentioned above, Remigio de’ Girolami and Dante Alighieri.  
In the view of Davis, Ptolemy was the most consistent republican of the three and 
he was also the most interesting one since his republicanism was paired with ardent 
papalism.304 Ptolemy was also outstanding in the way he contradicted Saint 
Augustine’s views regarding the Roman Republic and the values of regimen 
politicum in general. Moreover, he was the first to do that. Of course, first his 
veneration for Augustine had to be attested and even when he criticised his ideas 
he pretended to agree with him both in Determinatio compendiosa and De regimine 
principum. Davis summarised his strategy of argumentation accurately. “He did 
not attack the great African father directly. Instead he demonstrated an obsequious 
respect, together with a shameless flair for misquotation.”305   He quoted from 
Chapter 18 of Book V from De civitate Dei fairly selectively.306 He only borrowed 
lines that praised the republican virtues and completely ignored those that 
concerned the destructive self-love of the Romans. Davis argued that Ptolemy 
turned Augutine’s view of Rome on its head and made him say that the Romans 
always cared for the public good in the name of the highest Christian virtue of 
caritas and the Roman Republic was not a scourge but a blessing for humanity.307 
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He almost made Augustine say that Romans have built their empire with self-
sacrificing patriotism which was diametrically opposite to what he had actually 
said. Davis believed that it was his most original contribution to mediaeval political 
philosophy, because that creative interpretation of Augustine was without 
precedent.308 As we have already seen, Thomas Aquinas did not quote the relevant 
sections of Augustine in De regno and John of Salisbury’s Policraticus could only 
inspire Ptolemy, but the exact direction of argumentation and the specific 
referencing of Augustine’s text seems to be perfectly his own innovation. 
Let us see first which could be the ideas that he took from John of Salisbury whose 
works he must have been familiar with to a certain extent since he quoted from 
Policraticus in his Determinatio compendiosa. In fact Davis was only guessing 
when he stated that Ptolemy was aware of John’s views on the Roman’s sense of 
justice and their hospitality towards neighbouring peoples, since these were not the 
sections he quoted from him. However, if he really did know them, it could have 
influenced him to think higher about the virtues of the Roman Republic and finally 
led him to its systematic praise even though that was not the intention of John who 
merely mentioned the Roman virtues as examples together with those of other 
peoples. Ptolemy significantly developed the theme and his republican spirit 
contradicting Augustine made its appearance also in the works of other authors 
more and more often. It would be difficult to tell whether it was his impact or 
whether the zeitgeist drove many to similar conclusions independent of each other. 
In the view of Davis the other two contemporary authors approached Augustine’s 
train of thought in a startlingly similar way, but their argumentation based on it 
pointed to very different directions. While republican Roman patriotism meant 
guilty self-love for Augustine, it was rational love of their country in the works of 
Remigio, it meant something holy for Dante and Ptolemy derived it from the 
highest Christian virtue of caritas.  
It would be hard to examine whether these three authors influenced each other and 
Davis particularly warns against establishing the direction of the potential 
influences. Theodore Silverstein, for instance, thought it was obvious that Ptolemy 
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had an impact on Dante.309 However, Silverstein was not familiar with Remigio 
de’ Girolami and therefore could not even pose the question whether Ptolemy 
influenced both of them directly or whether his impact reached Dante only through 
Remigio. According to Davis it would be irrational to exclude the possibility that 
they influenced each other since they dealt with the same chapter of Augustine’s 
work around the same time. Despite that, Davis could not find a single case where 
their quotes from Augustine overlapped or in general any other interlinkages 
among their works and therefore he could not clarify the question of Ptolemy’s 
contemporary influence.310 On the other hand it is without doubt that Ptolemy 
significantly contributed to the complete change of opinion regarding the Roman 
Republic by the early 14th century and particularly by the time of Petrarch.  
That change was obvious in the works of Ptolemy as he regarded the virtues of the 
Roman Republic noble enough to suggest them to the Papacy. He believed that the 
republican era was more likely a secular precursor to the Papacy than the era of 
Augustus. The republican government was legitimate in his view while the 
authority of the Emperors was rooted in the infringement of laws and in human 
suffering. The magistrates of the republican era did not oppress people, but served 
them instead. According to Ptolemy, the Popes represented the Fifth Monarchy and 
they should have reached back to the Roman traditions that had existed before 
Caesar’s tyranny. Ptolemy underpinned his clearly innovative approach by a 
hierocratic pamphlet written during the time of Pope Innocent IV against Frederick 
II in 1245-46 entitled Eger cui lenia that interpreted Donatio Constantini in a truly 
peculiar way. The point of the text was that Constantine the Great did not leave 
anything to the Pope since it was Jesus Christ who personally placed the highest 
authority over the Church and the whole world in the hands of Saint Peter and the 
succeeding Popes. Ptolemy quoted from Eger cui lenia in Determinatio 
compendiosa which signals that he accepted its statements which undermined the 
relevance of imperial Rome from an ecclesiastic perspective.311 Under these new 
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theoretical circumstances Ptolemy’s only chance of retaining the providential 
concept of the Roman domination of the world was to regard Republican Rome as 
the precursor of the Papacy. Therefore Ptolemy praised the republican Romans’ 
indifference to wealth and pomp which also marked a call for the Papacy to regard 
these as their heritage and replace by them the imperial ostentation.312 Davis also 
remarks that Ptolemy saw the prefiguration of Christ in the heroes of the Roman 
Republic313 and not in the prophets of Israel or the martyrs. That approach was 
perhaps also facilitated by the fact that the Papacy had its seat in Rome instead of 
Jerusalem.314 Thus while before the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries ancient Israel 
or the imperial era guaranteeing the spread of the verb served as a model, from the 
time of Ptolemy the Roman Republic gradually became a point of reference at least 
in Northern and Central Italy. From among the historical regimes of Rome Ptolemy 
clearly held the Republic superior and he even proposed that as a model for the 
Papacy in his Determinatio compendiosa. If we look at De regimine principum 
which was written twenty years later, we will see how he viewed republican values 
in the secular political arena of his time.  
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Ptolemy basically stated with the Roman example that despite the original sin it 
had been possible even for some pagan peoples before Christianity to lead a 
virtuous life that allowed them to have regimen politicum. It was obvious for him 
that it must have remained so even after humanity was strengthened in their virtues 
thanks to Christianity. By dividing human sin, Ptolemy could say something 
fundamentally new. In essence, he claimed that regimen politicum was not a mere 
theoretical possibility, but with virtuous citizens it was a real alternative of regimen 
regale. He went even further and argued that with such citizens it should be more 
desirable: „regimen politicum regali praeponitur. Primo quidem, si referamus 
dominium ad statum integrum humanae naturae, qui status innocentiae appellatur, 
in quo non fuisset regale regimen sed politicum, eo quod tunc non fuisset dominium 
quod servitutem haberet, sed praeeminentiam et subiectionem in disponendo et 
gubernando multitudinem secundum merita cuiuscumque, ut sic vel in influendo 
vel in recipiendo influentiam quilibet esset dispositus secundum congruentiam 
suae naturae.”315 Thus before the Fall there must have been regimen politicum 
according to Ptolemy, where the application of general laws on specific issues must 
not have been a problem. Since then the flexibility of regimen regale has been 
required to adjust general laws to the changing circumstances,316 but in possession 
of the necessary virtues some nations may still return to regimen politicum. Here it 
is important to highlight that the image of the Roman Republic in De regimine 
principum was not simply a regimen politicum, but rather a mixed constitution 
(regimen mixtum) of which a rather idealised portrait was presented by the author. 
First he quoted the section of 1 Maccabees depicting the most beautiful period of 
the Roman Republic317 and then he generalised it temporally. He described how 
the authority of the consuls depended on the masses who therefore could never 
exceed their authority. He then asked the question whether the power of the 
dictators could be considered single rule which he denied arguing that even they 
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were elected leaders who sometimes were not even of noble descent.318 Ptolemy’s 
description of the various actors of the government taming each other clearly 
reflects Thomas’s model of the mixed constitution.319 It becomes almost explicit 
when Ptolemy elaborates that various characteristics of aristocracy and politeia 
could be found in the Roman Republic.320 The idea must have originated from 
Thomas who compared the Constitution of Rome and that of Moses at the 
beginning of the work completed by Ptolemy. Thomas regarded the former a mixed 
constitution, but he did not characterise the latter in detail.321 Blythe thought that 
Davis was wrong when he portrayed Ptolemy simply as a republican, since in fact 
he was a promoter of the mixed constitution which he demonstrated by adoring 
“Chalcedonia” besides Rome which also had mixed constitution.322 Ptolemy’s 
equal treatment of Rome and “Chalcedonia” was supported by Blythe with 
multiple convincing sections of his text.323 It is worth emphasising that it was not 
the exclusive point on which there was significant difference between the 
interpretation of Blythe and Davis. 
There is considerable contrast between their views on how universal Ptolemy’s 
republicanism was. Davis thought it was clear that he took the side of regimen 
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politicum.324 Blythe, on the other hand, highlighted that Ptolemy – in line with his 
experience in real life – made the applicability of regimen politicum dependent on 
numerous preconditions. It is true that in Ptolemy’s view regimen politicum 
harmonised most with true human nature, but he still provided much room for the 
other modes. In order to have regimen politicum favourable astrological 
situation,325 optimal geographic conditions and the ideal size of the community 
were all required according to Ptolemy. The latter was clearly modelled after the 
size of North-Italian city states.326 At least we can arrive at that conclusion if we 
observe the places where he saw these criteria fulfilled: apart from Rome, Ptolemy 
only listed North-Italian city-states.327 He believed regimen politicum could appear 
here and there also outside Northern Italy, but regimen regale or despoticum were 
more typical everywhere else. Political self-determination was celebrated by the 
author as a specific Italian feature, but we should emphasise that in case all criteria 
were met anywhere else, Ptolemy thought there was no doubt that regimen 
politicum should work best. In case these preconditions were missing, Ptolemy 
found the introduction of regimen politicum problematic.  
At that point there is a significant difference between the interpretation of Davis 
and Blythe. According to Davis, Ptolemy was the strongest proponent of regimen 
politicum in the 13th-14th centuries and it was also him who refused other modes of 
rule the harshest.328 Blythe believes that, by saying that, Davis attributed a value 
judgement to Ptolemy which in fact he did not profess. According to Davis, 
Ptolemy made it clear that regimen regale could not be detached from regimen 
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despoticum and thus from slavery which made him condemn all modes of rule other 
than regimen politicum. In Blythe’s view the approach of Davis was mistaken since 
Ptolemy did accept slavery as punishment for sinful societies, meaning all societies 
outside Northern Italy. Blythe argued that scholars only started questioning the 
legitimacy of regal rule much later in the name of the liberty of the people.329 In 
that question we may take the side of Blythe, but we have to note that Davis did 
not emphasise Ptolemy’s universal view of regimen politicum as fiercely as Blythe 
stated.330 
Another point of conflict between the two scholars was already mentioned, but we 
have to shortly return to that regarding Ptolemy’s concept of regimen politicum 
and legality. Davis makes the following claims: „only Ptolemy pointed out the 
essential difference between a government of laws and one of men. He applied this 
distinction both to ancient Roman and contemporary Italian history, illustrating it 
with specific examples. He also weighed the advantages and disadvantages of 
various kinds of rule and decided that on the political level, at least in Rome and 
northern Italy, government limited by law was superior.” He even argues that he 
followed Aristotle more closely than Thomas Aquinas.331 According to Blythe both 
regimen politicum and the question of legality were better emphasised by Thomas, 
and Ptolemy only pointed further than him in two cases. First, when he created the 
theoretical foundations of the feasibility of regimen politicum and, second, when 
he denied that single rule over free peoples was possible. Blythe also did not accept 
Davis’s claim that Ptolemy reached closer to the gist of Aristotle’s message than 
Thomas. According to Blythe that statement could only be supported regarding the 
special emphasis on city-states, but even that could be explained by the 
embeddedness of Ptolemy in Northern Italy. In every other respect Thomas was 
closer to Aristotle’s political philosophy.332  
There is one more point where the sharp difference between the interpretations of 
Blythe and Davis can be detected, even though Blythe did not make that explicit. 
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Davis expressed the opinion multiple times that Ptolemy only found regimen 
politicum feasible in the secular politics of North-Italian city-states and held the 
Papacy to have a fully monarchical mode of rule. To be more precise he found that 
the Popes personally should observe republican virtues, but regarding their 
authority he considered them absolute rulers.333 It is not that Blythe simply did not 
share that idea, but he linked Ptolemy’s image of the Papacy with his own 
(Blythe’s) key concept of the mixed constitution (regimen mixtum). He argued that 
the author envisaged a certain kind of mixed constitution for the Papacy in 
Determinatio compendiosa. In Blythe’s view that was demonstrated by Ptolemy 
comparing the Papacy to the constitution of Moses after having quoted the 
following words of Moses. „Dixit senioribus Israel, Exodo XXIIII, Habetis Aaron 
et Hur vobiscum, si quid questionis natum fuerit, referte ad eos. Per quod nobis 
ostenditur, quod duces fidelium eo modo assignatis in predictis salutaribus 
consiliis ferri debent ac substenari, dux quidem ecclesiasticus Aaronitis, id est 
cardinalibus et aliisecclesiarum prelatis maioribus, propter quod fuerunt ab 
antiquo consilia instituta, dux vero civilis sive rex sive imperator fulciri debet 
Huritis , id est principibus et baronibus, et ideo ab eisdem instituta sunt 
parlamenta, que ad hunc finem disponi debent, ut profectibus sui regiminis 
consulatur, ne, se forte consilio festinato aliquid diffiniatur incaute, per eorum 
successores, ut de facto videmus, quod cedit in sedis ridiculum, faciliter revocetur. 
Hinc per Salomonem scribitur, Proverbis XIII: Qui cuncta agunt cum consilio, 
reguntur sapientia, cuius est omnia secundum sapientem ordinare. Item Proverbis 
XXXIII: Salus erit ubi multa consilia. De quo specialiter veteres commendatur 
Romani, ut supra patuit, quando floruit res publica. Ille enim, cui magistratum seu 
consulatum pro suo anno commiserant, ut in libro Machabeorum continetur, 
cottidie agebat cum senatu consilium de multitudine, ut, que digna sunt, gerant, 
quemadmodum adhuc hodie Romana observant ecclesia, summus enim pontifex 
cum cardinalibus, qui locum possident senatorum, ut Constantini habetur 
traditione et in allegato supra frequentius capitulo de eiusdem actibus 
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declaratur.”334 Even though that section was referenced both by Davis and Blythe, 
it is worth noting how very different their conclusions were. Davis thought that 
Ptolemy advised the adoption of the virtues of the Roman Republic to the Papacy 
which he held to be an absolute monarchy that could decide about the fate of 
Emperors and could confer the Empire on anybody. Thus in the view of Davis, 
Ptolemy considered the Popes to be the heirs of Roman authority. As opposed to 
that Blythe’s interpretation highlighted that Ptolemy transferred the regimen 
mixtum of Moses’s constitution, described by Thomas, to Republican Rome and 
then to the Papacy. According to Blythe that is shown by Ptolemy’s analogy 
between the Roman Senate and the College of Cardinals. By doing that he merely 
recognised contemporary canon law which prescribed the Popes to consult the 
Cardinals in questions of crucial importance.335 The real innovation in Blythe’s 
view was that Ptolemy linked all that to the government of Moses. That enabled 
Petrus Johannes Olivi and John of Paris later to interpret the Papacy as regimen 
mixtum.336 Out of the two it seems that Blythe interpreted Ptolemy’s words in 
Determinatio compendiosa more correctly. In that text, Ptolemy saw the Papacy to 
be more like a mixed constitution than an absolute monarchy. However, by the 
time of De regimine principum he abandoned that view by introducing the category 
of regimen sacerdotale et regale and defined the Pope as a ruler who did not need 
to consult the Cardinals. Regarding that stage of his intellectual development it 
seems more apt to apply the interpretation of Davis who emphasised the (absolute) 
monarchic nature of Ptolemy’s image of the Papacy.  
Regarding his high mediaeval impact, Ptolemy was undobtedly an influential 
thinker. That, of course, was largely thanks to the fact that his most important work 
on political philosophy was spread under the name of Thomas Aquinas. In Blythe’s 
view, two future influential authors made Ptolemy’s impact lasting.337 One of them 
was John Fortescue (1394-1476) who played a key role in British constitutional 
development and borrowed many theoretical structures from Ptolemy even though 
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he attributed them to Thomas. In his view the difference between regimen regale 
and regimen politicum was whether the monarch ruled based on his own laws or 
whether he also involved the society into legislation. It is noteworthy that Fortescue 
under all circumstances would have preserved a single ruler and never questioned 
the necessity of monarchy. Similar to Ptolemy he linked the government of Moses 
to Republican Rome as well with the only difference that he also praised the pre- 
and post-republican Roman regimes and that he compared the Senate to the English 
Parliament instead of the Papacy. In essence he used Ptolemy’s toolkit to establish 
the early theory of English constitutional monarchy.338 The other important 15th 
century scholar increasing the impact of Ptolemy was Girolamo Savonarola (1452-
1498), a Dominican monk who gained much influence in Florence. He used some 
elements of Ptolemy’s theory to support his anti-Medici republican views which 
had practical relevance since he played a leading role in an insurgence against the 
Medicis in 1494. Of course, he also believed that he was using the text of Thomas 
when he relied on De regimine principum. First of all, Ptolemy’s republicanism 
had an impact on him and not his ideas about the mixed constitution. Even in one 
of his early texts the idea appeared that the temperament of the North-Italian 
peoples calls for regimen politicum and that regimen regale and regimen 
despoticum are essentially the same.339 He only accepted the possibility of single 
rule in mixed constitution in a transcendental sense as long as it concerned Jesus 
Christ and he wanted to redesign the constitution of Florence it that spirit to build 
a New Jerusalem.340  
Therefore it is true that Ptolemy would have had significantly less influence, had 
his major work been not canonised under the name of Thomas, but it is also not 
questionable that his contribution differed from that of Thomas in many regards 
and broke a new path. On the one hand, it seems that he took the side of regimen 
politicum more openly, although as we have seen, that statement is also somewhat 
debated. However, it seems verifiable that Ptolemy linked regimen politicum and 
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the ethos of the Roman Republic and he suggested secular and religious leaders to 
observe republican virtues. That could contribute to Petrarch’s representation of 
the republican stance341 and the rediscovery of the Roman Republican values 
during the Great Renaissance. Perhaps it is not an overstatement by Blythe that 
Ptolemy’s work was an early, mediaeval predecessor of modern democratic and 
constitutional thought.342  
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Comparison and Conclusions  
Comparison 
The most striking difference regarding the dates of publication of the four key 
works by Giles and Ptolemy is that they published their treatises on the Papacy and 
the ones on political philosophy in almost perfectly reversed order. Giles wrote his 
secular De regimine principum in around 1280, exactly when Ptolemy published 
his Determinatio compendiosa on the Church. Giles completed De ecclesiastica 
potestate at the beginning of the 1300s when Ptolemy published his De regimine 
principum. The same twenty years have passed between the publication of their 
ecclesiastical and political texts and both of their opinions have changed 
considerably. According to Ullmann, Giles’ point of view and tone has changed so 
much between composing his texts that we could assume different authors at a first 
glance seeing especially how superficial his Aristotelian language became by the 
time of De ecclesiastica potestate.343 Canning thinks differently and makes the 
following claim regarding the latter work of Giles: “The tract itself was devoted to 
the relationship between temporal and spiritual power, the topic omitted in Giles’s 
earlier De regimine principum (On the Government of Princes) with its thoroughly 
secular and this-worldly tone. There was no contradiction involved because the 
two tracts argued on different levels and in different ways: they were connected, 
however, in that both were systematic treatments of monarchy according to 
hierarchical principles.”344 Canning’s observation seems correct since the 
approach of Giles was clearly monarchist in both texts and Ullmann exaggerated 
when he wrote that the two treatises could have had different authors. However, it 
is striking that while the earlier work was dedicated to the future king of France, 
Philip IV, the latter provided ammunition for the Pope against the same French 
king. It would also be hard to deny that his Aristotelian language faded and became 
superficial in De ecclesiastica potestate and a more canon law-influenced 
terminology took over its role.345  
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In a similar vein there was a shift in the opinion of Ptolemy as well, but his differing 
points of view were harmonising more than those of Giles. Based on the works of 
Giles and Ptolemy we could argue that a hierocratic stance was more compatible 
with republicanism than with a monarchist approach. That was also the point of 
view of Davis who considered Ptolemy to be an Italian patriot and an avid 
supporter of the Pope whom he also regarded to be the heir of the Roman Republic. 
That explains partially why he thought higher of the Popes than of the Roman 
Emperors or their German successors. According to Davis, Ptolemy did not see the 
Popes ‘simply’ as the leaders of the universal Church, but also as the defenders of 
the independence of Rome and Italy against Northern monarchic absolutism. We 
can almost see a sort of Italian proto-nationalism in his treatises in which 
hierocratic, republican and patriotic thoughts were complementing each other.346 
Despite that level of harmony there is a clear difference of perception in these two 
works written in different times. We have already noted above that the influence 
of Thomas could clearly be felt in Determinatio compendiosa in which Ptolemy 
thought in terms of a mixed constitution. He believed that the authority of kings or 
even the Pope could be limited by bodies and councils. In opposition to that he 
thought it wiser to sharply separate regimen politicum and regimen regale in De 
regimine principum where he closely linked the latter to slavery and thus to 
regimen despoticum. It is rather paradoxical that Ptolemy somewhat distanced 
himself from the political thought of Thomas just while completing one of his 
works. 
The two authors also showed different attitudes to the political philosophy of 
Thomas Aquinas. Roberto Lambertini demonstrated in one of his important studies 
how closely Giles followed the political texts of Thomas347 and that on multiple 
points he even borrowed sections from them. According to Lambertini it is worth 
comparing Giles’ and Thomas’ concept of politeia. That is how Thomas defined it:  
“[…] politia nichil est aliud quam ordinatio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus 
qui sunt in civitate, sed precipue quantum ad maximum principatum qui dominatur 
omnibus aliis principatibus. Et hoc ideo quia politeuma civitatis, id est positio 
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ordinis in civitate, tota consistit in eo qui dominatur civitati; et talis impositio 
ordinis est ipsa politia. Unde precipue politia consistit in ordine summi principatus 
[…]”  
We can see a very similar formulation of the same concept in the treatise of Giles: 
“Politia enim quasi est quod ordinatio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus qui 
sunt in ea et principaliter quantum ad maximum principatum qui dominatur 
omnibus aliis. Politia enim consistit maxime in ordine summi principatus qui est in 
civitate. Omnis ergo ordinatio civitatis Politia dici potest.”  
In these two quotes the parts that are not in italics are identical, which means that 
Giles significantly relied on the text of Thomas and these two sections are not rare 
examples.348 Lambertini also highlighted that Giles erased all parts of the 
Aristotelian-Thomist political philosophy that could have served as 
counterarguments against regimen regale. For example, the Aristotelian list of the 
advantages of electing the ruler did not appear in the text of Giles although he did 
not exclude that it might work in the case of certain nations.349 Thus we were 
bestowed a treatise with a more compact but mediocre reasoning than those of 
Thomas.350 Perhaps its simplicity and its text “flowing on and on inexorably” 
propelled Giles’ De regimine principum to become an immensely influential tract 
that would be translated to the most important vernacular languages in the Middle 
Ages. According to Canning, that is why we may regard him to be the main 
mediaeval transmitter of Aristotelian political philosophy.351 
Ptolemy had strong ties to Thomas’ political philosophy since it was him who 
completed De regno. As we have already mentioned, by then he had developed his 
ideas independent of Thomas, but he did not distance himself from Aristotelian 
political terminology in his later works the way Giles did. On the contrary, he used 
it so confidently that Thomas’ authorship regarding the second half of De regimine 
principum could not be falsified until the 20th century. Thanks to the text being 
attributed to Thomas, his impact was comparable to Giles’, but Ptolemy already 
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represented a new era. According to Canning, “[t]he assimilation of Aristotelian 
ideas by the 1280s completed the process whereby medieval political thought was 
transformed through the introduction of literary, juristic and philosophical 
languages derived from the ancient world. Nothing less than an intellectual 
revolution had progressively occurred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.”352 
Indeed, while a monarchist Giles promoted Aristotelian terminology, Ptolemy 
sowed the seeds of a new republicanism at the beginning of the 14th century. Their 
different approaches also showed in the content of their works.  
Interestingly, different conclusions were often reached with the same starting 
points. For instance, both Giles and Ptolemy channelled the concept of original sin 
into their Aristotelian systems (in line with Thomas Aquinas), but Giles concluded 
that the original sin corrupted mankind so much that regimen politicum was out of 
reach in reality and would most typically lead to tyranny, war and deprivation.353 
Contrary to that, Ptolemy argued that some nations were capable to live virtuously 
and with brave hearts and therefore to them regimen politicum had to be the right 
way. Both authors approached the main differences between regimen politicum and 
regimen regale in a similar way, but again reached very different conclusions. In 
both modes of rule, legality played a certain role, but while in the latter the king 
was the source of law, in the former the leader(s) had to follow written rules. Based 
on these, Giles took the side of regimen regale while Ptolemy favoured regimen 
politicum.  
As we have seen, our authors represented very different points of view also 
regarding the Roman Republic and Northern Italy. Giles believed that the example 
of Northern Italy demonstrated well the destructive nature of regimen politicum.354 
Multiple rulers (regimen politicum) were only an exception to the rule even in the 
Roman Republic while the new Senator was not yet elected to replace the former. 
Therefore Giles considered Rome to be regimen regale.355 We have also indicated 
that Ptolemy, on the contrary, thought so high of the city-states of Northern Italy 
that he even considered regimen politicum feasible there.356 Not even in the case 
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of Rome did he see single rule like Giles, neither did he characterise it as regimen 
politicum, but rather as a kind of regimen mixtum. There was also a rather 
paradoxical difference between the authors regarding the institutional setup of 
regimen regale. Regarding Giles’ concept of regimen regale we have already noted 
above that one can rarely identify any limit or constraint of royal power. He did 
not accept the election of the ruler or limiting his authority by written laws under 
regimen regale and he did not support much regimen politicum. The only limits of 
royal power in his works were expressed by his peculiar theories about councils. 
We have seen that he regarded the rulers ignoring the advice of the council as 
tyrants and that he even viewed the privy counsellors suitable for correcting the 
ruler’s mistakes or handicaps as members replacing the ruler’s limbs.357  
Compared to that, Ptolemy drew a much more absolutistic picture of regimen 
regale in his own De regimine principum. For him the council was nothing more 
than another instrument over which the ruler could dispose, or as Blythe put it “one 
more resource to be managed by the prudent ruler.”358 By the time of writing De 
regimine principum Ptolemy entirely gave up on the idea of limiting the ruler or 
slavery in the case of regimen regale. That was underlined by his equalling regimen 
regale and regimen despoticum. At the same time, he drafted an image of regimen 
politicum and regimen mixtum that featured unusually strong limits on the rulers’ 
authority and therefore basically promoted a republican regime. Giles, as a 
hierocratic and monarchic thinker, could only conceive the spiritual authority of 
the Popes that could limit the power of the kings besides privy councils as he 
expressed it quite poignantly in De ecclesiastica potestate. In that question, 
Ptolemy clearly agreed which was indicated by his invention of a mode of rule 
designed specifically for the Papacy which included regal rule but was also more 
than that as it was indicated by the name: regimen sacerdotale et regale. Thus both 
authors shared the view that regal authority was limited from above by the rule of 
the Papacy. Ptolemy of course also expressed in Determinatio compendiosa that 
the Pope stands above secular rulers including the Holy Roman Emperor whom he 
did not like as a North Italian patriot. Both authors agreed on the supremacy of the 
Papacy, but they had markedly different views on secular political order. Both of 
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their opinions have changed by the beginning of the 14th century and it seems that 
their hierocratic view was more compatible with Ptolemy’s republicanism and 
patriotism than with the monarchist approach of Giles. That also signifies how a 
universalism (the Papacy) on the top of the mediaeval ‘international system’ was 
most antagonistic with royal authority besides the Emperor.             
Conclusions 
In the second part of the dissertation I aimed at introducing the views of two 
influential mediaeval political philosophers about the possibility of limiting the 
authority of rulers. The goal was also to demonstrate that there was no consensus 
about the right form of government and constitution and that the image of a 
theocratic Middle Ages promoting an intertwined spiritual and secular authority 
certainly cannot be labelled universal based on contemporary sources. The 
statement that republicanism and the concept of the rule of law could only be 
associated with Antiquity and the Modern era and that their modern versions were 
without any mediaeval preconditions is also easy to debunk. We could not trace a 
politico-philosophical consensus whereby rulers’ authority could have been 
exercised without limitations or institutional frameworks. Instead of that, we have 
seen conflicting opinions and a lively discourse triggered by the rediscovery of 
Aristotle’s political texts. As it was already mentioned, the rediscovery of Politics 
was the most belated of them all, but by the time it was discovered “the techniques 
of the interpretation of philosophical texts were already fully fledged”359 and thus 
European political thought could assimilate its main ideas much faster. The period 
required for the process of assimilation starting in the 1260s was finished by the 
time Thomas’ commentary on Politics, completed by Peter of Auvergne, was made 
official study material at the University of Paris.360 The philosophical canonisation 
of high mediaeval texts surrounding Politics was characterised by the active 
contribution of numerous authors going back to the original Aristotelian text. The 
commentary of Thomas Aquinas was unfinished and he did not leave behind a 
systematic work of political philosophy, De regno was only a draft or a fragment 
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of what he must have originally intended it to be. Thus, besides the two authors 
introduced above, Peter of Auvergne was also an important pioneer of the 
interpretation of Politics. He finished In libros politicorum, just like Ptolemy did 
De regno. The fact that two authors of the rediscovery of Aristotle believed that 
the task could best be accomplished through the completion of the works by 
Thomas, demonstrated his outstanding reputation. Peter followed him much more 
closely than Ptolemy who navigated towards republicanism in De regimine 
principum. Giles, as we have seen, also followed the path of Thomas’ De regno in 
his De regimine principum, but he only used those elements of it that supported his 
monarchist theory.   
It was demonstrated that neither of the authors promoted a single monolithic 
political agenda, but took different stances and approached their sources critically. 
They sometimes differed from the „great forefathers” who provided their 
theoretical frameworks. However they did not openly enter debates either with 
each other or with their forerunners in their surviving treatises. For instance, Blythe 
noted that Giles categorised the modes of rule differently from Thomas, but he did 
not make that explicit.361 Ptolemy of Lucca opposed Saint Augustine by attributing 
his own opinion to him which was contrary to what Saint Augustine had actually 
said. Our authors retained the façade of respect for their forefathers, but they freely 
voiced their differing opinions. It is worth emphasising that both authors 
extensively discussed the question of legality which is also a crucial concept in the 
present paper. It would be anachronistic to argue that they promoted the rule of 
law, but it is clear that both of them treated the relationship between the right form 
of government and legality as a centrepiece of their trains of thought. It was noted 
regarding Giles that, contrary to Thomas, he did not differentiate between the 
qualities of slavery and freedom, but between the rule based on the will of the ruler 
and the one based on law. It was Davis who noted about Ptolemy that he alone 
introduced systematically the difference between the rule of man and that of law.362 
Thus it can be easily claimed that Roman law and the assimilation of Aristotle’s 
philosophy in the High Middle Ages led some authors to suggest a government 
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based on law. In that process, a key role was definitely played by the translators of 
Aristotle, particularly William of Moerbeke among them, but Thomas Aquinas as 
his first interpreter and the canon law that was distilled by the time of Innocent IV 
should also be considered important. With these preconditions was it possible for 
some political philosophers of the High Middle Ages to formulate some 
prefigurations of the rule of law. Giles of Rome and Ptolemy of Lucca were were 
among the most progressive.  
In possession of their ideas, it is worth looking back at the previous part of the 
dissertation and see some of its claims verified and also looking forward to the next 
part to understand the authors’ key contributions to analysing political structures. 
The historically revised model of a neomediaeval international system was 
supported on many grounds by the texts of Giles and Ptolemy. We have already 
demonstrated with other examples how sovereignty had its mediaeval antecedents, 
but the fact that both authors found it necessary to treat the question of limiting 
royal power also reflects that kings had considerable authority. Giles of Rome 
could prove that even an element of government which could be interpreted as a 
bridle on royal power may have served as a tool to augment the authority of the 
kings. The council served as a limb of the inadequate ruler in his theory. We have 
seen in the First Part how the Papacy contributed to the birth of external 
sovereignty with their urge to weaken the Emperors by raising the kings (rex qui 
superiorem non recogniscit). In the Second Part the concept of rex inutilis was 
introduced that originated from canon law and was used by Giles to mark an 
example when the ruler could be replaced by the council or a governor. That 
happened in practice when in the mid-13th century the Portuguese king Sancho II 
was replaced by his brother Afonso as governor on the advice of the Pope. On the 
one hand that example showed that royal power could be limited by the Papacy, 
but on the other hand it displayed that the Popes (and Giles) were more concerned 
about the continuity of the dynastic rule than the actual ruler’s authority. That 
marked a shift away from the personified concept of authority and pointed towards 
the modern idea of sovereignty. It is important to note that even though both 
scholars were interested in the constraints of mediaeval ‘sovereignty’, they only 
dealt with the ones that limited royal authority from above. Osiander highlighted 
that Giles (and also Thomas) interpreted cities and their alliances as building bricks 
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of kingdoms, but consciously remained mute on lordships which would have been 
more difficult to sell as innocent building bricks.363 We could add that it is even 
more striking that Ptolemy of Lucca who was supposed to be focusing on a lower 
limit of royal authority, the city-states, also wanted to defend these by the authority 
of the Papacy. He attacked Northern monarchist absolutism (and not simply the 
Emperor) in the name of republicanism, Italian patriotism and the city-states, but 
relied on an upper constraint of royal power in doing that. In other words, none of 
them were unable to get rid of the era’s hierarchical patterns of power.  
The mediaeval sources analysed were also relevant regarding natural law, another 
point where deficiencies were found in the IR image of the Middle Ages. The 
concept of lex animata in the treatise by Giles emphasised that the ‘law is the 
lifeless ruler and the ruler is the living law’.364 Giles underlined perhaps even more 
than Thomas that the ruler is an intermediary between natural law (or divine law) 
and positive law. In case the ruler abandoned that role, his legitimacy could be 
questioned. Krynen argued that Giles’ ideas were directly referenced by influential 
figures of the Early Modern French parliament which also highlights the continuity 
of the natural law tradition of the Middle Ages and its direct links to the Early 
Modern version of natural law that was misleadingly depicted as something 
fundamentally modern by Bull.365 The lack of a proper mediaeval empire was 
illustrated by Ptolemy who could not clearly decide which mode of rule was 
characteristic of the Holy Roman Emperor. Since he was elected, he could have 
qualified for regimen politicum, but he was still a single ruler who primarily relied 
on his own will which were more characteristic of regimen regale. Thus we could 
see that the existence of a mediaeval empire was a problematic idea even for 
contemporary scholars. 
Towards the end of the first part of the text it was argued that the European Union 
is a neomediaeval actor in a neomediaeval international system. Our primary focus 
there was to find a place for the EU in the revised neomediaeval setting and it was 
concluded that the EU is not on the top level (supra-state level) of competing 
universalisms or in the lowest level (sub-state or trans-state level) of urbanisation, 
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territorial separatism etc., but in the mid-level where kingdoms used to be in the 
Middle Ages and where states are in a neomediaeval model. However, it was also 
noted that the European Union is not a state, but rather a pre-state or a post-state. 
In the third part of this dissertation I will make an attempt at analysing and defining 
the EU itself as a neomediaeval actor. We will abandon the surroundings, and a 
neomediaeval constitutional analysis of the EU will take centre stage. In doing that, 
the theoretical models of mediaeval authors introduced above will be of particular 
use. We have seen that Giles of Rome and Ptolemy of Lucca heavily relied on an 
Aristotelian toolkit they had inherited, but that they also revised it. The key 
concepts of their revised models were a six-fold scheme of the various forms of 
government and a modal classification consisting of three or four modes of rule, 
the combination of which was referred to as regimen mixtum (mixed constitution). 
In the following, closing part of the dissertation I will argue that a structurally 
revised concept of regimen mixtum could be applied to the European Union as long 
as it is defined as a neomediaeval actor.    
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Third Part 
The Debate on the Democratic Deficit of the European Union 
Since the 1980s there has been a continuous discourse about the nature of the 
European Union. The only point on which almost all authors seem to have reached 
a consensus is that the EU is not a state. Jacques Delors famously called the EU an 
‘unidentified political object’ in 1985. “This unidentified object may approximate 
to a compound democracy, a transnational consociation, a commonwealth, a post-
Hobbesian non-state, a Bund, or a federation d-états-nations, to name but a few of 
the candidate neologisms.”366 One could add Zielonka’s neomediaeval empire to 
that list or, for that matter, the post-colonial empire of József Böröcz.367 However, 
if we want to grasp what the EU is, before putting a label on it, we should first take 
a look at the main points it is criticised on. The discourse taking us closest to a 
constitutional understanding of the EU is the debate about its so-called democratic 
deficit.  
Criticising the European Union for the lack of democracy became an influential 
approach after the Treaty of Maastricht, in the mid-1990s. Joseph Weiler’s and his 
colleagues’ path-breaking European Democracy and its Critique set the tone by 
introducing a “standard version” of the critique of democracy in the EU.368 They 
argued that the “Standard Version is non-attributable. It is an aggregate of public 
opinion data, politicians' statements, media commentary, and considerable 
learned analysis.”369 However, scholars following Weiler’s footsteps attributed the 
standard version to him and also updated and changed it over the next decade. The 
most notable contributions came from Andersen and Burns, Raunio, Mattila, 
Kousser and Scharpf and of course Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik 
who strongly refused the idea of the democratic deficit. On the following pages an 
aggregate view of the standard version of democratic deficit will be presented and 
its criticism by Moravcsik will also be introduced based on the study of Follesdal 
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and Hix who published a comprehensive overview of the discourse in 2006.370 
There was one feature of the democratic deficit narrative that remained constant 
even during the most intensive period of the debate between 1995 and 2006 and 
that was the five-fold system of arguments, which sometimes overlapped. 
Therefore it is best to start with the introduction of these arguments.  
The first point typically underlines the weak parliamentary system within the EU. 
As Andersen and Burns (1996) put it “the EU is an instance of post-parliamentary 
governance, where the direct ‘influence of the people’ through formal 
representative democracy has a marginal role.”371 And that is largely so, because 
the EU brought about the rise of the executive branch of power to the detriment of 
the legislative. It were only the national parliaments who could control the 
governments, but as the latter were let out of their national stage, they became 
mostly unleashed. The crux of the matter is that while in national parliamentary 
systems the parliament may ‘hire and fire’ the cabinet, at the European level that 
does not work. Policy making is primarily in the hands of executive actors within 
the EU who are not subjected to almost any form of parliamentary control. “Even 
with the establishment of European Affairs Committees in all national parliaments, 
ministers when speaking and voting in the Council, national bureaucrats when 
making policies in Coreper or Council working groups, and officials in the 
Commission when drafting or implementing legislation, are much more isolated 
from national parliamentary scrutiny and control than are national cabinet 
ministers or bureaucrats in the domestic policy-making process. As a result, 
governments can effectively ignore their parliaments when making decisions in 
Brussels. Hence, European integration has meant a decrease in the power of 
national parliaments and an increase in the power of executives.”372   
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The second point is closely connected to the first as it emphasises the weakness of 
the European Parliament. Despite the fact that the ever-increasing authority of the 
European Parliament has been a recurring trope of the successive reform treaties 
of the European Union,373 to this day we can claim that the EP has a small share of 
power compared to its domestic counterparts. The most obvious difference is that 
while in most continental European countries the parliament serves as the key and 
exclusively institutionalised legislator, the European Parliament has incomparably 
stronger competitors. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, during the heyday of the 
discourse on democratic deficit, this was even more so. The European Parliament 
could never act on its own and always had to cooperate with the European 
Commission and the European Council or at least take into account their decisions. 
The Parliament has no voice in appointing Commissioners or in shaping the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and its hands are strongly bound by the other 
two organs under the cooperation and codecision procedures (known as ordinary 
legislative procedure since the Lisbon Treaty). While at the domestic level 
parliaments are considered to be the only real legislature, the EP is only a second- 
or third-rate legislator of the European Union. Another important difference is that 
the European Parliament does not play any role in the appointment of the executive 
authorities of the European Union. Therefore it is no exaggerated polemic to argue 
that the European Parliament is considerably weaker than both the other two EU 
bodies and the domestic legislative assemblies.374 
The third point seems the most surprising at a first glance, because it claims that 
there are no ‘European’ elections.  Authors like Weiler and Follesdal and Hix argue 
that the European electorate votes for national governments who then pursue 
European-level politics without their control and elect the European Parliament, 
but in their view none of these qualify as ‘European’ elections. They are not about 
politicians who try to convince their constituents about their own vision of Europe 
or about anything on the European political agenda. During the elections local 
governments there has traditionally been little focus on European matters. There 
seems to be no forum where ‘European’ issues are discussed with the inclusion of 
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the wider electorate since European parliamentary elections are treated as mid-term 
elections where protest votes are cast against incumbent governments and which 
only provides domestic parties an opportunity to poll their voters. “This is, an 
evocative fact too, the opposite of American politics where State elections are 
frequently a mid-term signal to the central federal government.”375 No wonder that 
European parliamentary elections’ turnout has been a history of steady decline 
since 1979. As early as 1980 Reif and Schmitt described EP elections as ‘second-
order national contests’ and the future proved them right.376 “The abstract 
representation function of "the people" – its public forum function – is also 
compromised, by a combination of its ineffective powers (the real decisions do not 
happen there), by its mode of operation (time and place), by its language 
"problem", by the difficulty (and disinterest) of media coverage.”377 The question 
of the lack of a European demos is often treated separately, but in fact it seems 
strongly connected to that of ‘European’ elections. The No Demos thesis, as Weiler 
calls it, claims that common language, a shared history, common religion, cultural 
habits and sensibilities are required which clearly do not stand in the case of 
Europe. The No Demos thesis has a soft and a hard version. The soft claims that 
one day a European Demos might emerge and that is the point when the question 
of European parliamentary democracy should be rethought, the hard version argues 
that such a Demos is not even desirable. However, the key message of the third 
point is that the electorate, be it a demos or not, cannot influence policy-makers to 
change their political course or cannot dismiss them through European 
parliamentary or domestic elections.378 
Under the fourth point authors have argued that not even a potential strengthening 
of the authority of the Parliament would solve the problems of the EU, since it is 
simply ‘too distant’ from its citizens. According to Follesdal and Hix, that sense of 
distance has an institutional and a psychological aspect. As we have seen the 
Commission and the Council is institutionally far from the voters, they have very 
little influence over the appointment of Commissioners and little control over the 
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members of the Council when they act on the European level. Regarding the 
psychological side, Follesdal and Hix relied on the works by Magnette and claimed 
that “the EU is too different from the domestic democratic institutions that citizens 
are used to. As a result, citizens cannot understand the EU […] For example, the 
Commission is neither a government nor a bureaucracy […]. The Council is part 
legislature, part executive, and when acting as a legislature makes most of its 
decisions in secret. The European Parliament cannot be a properly deliberative 
assembly because of the multi-lingual nature of debates in committees and the 
plenary without a common political backdrop culture.”379 Essentially with the 
psychological aspect of the fourth point scholars claim that voters are distant from 
the EU, because they cannot recognize the separation of powers or the checks and 
balances in its institutional setup. 
According to the fifth point the EU provides an opportunity for politicians to drift 
away from the voter’s preferences as a consequence of the preconditions outlined 
above. The ‘leaders’ of the EU may realise political goals at the European level 
that would be torpedoed domestically. Some authors attribute the strongly neo-
liberal and monetarist regulatory environment provided for the European Monetary 
Union to that ‘policy drift’. It has even been argued that the oversized budget of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has also been a consequence of that, since 
the proportion of the population involved in agriculture in the EU could not justify 
the CAP’s share of the budget, only the lobbying force of farmers.380 By that we 
reach the question of pressure groups, private interest groups and the lobbying 
power of multinational companies in the European Union. Many authors argue that 
in the lack of effective EU-level trade unions and groups protecting consumer’s 
interests it is easier for business interest to penetrate Europe at that level. Therefore 
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scholars claim that the policy outcomes of the EU favour more the owners of 
capital than the average citizen.381   
The most influential critic of the five-fold standard version of democratic deficit 
has been Andrew Moravcsik. He argued against four of the five points in his papers 
written in the early 2000s. First he attacked the idea that authority has shifted to 
the executive and away from the legislative by claiming that all those government 
politicians who seem to act relentlessly in the EU are directly accountable to their 
voters. They were elected in some of the most developed democracies of the world 
and therefore it is somewhat problematic to make a case that they are without 
control. He also claimed that since the EU is still mostly intergovernmental and 
Member States dominate its functioning,382 the democratic legitimacy of the EU 
should also be measured at the level of Member States.  
Regarding the second point Moravcsik underlined that strengthening the authority 
of the European Parliament has been the most continuous and consistent 
development in the consecutive reform treaties of the EU. The Parliament gained 
veto power regarding the selection of the Commission and its rights were 
considerably widened also in the codecision procedure (or ordinary legislative 
procedure) since the Amsterdam Treaty.  
Thirdly, Moravcsik claimed that policy-making as a process is more clear and 
easier to follow in the European Union than at the domestic level.  His main 
arguments were that the strengthening belief of the EU being distant from voters 
drove most EU institutions to open up and take their decision-making processes 
closer to the citizens by providing them access to documents and information. He 
emphasised that the European Court of Justice and national courts have increasing 
powers of scrutiny while the EP’s scope of action has also been widened in this 
field.  
Moravcsik countered the fourth point by claiming that there is a delicate system of 
checks and balances in the EU since a high level of consensus is required for almost 
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any decision. He particularly mentioned that unanimity was necessary to change 
the founding treaties and that in general the EU institutions can rarely act alone in 
policy-making which is a symptom of an elaborate system of control.383 Even 
though the traditional separation of powers is difficult to identify at the level of the 
EU, Moravcsik argued that a refined system resembling the checks and balances is 
at place.  
As we can see the debate about the democratic deficit was centred around the 
Westphalian categories of representative democracy, the separation of powers and 
the system of checks and balances. All these categories which had been developed 
for the modern territorial nation-states were now applied to describe the European 
Union of which there seems to exist a consensus of not being a state, and definitely 
not a Westphalian nation-state. As we have already seen Zielonka wrote: “Without 
a change of paradigm we will be unable to comprehend the ongoing developments, 
assess their implications, and identify proper solutions for addressing these 
implications. Even now, we are trying to apply Westphalian solutions to a largely 
neo-medieval Europe, and are surprised that these solutions do not work.”384 The 
discourse on the EU’s democratic deficit is one of the archetypal examples of that 
anachronistic attitude criticised by Zielonka. Since we regard the European Union 
to be the exclusive neomediaeval actor in a neomediaeval international system we 
find it particularly urgent for a ‘change of paradigm’ to emerge in the internal, 
institutional description of the EU. The roots of that change are already visible and 
seem to be largely compatible with the stream of neomediaevalism even though 
the scholars often fail to find or present the interlinkages. As we will see, they 
either detect and identify some traits in the functioning of the EU as mediaeval 
without being aware of neomediaevalism or they describe the functioning of the 
EU in a sense that structurally resembles mediaeval patterns of political 
philosophy, but they fail to recognize the similarities. In the following chapter, 
using these scholars’ works we will introduce the concept of the European Union 
as a neomediaeval ‘regimen mixtum’ or a ‘mixed constitution’. In light of the 
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revised model of neomediaevalism introduced above, this new understanding of 
the European Union will be hopefully more than just another neologism.   
The European Union as Neomediaeval ‘Regimen Mixtum’ 
Since the end of the 20th century there has been a strong opinion voiced by many 
that the Westphalian constitutional approach should be abandoned or at least 
revised even at the level of states. One of the most open contemporary advocates 
of that view has been Bruce Ackerman who published a study in 2010 with the 
telling title ‘Good-bye, Montesquieu’.385 Ackerman believed that no advance in the 
understanding of today’s states could be made until we fundamentally reshaped the 
conceptual framework bequeathed to us by Montesquieu. “No other field of 
academic inquiry is so dominated by a single thinker, let alone an eighteenth-
century thinker. However great he may have been, Montesquieu did not have the 
slightest inkling of political parties, democratic politics, modern constitutional 
designs, contemporary bureaucratic techniques, and the distinctive ambitions of 
the modern regulatory state. And yet we mindlessly follow him in supposing that 
all this complexity is best captured by a trinitarian separation of power into the 
legislative, judicial, and executive […]”386 Despite that Ackerman gave 
Montesquieu his due for his functionalist turn which “represented a fundamental 
advance over traditional Aristotelian understandings of mixed government.” 
Ackerman described the Aristotelian theory as a class-based understanding where 
the various branches of power were separated based on the social groups they 
represented and not based on their functions. Aristotle’s politeia, aristocracy and 
monarchy were well represented in early modern England by the House of 
Commons, the House of Lords and the Crown. Montesquieu’s great contribution 
was shifting the focus to the function of power from the representation of class 
interests. That was what Ackerman referred to as the ‘functionalist turn’.  
However, as we could see, Ackerman argued that the functionalist turn is not 
sufficient anymore and that we need to go further than that in the 21st century. 
Ackerman was particularly critical about Montesquieu having been so mesmerised 
by his trinitarian thinking that he allowed only three boxes in his conceptual 
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scheme. Therefore he suggested a drastic departure from that classical concept of 
the separation of powers. “Almost three centuries later, it is past time to rethink 
Montesquieu’s holy trinity. Despite its canonical status, it is blinding us to the 
world- wide rise of new institutional forms that cannot be neatly categorized as 
legislative, judicial, or executive. Although the traditional tripartite formula fails 
to capture their distinctive modes of operation, these new and functionally 
independent units are playing an increasingly important role in modern 
government. A ‘new separation of powers’ is emerging in the twenty-first century. 
To grasp its distinctive features will require us to develop a conceptual framework 
containing five or six boxes – or maybe more.”387 It is worth bearing in mind that 
Ackerman suggested this shift in the discipline of comparative administrative law 
which focuses on states, i.e. the descendants of former Westphalian nation-states. 
However, the European Union was taking shape in a period when the Westphalian 
international system was slowly waning and it has never been a Westphalian state. 
Therefore in understanding its institutional setup, it seems even more necessary to 
leave behind some of our Westphalian ‘instincts’. In other words, perhaps it is 
wiser to simply describe what we see when we look at the EU without a 
Westphalian bias.  
Some scholars were intellectually daring enough to do that even before or during 
the ‘democratic deficit’ debate. Three names should particularly be mentioned 
here, those of Jean Paul Jacqué, Giandomenico Majone and Mario Telò. Jacqué 
reached the threshold of understanding the neomediaeval nature of the European 
Union while Majone later claimed that the European Union’s community method 
resembled a preabsolutist or mediaeval ‘mixed government’ without being familiar 
with neomediaevalism. Telò also defined the European Union as a ‘mixed 
government’ and even used Aristotle’s six-fold scheme to make sense of its 
institutions, but he did not build on Majone’s results or criticise them. Out of the 
three, clearly Majone understood the deepest implications of the concept, but it was 
Telò who took it the furthest by comparing EU institutions to the categories of the 
Aristotelian scheme. On the next pages I will analyse, compare and revise their 
observations.  
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Jean Paul Jacqué’s course entitled ‘Cours Général de Droit Communautaire’ was 
held and published at the Academy of European Law of the European University 
Institute.388 He discovered that the representation of national and supranational 
interests replaced the separation of powers at the level of the European Union. In 
that sense, the various interests were represented by different kinds of voting 
procedures. Unanimous voting was required in the Council in all cases where 
national interest was deemed to be prevalent, but the Council had to take into 
account the proposals of the Commission in all cases where majority voting was 
introduced in order to balance national and community interests. In all fields where 
community interest was supposed to be dominant, the Commission received 
discretionary decision-making powers. Thus, in Jacqué’s understanding each field 
gained its own voting procedure in line with the interests involved. Jacqué did not 
label the European Union a mixed constitution, but marked the EU’s institutional 
design with some of the major characteristics of it.  
It was Giandomenico Majone who clearly designated the community method of 
the European Union as a ‘mixed government’ in 2005 and he also used that concept 
in some of his later works.389 He gradually reached that conclusion from the debate 
on democratic deficit in which he argued that inappropriate standards were used 
when the legitimacy of the European Union was measured. In the 1990s Majone 
agreed that by general Westphalian standards the European Union cannot be 
labelled democratic, however he highlighted that these standards were inadequate 
for the EU. Later he called it an ‘analogical fallacy’ to apply the ‘legitimacy 
standard of democracy’390 to the European Union.  He viewed the European Union 
to be a regulatory agency that does not have to be democratic in a sense nation 
states are, because it has far weaker political authority to begin with and curbing 
even that by means of democratic checks and balances could paralyse the whole 
process of integration.  “The process is non-majoritarian not because the founding 
fathers distrusted democracy. Rather, they understood more clearly than today’s 
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leaders that economic integration without political integration is feasible only if 
politics and economics are kept as separate as possible. Depoliticisation of 
European policy-making is the price we have to pay in order to preserve national 
sovereignty largely intact. As long as the majority of the citizens of Member States 
oppose the idea of a European super-state, while supporting far-reaching 
economic integration, we cannot expect democratic politics to flourish at the 
European level. These being the preferences of national electorates we cannot but 
conclude that, paradoxically, Europe’s ‘democratic deficit’ as the expression is 
usually understood, is democratically justified.”391 Majone also argued that as long 
as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and narrowly defined and 
transparency, expertise, procedural rationality and accountability are ensured, the 
legitimacy of the EU should be considered guaranteed.392  To sum it up, Majone 
agreed that there was a democratic deficit in the EU by Member State standards, 
but he found it highly questionable whether that was the appropriate standard to 
measure the legitimacy of the European Union. Recently his concept of a 
‘legitimacy deficit’ became more widespread in the literature than ‘democratic 
deficit’.393   
Moving on from the question of majoritarian decision-making to the separation of 
powers, Majone later identified the European Union as a ‘mixed government’. In 
his train of thought, he relied on Jacqué’s assertion that the representation of 
interests replaced the separation of powers in the EU. He criticised the practice that 
the EU had constantly been labelled sui generis since that created a hurdle in the 
way of contextualising or comparing the Community to other polities. “It is true 
that the principles of the Community method diverge significantly from those of 
contemporary democratic states […]. But recall […] Tocqueville’s remark to the 
effect that the gallery of human institutions contains mostly copies. It is therefore 
likely that if no relevant contemporary models can be found, precedents may be 
discovered in our constitutional past. In fact, the institutional architecture 
designed by the Treaty reveals striking similarities to a much older model of 
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governance known as ‘mixed government’ […]. The mixed constitution — already 
discussed by ancient political philosophers such as Aristotle and Polybius — was 
prevalent in medieval and preabsolutist Europe. According to this philosophy of 
government, the polity is composed, not of individual citizens but of corporate 
bodies balanced against each other and governed by mutual agreement rather than 
by a political sovereign.”394 
Majone highlighted that the crucial difference between modern governments and 
‘mixed polities’ was that the latter were not interested as much in policy-making 
as in the sharing and distribution of privileges, rights and immunities. He depicted 
a mixed constitution as a ‘tug-of-war’ among various centres of power which was 
tamed by a high level of institutionalisation. Majone made it clear that even though 
the model’s relevance declined by the 19th century, it was still important during the 
Glorious Revolution in England and the debate about the American constitution. 
He also tried to shed some light on why the founding fathers of the Community 
had created an institutional design similar to a mixed constitution. “It seems 
unlikely that the framers of the Rome Treaty were directly inspired by medieval 
theories of government […]. They did, however, make a conscious choice between 
two distinct constitutional alternatives: either separating the functional branches 
of government or mixing the ‘estates’ (or main interests) of the polity in the 
legislature — where the three political estates are not, of course, the Crown, Lords, 
and Commons, but the national governments represented in the Council, the 
supranational institutions — Commission and European Court of Justice, and the 
‘peoples of the States brought together in the Community’ (Article 137 of the Rome 
Treaty), represented, at least in theory, by the EP.”395 Following the identification 
of these basic resemblances, Majone went on to pinpoint further structural 
similarities between the European Union and mixed constitutions.  
First, he claimed that there was a certain analogy between the dualism in mediaeval 
mixed constitutions and that within the European Union. The essential balance of 
the various institutions representing interests was to be built between the territorial 
rulers and other estates in mediaeval mixed polities while it is sought between the 
Community and the Member States in the European Union. It is noteworthy that 
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this is one of the few points where Majone makes statements about the actual 
Middle Ages in his work published in 2005 and in doing so the only mediaevalist 
he references is the same Otto von Gierke from the 19th century who was mentioned 
by Hedley Bull a quarter century earlier. Even that reference is borrowed from the 
sociologist and lawyer Gianfranco Poggi’s work on modern state formation.396 
Majone used the concept of dualism by Gierke correctly, but the fact that Gierke 
was his only mediaevalist source on a mediaeval topic indicates well the 
dissatisfactory assimilation of contemporary historical results in political science.   
Second, Majone argued that the ‘institutional rigidity’ of the European Union is 
also a ‘mixed polity’ feature. According to that observation the delicate 
institutional balance functions as an impediment of ‘far-reaching reforms in the 
EU’. The rationale behind the balance was to prevent any institution from 
delegating policy-making to a European agency and thereby guard the Member 
States and the institutions themselves. In Majone’s understanding the difficulty to 
reform or abandon that Community method has made its circumvention 
increasingly frequent.397  
Third, he clearly indicated that the Community method’s incompatibility with the 
modern idea of indivisible sovereignty marks the EU’s ‘deep affinity’ to the 
concept of mixed government. Using Bull’s phrase, both regimes suffer from a 
“protracted uncertainty about the locus of sovereignty”.398 In the EU, sovereignty 
is shared among its constituents (the Member States and the Community 
institutions) which leads to the question whether that form of authority could still 
be referred to as sovereignty. A key characteristic of modern sovereignty has been 
its indivisibility which is obviously lacking if the locus of sovereignty is ‘lost’ 
halfway between the Community and the Member States.399  
Fourth, Majone thought that the limited role of democratic functioning in the 
European Union could most easily be attributed to its mixed constitutional nature. 
Referencing Aristotle, he noted that the mixed polity was not “a variant of, but an 
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alternative to, majoritarian democracy.”400 In a sense mixed constitutions provide 
a depoliticised governance by strictly balancing the tug-of-war among various 
social groups and their representative institutions. According to Majone, the 
process of European economic integration was shielded from the ‘clash of political 
interests’ by such practices. Another non-majoritarian analogy between the EU and 
mixed polities is that “there is no central power to conquer in a competition among 
political parties” as in modern democracies and it is the political exchange of the 
three legislative institutions that result in policies as opposed to majority 
government decisions. An important symptom of that is the lack of political 
division along party lines in the European Parliament which typically represents a 
‘united front’ towards the other two institutions. “The language of majoritarian 
politics — government and opposition, party competition, left and right — has very 
limited currency in this context precisely because the prime theme of the internal 
political process is the contest among autonomous institutions over the extent and 
security of their respective jurisdictional prerogatives.”401   
Fifth, Majone indicated that the absence of centralised administration was also a 
shared feature of mixed polities and the European Union. Regarding the estates of 
the realm in mixed governments he mentioned that these were supposed to take 
care of their own members and therefore individuals were not directly linked to the 
general government. In a similar vein the EU is also lacking a centralised 
bureaucracy, because EU policies are implemented by national administrations and 
in most fields the Community institutions do not even have policy-making 
competences. 
Finally Majone attempted to understand why the Community method of the EU 
could take after mixed constitutions so obviously. In his view the general objection 
against his theory could have been that mixed polities disappeared from modern 
European political thought, because the complex political structures of a well-
organised society required more refined mechanisms such as majoritarian 
democracy and the separation of powers. How could have they reappeared then in 
an even more complex entity? The counterargument of Majone was that 
‘European’ society is far less complex than those of the Member States. “European 
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society—as distinct from the separate national societies of the members of the 
Union—is still at a rather primitive stage. The absence of European media, of 
effective European political parties, of a genuinely European process of public 
opinion formation, are only some indications of this situation. The archaism of the 
mixed-polity model reflects the underdevelopment of European society.”402 
As we can see, Majone went much further than Jacqué and clearly identified the 
EU as a mixed constitution. He listed numerous symptoms of that condition and 
also tried to find the root causes of this anachronistic constellation. Six years 
following the work of Majone, another Italian scholar, Mario Telò, also concluded 
that if there was any type of regime the EU resembled, it had to be mediaeval mixed 
government.403 It is relevant to note that he seems to have arrived to this 
conclusions independently of Majone, at least he did not reference any of his 
works.404 Telò approached the issue from the viewpoint of the legitimacy and the 
stability of the European Union, essentially asking the question how it is possible 
that the EU has been stable for seven decades and at the same time has almost 
constantly been criticised for the lack of democracy while all its Member States 
have been democratic. He argued that longue durée stability, relatively weak 
democracy and legitimacy may coexist in the European Union because it has 
adopted a mixed constitutional structure from the beginning. Telò provided a more 
thorough introduction of the history of mixed constitution and referred to numerous 
scholars who have worked with the concept since Antiquity. Apart from Aristotle 
and Polybius who were also mentioned by Majone, he named Thomas Aquinas and 
Machiavelli from the Middle Ages, but it was also characteristic of his paper to 
draw heavily on ancient and particularly modern authors (Cicero, Guiccardini, 
Milton, Montesquieu and Hegel). It is also worth noting that he relied on the works 
of Norberto Bobbio, a notable 20th century historian of political thought, when he 
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defined mixed constitution.  “[T]he concept of ‘mixed government’ defines a 
seventh kind of government, beyond the three good ones (monarchy, aristocracy 
and democracy) and the three degenerated ones (tyranny, oligarchy and 
demagogy). It fits well for polities combining stability and complex internal 
balances by merging the three good principles of government.”405 In his overview 
of the literature, Telò underlined that Hegel was the first modern scholar who wrote 
appreciatively about mixed constitutions since he regarded them to be a form of 
“stable and durable polities.”406  
As opposed to Jacqué and Majone, Telò did not approach mixed governments from 
the perspective of the representation of social interests, but primarily from the 
question of legitimacy. He claimed that mixed governments have three sources of 
legitimacy; aside from the support of the masses expressed by democratic 
legitimacy there is aristocratic legitimacy that stems from a high level of technical 
knowledge and monarchic legitimacy which has the capacity of concentrating 
political will. Telò found it important to mention multiple times that the full 
politicisation or democratisation of the EU is not possible since “in mixed 
constitutional polities, the will of democratic majorities at national and 
supranational levels is not the only norm-setting principle.”407 
He then moved on to ask the question whether it makes sense to apply the model 
on non-state entities and responded affirmatively, because the concept took shape 
long before the Westphalian state was born. In Telò’s understanding it was an 
important feature of the mixed constitutional model that it mixed realism and 
idealism and was therefore flexible enough to describe the European Union. In one 
way Telò went further than Majone and tried to link various EU institutions to 
Aristotelian forms of government. “In the EU context, the Court of Justice and the 
Commission represent the aristocratic dimension (based on technical knowledge 
and expertise), while the Council represents the monarchy (political will of 
governments) and the Parliament plus various forms of democratic participation 
(social dialogue, right of petition, role of national parliaments) represent the 
democratic dimension, the direct legitimacy of the citizens. All three matter and, 
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only if combined, can explain the EC/EU’s longue durée stability over six decades. 
So far, every attempt to simplify the system to only one of the three principles 
(including the democratic one) has failed and will probably continue to fail in the 
future. This explains the shortcomings of mere intergovernmental and functionalist 
theories of EU integration.”408 
Following these assertions, Telò concluded that the longterm stability of the EU 
has primarily been guaranteed by its mixed constitutional setup. According to him, 
the success of the EU lies in the creative combination of international peacekeeping 
in a historically war-prone region, the augmentation of technical and epistemic 
capacities and “supranational conditionality”. In this system the constrained 
concentration of authority is balanced out by EU’s role of scapegoat by national 
populists and the utopian vision of a European federation. To sum it all up, Telò 
considered the European Union already to be a mixed polity and also found that 
the only way forward in the constitutionalisation of the EU would be an innovative 
revision of its mixed constitution. That this was not just an ephemeral side note in 
his career is marked by the fact that he almost literally repeated his most important 
claims in another paper written in 2016.409 
When it comes to the way forward, it is not without use to look at the models 
proposing a future direction for the European Union instead of describing it. It is 
strikingly obvious that even these works are leaving behind Montesquieu’s 
functional approach and introduce a system reflecting the Aristotelian social class-
based approach more than anything else. The EU has often been prescribed a 
consociational model410 which was developed by Arend Lijphart in the 1970s to 
provide a deeper understanding of how democracies in plural societies, as in 
Switzerland, Belgium or the Netherlands, worked.411 Such studies invoking the 
concept of consociational democracy arrived at the conclusion that various social 
groups should be more poignantly represented in the institutions of the European 
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Union than in the traditional Westphalian scheme. They believe so, because they 
have noticed the increasing relevance of the social dimension in the building units 
of the EU, i.e. in its Member States. As Andersen and Burns put it:  “An underlying 
logic in the evolution of modern governance in advanced, Western societies is a 
particular duality: on the one hand, increasing monitoring and regulation of more 
and more areas of social life, and often greater systematic and rational regulation, 
and, on the other hand, the diffusion into civil society of governance powers or 
simply its appropriation by agents in civil society. In a word, state government and 
society appear to interpenetrate - and to dissolve into – one another.”412 (The last 
sentence of the quote was highlighted by the authors.) They also identified three 
organising principles within the EU which were national representation, interest 
representation and representation of expertise.413 State and society 
interpenetrating each other and the representational setup of the EU convinced 
some scholars that the representation of various social classes through a model of 
consociation paves the EU’s way to the future. Unlike Majone, they did not 
differentiate between the societies of Member States and a ‘European’ society and 
implicitly argued that if the EU is built of the most progressive societies of the 
world, ‘European’ society should also be represented in the EU by the most 
progressive models. In other words, they advocated the adoption of a model which 
was not looking back to historical regimes, but that was looking forward in the 
direction of the sophisticated representative systems of the most developed 
European countries.  
However in terms of its structure and principles consociationalism highly 
resembles premodern class-based regimes. Consociationalists seek to “manage 
deep disagreement through executive power sharing and the creation of veto 
positions for minority groups.”414 We should see that these societal groups do not 
simply enjoy autonomy rights, but are also granted “protected position in the 
central decision making structure of the state.”415 That “protected position” 
essentially means a form of institutional representation of various social segments. 
According to Weiler, in a consociational system “traditional political fora were 
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bypassed, and substituted by fora in which the leaders of all social segments 
participated.”416 These segments are represented by elites who are involved in 
bargaining and consensus seeking rather than majority decision making. The fora 
for these processes are also highly formal and institutionalised where the structure 
favours the social status quo and the representation of new minorities is always 
lagging behind.417 As we can see, a significant feature of the consociational model 
is a shift back to class-based representation and therefore it also reaches back to 
earlier regimes even if its proponents are not aware of that or do not declare it 
explicitly. Weiler also came up with competing representative models where 
“supranationalism”, “pluralism” and “competitive elitism” are mixed and which 
do not take much creativity to replace with “monarchy”, “democracy” and 
“aristocracy”. Thus even when it comes to some of the progressive propositions 
for the future of the EU we often face solutions that are more class-based than 
functionalist and implicitly resemble mixed governments more than anything.  
In order to revise and make sense of the theories introduced above in terms of 
neomediaevalism it is worth noting that in line with Ackerman’s claim, all the first 
three authors agreed that traditional separation of powers should be replaced in a 
scheme describing the European Union. Jacqué and Majone replaced it with the 
representation of interests and Telò with competing sources of legitimacy. 
However, they defied the idea that it should include more boxes than three and that 
it should go further in the direction of Montesquieu’s functionalist turn. Those of 
them who introduced the mixed constitutional idea (Majone and Telò) remained 
conservatively trinitarian and reached back to a pre-modern type of regime instead 
of revising the functionalist approach. Ackerman also indicated that Montesquieu’s 
concept should rather be discarded than revised, however he clearly wished to pave 
a way forward (in terms of not reaching back to Aristotle again) and appreciated 
the functionalist turn. It is also worth noting that his suggestion of introducing six 
or more boxes was pretty much in line with the concept of the mixed constitution, 
but the authors applying this model to the EU were not exactly aware of that. Even 
though Telò mentioned that a mixed polity was a seventh kind of regime besides 
monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, tyranny, oligarchy and demagogy, he 
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essentially mixed the three good forms. None of the authors were familiar with 
mediaeval political philosophy sufficiently to pinpoint that besides these forms of 
government, the various modes of rule were also a significant feature of the concept 
of mixed constitution. In other words the representation of interests was not the 
only focal point of the mediaeval discourse of mixed polities, but the ways power 
was used (modes of rule) were equally important. The concepts of regimen 
politicum, regimen regale and regimen despoticum were so relevant that the Latin 
expression for a mixed constitution – regimen mixtum – is derived from these. The 
reason for choosing the two mediaeval authors in Part Two besides the ones 
mentioned earlier was that they both heavily relied on this modal classification 
aside from the six forms of government. And if we take a closer look at some of 
the works describing the EU even without a neomediaeval or mixed constitutional 
toolkit it is obvious that they also often identified various modes of rule and 
sometimes strikingly used the same phrase to describe them. Take for instance the 
following quote from Weiler:  “We will present a description of European 
governance which has (at least) three principal facets: International, 
Supranational and Infranational. Our argument is simple. In this sense there are 
three polities, or three regimes, or three modes of governance. This trichotomy 
creates fundamentally different permutations of power distribution in the overall 
European polity.”418 (Expressions highlighted by me.)  
Therefore it is possible to argue based on the literature, that the European Union 
can be understood as a neomediaeval regimen mixtum where instead of the 
separation of powers one can find the mixture of various forms of government and 
different modes of rule. When it comes to the forms of government the chief 
question is who are exercising power or whose interests are represented. As 
opposed to Telò, it seems more grounded to argue that the representation of 
interests is paramount compared to the sources of legitimacy. And that approach 
would provide us with different results regarding the place of various EU 
institutions in the model. It is clear that the European Parliament represents the 
people and therefore it can easily be interpreted as the democratic element. 
However, the Council where a political elite represents the Member States is more 
logical to be regarded the aristocratic element while the Commission representing 
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the community interests could be labelled monarchic. Therefore in the present 
model of the neomediaeval regimen mixtum, the position of the Council and the 
Commission is reversed compared to Telò’s approach. Perhaps it is wiser to go 
even further and revise the anachronistic labels themselves. The EP’s democratic 
label is clearly suitable, but the nature of the Council could be better described by 
the adjective ‘diplomatic’ and the Commission by the term ‘bureaucratic’. 
Therefore when it comes to the forms of government in this model of regimen 
mixtum we have a democratic, a diplomatic and a bureaucratic element 
representing respectively the European people, the Member States and the 
Community. And their interaction may take the shape of international, 
supranational or infranational modes of rule.  
It is equally important to understand the meaning of these modes. What do the 
words international, supranational and infranational mean and why cannot these be 
linked with the various institutions? What is the difference between the forms of 
government and the modes of rule in the EU? The dividing line between these two 
sets of categories seem to be equally blurred as it was the case in mediaeval 
political philosophy. The division is still necessary because the modes define how 
power is exercised and cannot always be identified by a single institution. In fact 
they also signify the various ways of interaction between the components and the 
institutions of the EU. Perhaps the best way to understand the difference between 
them is to follow the footsteps of mediaeval authors, some of whom (Thomas 
Aquinas) claimed that the major difference between regimen politicum, regimen 
regale and regimen despoticum was the subjects’ level of freedom while some 
others believed it was whether the ruler based his decisions on his own laws or also 
on the will of the people (Giles of Rome) and yet some others linked it to the 
number of rulers (Ptolemy of Lucca). These considerations seem to be relevant also 
in understanding the concepts of international, supranational and infranational 
modes of rule. 
The international (or intergovernmental) mode is based on national laws and as a 
consequence Member States have a high level of freedom while people who elect 
their governments have a limited, indirect form of freedom with the number of 
decision makers being relatively high, typically equalling the number of Member 
States. Supranational mode is characterised by a single decision making unit (the 
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Community) where the freedom of the Member States and the citizens is seriously 
curtailed and the Community decides almost exclusively based on its own laws. 
The infranational mode boasts bigger freedom for private organisations (e.g. 
NGOs) and a limited authority of the Community with a very high number of 
decision makers and decisions mostly based on the interest of these private 
organisations. A typical example of the international mode is the procedure of 
drafting the Treaties of the Union or the decision-making methods in the Council. 
Supranational mode can mostly be associated with the functioning of the 
Commission which is embodied by its President and the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy since the Lisbon Treaty. Infranational mode is 
chiefly characterised by NGOs’ and government departments’ networking, 
lobbying and bargaining. However, even if it is not discussed under infranational 
mode in the literature, I would also add European Citizen’s Initiative and elements 
like social dialogue and right of petition since these also express the will and 
interest of significant segments of the ‘European’ society.  
Regarding the relevance of these modes it is worth quoting Weiler again: “The 
inter-supra-infra trichotomy enables us to build a better picture of the 
disbursement of power and accountability in the Union. The stakes as to arena, 
where (in this scheme) issues get decided, is as important as what gets decided -- 
since the where impacts, indeed determines the what.”419 Later Weiler gave 
examples when the forum and the mode of decision making was as important in 
the EU as the content of the decisions. He claimed that in some instances the real 
battle was about deciding whether a matter should be settled in the international or 
the supranational arena and not about the content. Weiler highlighted that this 
debate reached the highest level of Treaties since the Maastrich three pillar 
structure basically reflected the ‘modes of governance’. Weiler even argued that 
since the Single European Act (1986) considerable political battles in the EU 
concerned fora rather than outcome.420 (See Weiler’s table of the modes in the 
Annex) 
In the previous pages an overview of the analyses of the institutional setup of the 
EU was presented with special regards to the concept of mixed government. It was 
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argued that in line with neomediaevalism many scholars interpreted the European 
Union explicitly as a mixed government or presented models that structurally 
resembled this premodern concept. However, they were not familiar with the 
neomediaeval approach and sometimes were also unaware of each other’s works. 
The goal of the present chapter was to fill these gaps and deliver a more rounded 
neomediaeval understanding of the constitutional setup of the EU. The model was 
labelled a ‘neomediaeval regimen mixtum’ where the democratic European 
Parliament, the diplomatic European Council and the bureaucratic European 
Commission respectively represent the European People, the Member States and 
the Community. The novelty of the model besides the revision of the labels of the 
‘boxes’ was the introduction of the modes of rule which was also implicitly 
available in the literature, but not linked to either neomediaevalism or the concept 
of mixed government. The interaction between the components and institutions of 
the EU was characterised by international, supranational and infranational modes 
of rule. Thus neomediaeval regimen mixtum was defined as a regime where the 
democratic, diplomatic and bureaucratic forms of government were mixed with 
international, supranational and infranational modes of decision making. In the 
following, concluding chapter it will be attempted to understand why the model of 
neomediaeval regimen mixtum may seem particularly fitting for the European 
Union. In doing so the First Part’s neomediaeval international system and the 
present chapter’s findings will be synthesised with the help of three tropes of 
neomediaevalism: sovereignty, empire and natural law.   
Conclusions 
In this concluding chapter identifying the structural causes of the European Union’s 
mixed constitutional nature will be in focus. Why does it make more sense to ask 
how power is shared or used in the EU than to look for the ‘content’ or function of 
exercising power as in a Westphalian constitution? Why are the forms of 
representation (or governance) and the modes of rule more important than the 
separation of powers and checks and balances? Using the concepts that were 
applied in the previous two parts, this chapter will provide an addition to the causes 
shortly discussed by Majone who claimed that the primitive stage of ‘European’ 
society is responsible for the mixed constitutional setup in the first place. Here the 
argument will be delivered that the neomediaeval structure of the international 
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system outlined in the First Part is the primary cause since the EU took shape when 
that international system was put in place and therefore it had to adapt to this ‘post-
Westphalian constellation’. 
Sovereignty 
We have already seen that Majone treated the lack of indivisible sovereignty as one 
of the major symptoms of the EU’s mixed constitution.421 Bull also claimed that 
there was uncertainty about the ‘locus’ of sovereignty422 in the EU which we may 
interpret also as an observation of its absence. These two influential scholars have 
demonstrated that there has been a serious belief both in the disciplines of political 
science and international relations that the European Union lacks full scale public 
authority. Sociologists and economists have mostly shared that opinion. József 
Böröcz, a notable dependency theorist articulated the same idea very clearly in his 
book analysing the EU. “If we evaluate the EU only in terms of the conventional, 
Weberian criterion of monopoly over legitimate means of coercion, we must 
dismiss the idea that the EU is a state because of the near-complete absence of an 
executive apparatus, and hence the lack of means of coercion of its (the EU’s) 
own.”423 That is so, not just because the ‘European society’ is underdeveloped and 
not ready to delegate more power to a European authority (Majone), but also 
because the EU is particularly subjected to what could be called the neomediaeval 
international system. As it was mentioned, the authority of the European Union is 
also limited by the contemporary competing universalisms from above similarly to 
states, but these limits can be even more obvious in the case of the EU. As 
Follesdal–Hix demonstrated, multinational companies had more incentive to lobby 
at the European Union than in Member States, because of the less virulent 
consumer protection activities and trade union bargaining there.424 It is especially 
relevant in a period when 51 percent of global profit is realised abroad that the 
transnational market economy, the hard upper constraint of the neomediaeval 
international system, has found open gates in the European Union. We will get 
back to the human rights regime as the other universalism under the section on 
natural law.  
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Here it is more important to emphasise that the lower limits of the EU’s authority 
are more considerable than in case of other mid-level actors (states). On the one 
hand the European Union is made up of states which invented and have tried to 
maintain the heritage of sovereignty and have therefore refrained from delegating 
much power to the EU. It was already argued above that sovereignty seems to be 
lost halfway between the Member States and the Community and therefore it could 
hardly be labelled indivisible. On the other hand the EU has an infranational ‘arena’ 
or a ‘mode of rule’ that semi-institutionalises even the bargaining and lobbying of 
NGOs. It means that the EU has to face more forms of the limitation of its public 
authority than states. However, the European Union has adapted to these 
circumstances well and has also managed to shape them in line with its own needs. 
As Böröcz puts it: “The distance created by its meta-relationship with the member 
states allows the EU to remain ‘clean’ in such matters that states muddle through, 
often with much trouble. By contracting out the burden of strategic defense to 
NATO, the EU can maintain an elegant and convenient distance from matters of 
coercion without endangering its own defense. In the process of ‘eastern 
enlargement,’ much of the transformative ‘dirty’ work in the economies on the 
EU’s eastern and southeastern flanks is done by the state apparatuses and the 
political elites of those societies themselves. EU-based multinational companies do 
much of the coercive work in the economic, environmental, social and legal realms 
worldwide without the EU itself ever having to utilize conventional tools of state-
based coercion.”425  
Beside that Böröcz characterised the Eastern enlargement in an imperial 
colonisation context, similarly to Zielonka,426 it is also clear that he found the EU’s 
way of managing its own lack of authority spectacularly innovative. Böröcz argued 
that outsourcing every task related to ‘state-based coercion’ either to NATO427 or 
the Member States essentially has allowed the EU to pose as “the epitome of 
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goodness in world politics.” It does not take much visionary zeal to interpret his 
observations in a neomediaeval framework. The European Union seems to behave 
even in these regards structurally similar to mediaeval kingdoms where the size of 
the kings’ armies were considerably lower than their absolutist counterparts’. 
Mediaeval kings also outsourced most tasks of coercion to greater landowners who 
could join his campaigns under their own banners. That practice could downright 
threaten the territorial integrity of some of these kingdoms by the High Middle 
Ages. The concept of the monopoly of violence was not even on the horizon. In 
turn, mediaeval kings were seldom identified with coercion or violence and as a 
consequence were also often regarded as the embodiment of goodness. A 
convincing indicator of that is the high number of beatified kings and the long 
standing tradition in mediaeval England and France according to which ‘royal 
touch’ would heal scrofula.428  
Nobody believes that the EU would heal scrofula, however it was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 which could be interpreted as modern day beatification. 
When the ‘West’ is in the crosshairs of its enemies either the United States, a 
former colonialist West European power or the NATO tends to personify the 
‘West’ and rarely the European Union. The EU has also been surprisingly popular 
in the polls of its own citizens despite that many countries’ leaders have used the 
EU as a makeshift enemy or a scapegoat. According to the Eurobarometer, over 
the last decade, which did not spare crises for the EU, there was only a brief period 
between 2011 and 2012 when the majority did not consider their countries’ EU-
membership a good thing and even then 47 percent were for and only 18 percent 
against the membership. Brexit could be a counterargument, but according to the 
same poll, the EU has become more popular after Brexit than ever since 1983 
among its citizens. 67% of the respondents viewed EU membership favourable for 
their countries in 2018. In only 6 countries out of 28 was the share of EU-supporters 
lower than 50 percent.429   
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The lacking sovereignty – irrespective of how the EU manages it – takes us closer 
to understanding why the content of decisions is sometimes less important than the 
process of making them. If there is no complete, indivisible authority the primary 
question becomes how (through which methods) issues are decided and who are 
entitled to decision-making. Among the chief reasons behind that, the structure of 
the international system is just as relevant as the half-baked ‘European’ society or 
demos. The approach which viewed the function of power so important that it 
differentiated between the various branches of power based on their function and 
then made them put a bridle on each other was developed as a reaction to 
absolutism in the period of Enlightenment. Absolutist rulers disregarded mediaeval 
immunities, prerogatives and liberties and carried out a total concentration of 
power. That process was also triggered by the restructuring of the international 
system at the time. With the disappearance of the ‘global’ authority of the Pope 
and the Emperor, kings felt justified to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the 
domestic/lower limits of their power and centralised their bureaucracy, organised 
ten or twenty times bigger regular armies than their predecessors and introduced 
public schooling and mass prisons. The 16th and the 17th centuries brought about 
the concept of indivisible sovereignty. Sovereignty essentially meant that all 
resources stood at the disposal of the monarch/state to use them for any end they 
wished. Hence the key question was not anymore how to share power or which 
groups to represent, but what the goal or the function of exercising power was. 
There was an abundance of power in a single hand which made scholars regard 
every question secondary compared to its function. That is what Ackerman referred 
to as the functionalist turn. Even those enlightened scholars shared that functional 
view who were worried by the lack of control of royal/state authority. They noticed 
that the external limits of royal authority (Papal and Imperial authority) 
disappeared with the structural transformation of the international system and as a 
response instinctively internalised these limits, developing concepts like the 
separation of powers and checks and balances. With the appearance of the demand 
of universal suffrage, power sharing became considerably less relevant and it was 
replaced by the enlightened objective of providing safeguards for private autonomy 
i.e. taming public authority. A section already quoted from Constant summarized 
this change: “The aim of the ancients was the sharing of social power among the 
citizens of the same fatherland: this is what they called liberty. The aim of the 
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moderns is the enjoyment of security in private pleasures; and they call liberty the 
guarantees accorded by institutions to these pleasures.”430 These scholars created 
the foundations of modern democracy as a response to absolutism.431 In the 
Westphalian international system the limits of public authority became internal, 
meaning that they were a question of each state’s constitutional structure.   
However the second half of the 20th century considerably restructured the 
international system again. That process was characterised in the First Part as the 
appearance of a neomediaeval international system in which some new upper and 
lower constraints of state authority emerged, structurally resembling the mediaeval 
system. It was this period that the European Union was taking shape. No wonder 
that if an entity is created by actors with strong traditions of modern statehood 
(meaning that they have refrained from delegating much power to that entity) in a 
period when sovereignty in general is also undermined, it would experience the 
limitation of its own authority immediately. With such a deficient form of 
sovereignty in a complicated institutional setup it seems natural that power sharing 
and the methods of using power should be deemed just as important or sometimes 
even more important than the function of it. In such a system “the where determines 
the what” as Weiler put it.432 These circumstances are just as important in 
understanding the EU’s lack of sovereignty and the root causes of its mixed 
constitutional nature as the ‘European’ society’s primitive stage of development.  
Empire 
It is difficult to justify labelling an entity an empire which is lacking sovereignty. 
Centralised executive apparatus and indivisible authority are widely regarded to be 
the basic tenets of imperial functioning. Despite that, there were multiple attempts 
at describing the European Union as an empire. We have already seen that Zielonka 
tried to analyse the EU as a neomediaeval empire, but he was not alone with the 
imperial approach. As influential officials of the EU as José Manuel Barroso, 
former President of the European Commission, called the EU an empire. He was 
asked after one of the debates on the Constitutional Treaty of the EU in 2007 what 
the European Union would be once the Treaty entered into force. This is how he 
                                                          
430
 Constant [2003] p. 317 
431
 On enlightened scholars and absolutist rulers: Zsinka, László [2011]: Az európai történelem 
eszméje. Aula, Budapest p. 22 and p. 28.  
432
 Weiler [1995] p. 32 
166 
 
responded: “Sometimes I try to compare […] the European Union as a creation to 
the organisation of empires … The empires … Because we have [the] dimension 
of empires. But there is a great difference. The empires were made usually through 
force. With a centre that was imposing a diktat, a will on the others. And now we 
have what some authors called the first non-imperial empire. We have … by 
dimension … twenty-seven countries that fully decided to work together to pool 
their sovereignties, if you want to use that concept of sovereignty, and work 
together to add values. I believe it’s a great construction, and we should be proud 
of it–at least we in the commission are proud … of our union.”433  
Based on Barroso’s response it is obvious that he understood the major dilemmas 
of comparing the EU to empires. The term non-imperial empire indicates that he 
noticed some of those missing imperial traits that were also listed at the end of the 
First Part of this dissertation. Barroso explicitly mentioned the absence of the initial 
scenario of one actor using coercion to force other actors into the imperial structure, 
i.e. he drew attention to the EU not being a top-down construction like regular 
empires tend to be. After quoting the lines of Barroso, Böröcz noted two things. 
Barroso indicated only global factors behind the birth of the EU and he insisted 
that the European Union should be viewed “in the context of geopolitical-economic 
history of large scale public authorities–not only states, but also supra-state 
structures, such as empires.”434 Böröcz then went on to provide the proposed 
longue durée analysis of West European geopolitics and the birth of the EU, a 
fascinating path which we cannot follow here. However, it is still important to bear 
in mind that he arrived at the conclusion that post-colonial imperial structures 
served as the basis of the EU and that statement should be scrutinized in the present 
section on the concept of empire.  
Böröcz differentiated between two types of empires and argued that before the 16th 
century, i.e. until the end of the Middle Ages, only contiguous (land-based) empires 
existed. These “spread like blots of ink spilled on a map, over spatially more or 
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less contiguous units.”435 Only geographic obstacles like seas or high mountains 
and deserts could insert white spots or hiatuses in them. It is worth noting that even 
though Böröcz marked the end of the Middle Ages as the ending point of the 
exclusivity of contiguous empires, only ancient, modern or non-European empires 
were featured in his list: the Sung, Ming and Manchu empires, the Romanov, the 
Habsburg, the Ottoman and the Safavid empires.436 It means that according to his 
classification, empires were absent in mediaeval Europe before new empires 
emerged in the Modern era.  
The other type of empires that appeared from the 16th century onwards were so-
called detached empires in his understanding. That type created “global linkage 
structures” using fast developing transportation and communication technologies 
and thus laid the basis of colonial functioning. Therefore beside the term detached, 
overseas and colonial could also be applied for them since they were characterised 
by a structure of thinly linked nodes. Böröcz called these linkages vectors or dyads 
that linked these dyadic nodes one of which was in West Europe in almost all such 
colonial empires. In some cases these “highly diversified interests of overseas 
imperial control” were “strikingly similar in terms of their impersonal and 
detached logic to the globally diversified property portfolios of today’s investment 
holdings.”437 According to Böröcz the EU inherited and has smartly used that 
colonial structure and even though he did not wish to rely too closely on the concept 
of the empire,438 he basically characterised the EU as an entity structurally 
resembling a post-colonial empire which innovatively adopted some strategies of 
contemporary multinational companies like “flexible specialization”, “network 
governance”, “just-in-time production” and “subcontracting” to maintain those 
structures.439  
Böröcz described the EU along these lines from a global geopolitical-economic 
perspective of dependency theory which mostly resulted an analysis of the place of 
the EU in global structures and less an understanding of the EU’s internal setup. 
The aim of the present, concluding section of the dissertation, however, is to 
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provide a synthesis of the EU's place in the global structures that were identified 
as neomediaeval in the First Part and the EU's political and constitutional setup as 
well which was labelled a mixed constitution in the Third Part. The first requires 
an international relations outlook while the second a political science perspective 
(comparative administrative and constitutional studies) and the revision of both 
concepts rely on Mediaeval Studies delivered in the Second Part. Böröcz criticised 
the literature on the EU in the name of economic dependency theory for focusing 
exclusively on a narrow political image of the EU and then being “preoccupied 
with the task of disentangling the truly bewildering gamut of laws, regulations, and 
directives”.440 However, in turn, Böröcz neglected the internal political setup of the 
European Union in favour of its longue durée geopolitical-economic analysis. 
Despite that his claims are still relevant for us from the viewpoint of empires, 
because he made it clear that the concept of the EU as empire is most applicable if 
it is modelled after modern, detached colonial empires instead of non-existing 
mediaeval ones.  
At this point it is relevant to shortly look back at Zielonka’s concept of 
‘neomediaeval empire’. Based on mediaeval authors introduced in the Second Part 
it could be argued that the concept of regimen mixtum proposed here is compatible 
with that of a ‘neomediaeval empire’. As we have seen, Ptolemy of Lucca claimed 
that the Holy Roman Empire had some features of regimen politicum and regimen 
regale. The Emperor was elected and even men without noble descent were eligible 
(regimen politicum), but the rule of the emperor was based on his own will instead 
of laws (regimen regale).441 One could argue that Ptolemy of Lucca described the 
Holy Roman Empire as regimen mixtum in which two modes of rule were mixed 
while he also regarded it an empire. Blythe emphasised that mixture,442 but as it 
was already mentioned in the Second Part, his (Blythe’s) complete work revolved 
around the belief that all 13th and 14th century political philosophers detected or 
proposed mixed government everywhere and for everyone. I.e. based on Ptolemy 
and Blythe it would be possible to claim that the Holy Roman Empire is both a 
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regimen mixtum and an empire which essentially would provide some basis for 
Zielonka’s thesis of a ‘neomediaeval empire’.  
That still seems unjustifiable because of four reasons. The first three consider the 
concepts of regimen mixtum and empires while the fourth the nature of the 
neomediaeval international system. Ptolemy never equalled regimen mixtum and 
the Holy Roman Empire. Apart from the ancient examples like Chalcedonia 
(Carthage) he wrote about the Roman Republic and some of his contemporary city-
states as regimen mixtum (without using the phrase). Despite acknowledging that 
some Emperors had no noble descent, he clearly seemed to despise the Roman 
Empire so much that he tried to discourage the Papacy from adopting any of their 
symbols and pompous rituals. Regarding the Holy Roman Empire, Ptolemy only 
mentioned that some features of regimen regale and regimen politicum can be 
discovered in its functioning, but did not have anything to say about the mixture of 
the various forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) in it. On the 
basis of these claims, it is possible to conclude that Ptolemy did not find the concept 
of the empire and regimen mixtum compatible. According to Blythe, the concept 
of mixed government he inherited from Thomas Aquinas was more likely based on 
France of Louis IX than any other contemporary regime.443 Labelling the EU a 
neomediaeval ‘empire’ and a ‘regimen mixtum’ at the same time would seem 
problematic based on the mediaeval understanding of these two concepts.   
As it was demonstrated in the critique of the standard IR understanding of the 
evolution of sovereignty, if there were some mediaeval entities that contemporary 
scholars viewed as ‘empires’, they were the kingdoms of Europe. The famous 12th 
century formula of Alanus Anglicus ‘rex in regno suo est imperator regni sui’ 
essentially meant that each king was an emperor in his own kingdom. The author 
of one of the most important 20th century works on mediaeval political authority 
found that understanding of the empire so important that the title of his book was 
L’empire du roi (The Empire of the King).444 In that sense one could label every 
mediaeval kingdom an empire, but comparing the EU to them by the term empire 
would harm today’s linguistic consensus on what we mean by empire.  
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The problem with the linguistic consensus of empire and its relationship with the 
EU is marked by Barroso’s term ‘non-imperial empire’ and Zielonka’s 
‘neomediaeval empire’. The first itself is a contradiction in terms clearly indicating 
the problem of applying the concept of ‘empire’ to the EU while the second bases 
the EU’s imperial nature on a period without a proper empire.  
The fourth and final argument against the ‘EU as empire’ is that the only proper 
imperial characteristic of the Holy Roman Empire – namely that it was one of the 
two competing universalisms in the mediaeval international system – is clearly 
missing from the EU. As it was argued, the EU is not a competing universalism at 
the top level of the neomediaeval international system, but one of the entities in the 
middle whose neomediaeval nature is best expressed by its mixed constitution.  
While arguing that the EU has post-colonial, detached imperial foundations makes 
sense from the perspective of dependency theory, if the discourse remains within 
the field of political science and international relations, the imperial claim falls 
short of justification. Particularly, if the question is approached from the 
perspective of neomediaevalism which is based on a historical period without 
contiguous or detached European empires. It makes more sense to apply the idea 
of regimen mixtum to describe the EU, a concept that was widely used in mediaeval 
political philosophy to understand the nature of various regimes from republics to 
kingdoms and that has also appeared (as ‘mixed constitution’, ‘mixed government’ 
or ‘mixed polity’) in the works of today’s political scientists examining the EU.   
Natural Law 
Contrary to the widely held popular opinion, natural law and the natural rights 
language have less of their roots in Antiquity and Modernity than in mediaeval 
canon law and political philosophy. It was already argued on the pages reviewing 
Bull’s work that modern international lawyers like Victoria, Suarez and Gentili 
were not the ones who invented natural law. According to Brian Tierney, an 
acclaimed expert of the question, these scholars relied so heavily on Thomas 
Aquinas that their school of thought was often referred to as Spanish ‘second 
scholasticism’.445 Tierney convincingly argued that Antiquity had had even less to 
do with the invention of natural law and defied the misconceptions that Sophocles’ 
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Antigone could have been the first expression of natural rights or some form of 
God-given law and that Cicero had advocated natural rights in the form of vis 
innata.446 Instead he tried to identify a period and a historical context when the 
phrase ius naturale acquired the meaning of subjective inalienable natural rights 
besides its earlier content of cosmic justice or objective harmony.447 Countering 
earlier historical canon, he argued that this change did not happen sometime 
between Thomas Aquinas (13th century) and early Modernity, but was brought 
about by glossators (canononists or Decretists) like Rufinus, Ricardus, Huguccio, 
Alanus Anglicus and most notably Gratian during the Twelfth Century 
Renaissance.448 From the late 12th century ius naturale was interpreted as “a faculty 
of power inherent in human nature” and in the 13th century the “understanding of 
right as a person’s property” was born thanks particularly to the works of Henry 
of Ghent.449 Due to these scholars, “by about 1300, particular rights were defended 
in terms of natural law.”450 Although Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham 
were most often referenced by early modern thinkers as their sources, and natural 
law was further honed during the 14th century Franciscan ‘poverty debate’451, it 
was the language of glossators by which internationalists were unwittingly 
influenced.452   
Relying on these results it is easy to dismiss those claims which criticised 
neomediaevalism based on the fundamental difference between the contemporary 
human rights-based international system and the ‘dark middle ages’. And also 
those which argued that a neomediaeval world order means going back to a stage 
of anarchical lawlessness before civilisation.453 The human rights advocacy of the 
European Union could be interpreted as an argument for and not against its 
neomediaeval nature. The EU has had a long established mission of promoting 
human rights both among its Member States and externally. Its Rights-Based 
Approach (RBA) to development cooperation, Action Plans on Human Rights and 
                                                          
446
 Ibid. p. 45-46 
447
 Ibid. p. 46-47 
448
 Ibid. p. 54 
449
 Ibid. p. 77 and 79 respectively. The contribution by Henry of Ghent is explained in detail on pages 
83-89. 
450
 Ibid. 70. 
451
 On the Franciscan ‘poverty debate’ see: Ibid. p. 93-97 
452
 Ibid. p. 76. 
453
 See the texts of Czerny [1998], Minc [1993], Kaplan [1994] Riva–Ventura [1992], Badie [1995] 
and Khanna [2009] already discussed in the First Part.   
172 
 
Democracy and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) all express that role. The primary international fora where the EU can 
effectively pursue its human rights agenda are the UN Human Rights Council and 
the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly.454 The EU’s special 
relationship with the United Nations is reflected by the fact that the European 
Union as the greatest entity that came into existence after the birth of the UN has 
been an open promoter of its key values. Moreover human rights comprise the 
fundamental values of the European Union according to its founding Treaties. In a 
similar vein to mediaeval France which was regarded as the eldest daughter of the 
Catholic Church, one can consider the EU to be the ‘eldest daughter of the United 
Nations’. Both the Church and the UN have had a universal mission and both 
mediaeval France and the EU have served and promoted that mission. 
As it was promised in the section on sovereignty, we should examine here what 
can be known about the EU’s strategy towards the upper constraints of its authority, 
i.e. towards the two competing universalisms of the human rights regime and the 
transnational market economy. Although that issue cannot be strictly and 
exclusively linked to natural law and human rights, it is most logical to discuss it 
here after all other questions were overviewed. Böröcz argued that they are exactly 
these relations where the EU proves to be most flexible and ingenious. The EU can 
often act as a single entity or thanks to the lack of a coercive machinery also as 
twenty-eight different states according to its own interests. That shifting between 
the single-actor and the Westphalian frames (in Böröcz’s words) lends 
“tremendous amounts of flexibility to the EU in many matters of international 
relations.”455 In the UN where the number of votes matter, the EU uses the 
Westphalian strategy and has 28 votes in the UN General Assembly and also two 
permanent seats in the Security Council (until Britain finally leaves), but there have 
also been attempts to gain a third. “To see the advantages of this arrangement, 
imagine what the world of international diplomacy would be like if the United 
States had not one, but fifty votes in the General Assembly, and not one, but, say, 
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four or five seats in the Security Council of the UN. Add China, Russia, India, etc., 
and the EU’s unique advantage becomes clearly visible.”456 
On the other hand in the transnational market economy, where size matters, the EU 
is ready to play the role of the ‘mighty international bloc’. That strategy was 
demonstrated at the World Trade Organization round in Cancún where the EU as 
a single entity teamed up with the United States and the two of them representing 
10 percent of the global population but over 50 percent of global GDP were facing 
the G21 states exactly showing the reverse figures.457 Thus vis-à-vis the two 
competing universalisms, the EU pursues a “creative shifting between two frames 
of presentation.” That creative switching or ‘oscillating movement between the two 
strategies’458 was partially made possible by the fact that the EU was already born 
and ‘socialised’ in an international system that was gradually taking a 
neomediaeval shape and the strategies of the EU were developed in constant 
dialogue with that international system. That situation is obviously advantageous 
for the EU compared to the position of the heirs of traditional Westphalian 
statehood. Not surprisingly, a flexible and fuzzy neomediaeval entity which is 
capable of switching identities seems rather compatible with and competitive in a 
neomediaeval international setting. Since the EU has been the only large-scale 
entity having been ‘raised’ in that neomediaeval scenario, it also seems to be the 
only one having adapted to it fully.     
Summary and Final Remarks 
This dissertation had a three-fold goal, namely the revision of the model of IR 
neomediaevalism, understanding the role of the European Union in it and 
characterising the constitutional setup of the EU as mixed constitution. These goals 
were achieved by exposing IR neomediaevalism to contemporary historiography 
(First Part) and mediaeval primary sources (Second Part) the latter of which were 
also used to further hone the concept of the EU as mixed constitution (Third Part).  
The most important results of the First Part were the clarification of the major 
weaknesses of ‘standard’ IR neomediaevalism by shedding some light on the 
mediaeval roots of sovereignty and natural law and by questioning the conceptual 
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relevance of the notion of empire in neomediaevalism. In doing so an overview of 
the cultural and the IR ‘legs’ of neomediaevalism were presented and contrasted 
with the recent results of Mediaeval Studies. With the consequent revised model 
of neomediaevalism it was argued in line with standard literature that states’ 
sovereignty was being eroded both by supra-state and sub-state actors and 
tendencies. Regarding the sub-state factors there has been a consensus in the 
literature stating that territorial separatism, transnational terrorism, NGOs and 
urbanisation were the key challenges limiting states. That observation was shared 
by the revised model as well, while considerable changes were introduced 
concerning the supra-state elements. Friedrich’s thesis of two competing 
universalisms at the supra-state level holding the system together was accepted, 
but with a major modification. While the argument that one of these was the 
transnational market economy was incorporated into the new model based on the 
increasing share of the global GDP in the world economy, the nation-state system 
as the other universalism was rebutted. The major reason for that has been that the 
nation-state system was supposed to comprise the mid-level of the model the 
sovereignty of which had to be limited by factors other than itself. Instead the UN 
and its human rights regime was presented as the second competing universalism 
on the grounds that these embodied a secular form of natural law developed earlier 
on the bosom of the Catholic Church and that they had soft power and a universal 
mission similarly to the mediaeval Church. Thus a model was built that had 
transnational market economy and the human rights regime as two competing 
universalism on top and territorial separatism, transnational terrorism, NGOs and 
urbanisation at the sub-state level. Another novelty of the model has been that it 
placed the European Union at the mid-level of states based on the argument that 
the EU was similar to mediaeval kingdoms in many regards. By saying that the 
claim was made that the EU was the only neomediaeval entity at the mid-level of 
the revised model. In the following parts of the dissertation that claim was closely 
scrutinised and the focus was gradually shifted from the international system to the 
constitutional setup of the EU.  
The Second Part, paving the way to the internal examination of the EU, had an 
explanatory force both regarding the neomediaeval international system and the 
constitutional understanding of the EU. This part consisted of the long-due analysis 
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of mediaeval primary sources originally proposed by Wolfers in the 1960s. The 
mediaeval authors chosen were Giles of Rome and Ptolemy of Lucca who were 
active in the exact century (13th) after which most models of IR neomediaevalism 
were designed. They published two treatises of the same name (De regimine 
principum) providing good insight into the language, topics and intellectual 
structures of mediaeval political philosophy. Both Giles and Ptolemy served as 
convincing introduction to understanding the spiritual authority of the Papacy and 
the limits of royal power. Ptolemy also delivered a detailed portrait of the 
mediaeval ideal of independent city-states. Both author’s works were useful in 
applying mediaeval primary sources to question the widely held anachronistic and 
ahistorical notion of general mediaeval anarchy and lawlessness. Giles of Rome 
differentiated between a government based on law and one based on the will of the 
ruler. Even if he promoted the concept of the efficient ruler, he also introduced the 
concept of legality in his tremendously popular mirror of princes which could serve 
as one of the roots for the future concept of the rule of law. Ptolemy of Lucca on 
the other hand seemed to have been the most important pre-humanist author 
reviving the idea of republicanism and rejecting imperialism. As we have seen he 
may even have had an influence on Petrarch. The idea of legality and republicanism 
and the limits of royal power reflected by these works considerably undermined 
the tabloid vision of mediaeval anarchy proposed by some scholars.  
It is also noteworthy that the works of Giles and Ptolemy provided a good insight 
into the intellectual structures of mediaeval Aristotelian political philosophy. The 
way various forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, politeia, tyranny, 
oligarcy and democracy) and modes of rule (regimen regale, regimen despoticum, 
regimen politicum) were interpreted and applied in these works demonstrated well 
the major concerns of the ‘political science’ of the time. They were also helpful in 
demonstrating the fundamental categories in the model of regimen mixtum which 
proved to be useful in the constitutional understanding of the European Union. 
In the Third Part the application of Westphalian categories (separation of powers, 
sovereignty, democracy) to the European Union were questioned through the 
summary of the debate on the EU’s democratic deficit. It was argued that if 
influential scholars of comparative constitutional law (Ackerman) claim that 
Westphalian categories are not appropriate anymore to describe contemporary 
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states, even much less efficient they have to be in making sense of the European 
Union. As a critique of the Westphalian approach three scholars’ innovative takes 
were discussed who all proposed either implicitly (Jacqué) or explicitly (Majone, 
Telò) that the European Union essentially had a mixed constitution. Their concepts 
were reviewed and the model of the EU as regimen mixtum was introduced which 
modified the earlier versions on two major points. On the one hand instead of 
keeping the mediaeval labels of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy on the forms 
of government, the European Commission, the European Council and the European 
Parliament were interpreted as bureaucratic, diplomatic and democratic elements. 
On the other hand, relying on the mediaeval literature of the Second Part, it was 
highlighted that modes of rule should be equally important as forms of government 
in a neomediaeval model of regimen mixtum. Therefore, based on Weiler, 
supranational, international and infranational modes were incorporated into the 
model. It has to be pointed out that while those political scientists (Majone, Telò) 
who discovered the EU’s mixed constitutional nature did not elaborate on it in a 
neomediaeval analytical framework, those who did build such a framework (e.g. 
Zielonka, Friedrichs) were unaware of the concept of the mixed government and 
forced the idea of empire or universalism on the EU.459 An intended contribution 
of the present thesis was to bridge that gap by collecting and revising the works 
relevant for a neomediaeval understanding of the European Union.   
As a conclusion of the dissertation it was argued that the modes of rule and the 
forms of representation could gain relevance in the European Union again for two 
reasons. On the one hand, Majone was right about the primitive stage of 
development of the ‘European’ society and demos which reproduced earlier 
constitutional structures. On the other hand, the argument was presented that the 
sovereignty-eroding nature of the neomediaeval international system has also 
contributed to that result. It was also the abundance of power resulted by the 
disappearance of external constraints of absolutist royal or state authority that 
contributed to the concept of modern sovereignty and the functionalist idea of the 
separation of powers. With the re-emergence of external limits on authority the 
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 An interesting fact: Santa Maria Novella where Ptolemy wrote some of his works and the 
European University Institute where Jacqué, Weiler and Majone discussed the EU as mixed 
constitution were both established in Florence.  
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relevance of the forms of representation and modes of rule are again on the rise as 
the example of the European Union demonstrates it well.     
On a final note, it is important to highlight that the dissertation proposed a new 
topic for research by incorporating the concept of mixed constitution into 
neomediaevalism. However, that naturally resulted in leaving more questions open 
than this thesis could possibly answer and therefore it is easy to propose future 
directions of research and new fields of study. Enriching the analysis of mediaeval 
political literature from the perspective of IR seems to be an inexhaustible task. 
With a special focus on the literature of mixed government, including authors such 
as Nicole Oresme, John of Paris or Engelbert of Admont, a better understanding of 
the concept and its present implications could be achieved. Applying all six boxes 
of the Aristotelian scheme to the European Union and, for instance, detecting the 
interests of capital under the conceptual frames of oligarchy could reasonably link 
the political and the economic analysis of the EU. Fascinating these aspects may 
be, their inclusion would have widened the scope of the dissertation to the point of 
dysfunctionality. Confronting IR neomediaevalism – in the words of Holsinger – 
with the ‘historical veracity of the Middle Ages’ and finding the role of the 
European Union in a neomediaeval setting were accomplished. These were the 
primary objectives of this work.    
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